Scientific personnel of the Metallurgical Lab, Chicago.

July 17, 1947

David L. Hill
Robert J. Maurer
Francis L. Friedman
David B. Hall
Albert Cahn,Jr.
Hubert E. Kubitschek
Alexander Langsdorf,Jr.
Robert L. Purbrick
Norman Goldstein
B. Roswell Russell
William Karush
Ethaline H. Cortelyou
Alfred Pfanstiehl
Katherine Way
Norman F, Modine
Mary Burke
Mildred C. Ginsberg
Robert L. Platzman
Sherman Fried
Hoylande Young
Leo A. Ohlinger
Ernest J. Wilkins,Jr.
Wilfred Rall
George R. Carlson
William Rubinson
Mark s. Fred
John Crawford
Ellis P. Steinberg
Sheffield S. Friedman
Edgar F. Westrum,Jr.
Earl K. Hyde
Ralph E. Telford
Lawrence B. Magnusson
Paul R. O’Conner
Truman P. Kohman
D.C. Stewart
Larned B. Asprey
Walter J. Grundhauser
C. Ladd Prosser
Miriam P. Finkel
Joseph D. Teresi
David S. Anthony
Horace O. France
Mary M. Dailey
Kenneth S. Cole
Austin M. Brues
Eric L. Simmons
Margaret H. Rand
Robert J. Moon
Marguerite N. Swift
Jasper B. Jeffries
George Saihla (Saihlo)
William P. Norris
Charles W. Hagen
George A. Sacher
Marietta C. Moore
Ralph E. Lapp
Robert S. Mulliken
Eugene P. Wigner
George S. Monk
Leo Szilard
J.J. Nielsson
William F.H. Zachariasen
Francis R. Shonka
John A. Simpson
Walter Bartky
John P. Howe,Jr.
Frank G. Foote

TSEDO)

1 8 JUL 1947

Meteorological Research and Development
Responsibilities in the Air Forces

Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.
Attention: Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research
and Development (for Major General
Curtis E. LeMay)

1. With reference to the 26 March 1947 letter from the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, on the above subject, to the Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, immediate action was taken to activate a new Laboratory having the responsibilities of meteorological research and development, and upper air research, within the Electronic Subdivision of the Engineering Division.

2. In view of the close relationship and interdependence of research in meteorology and research in electromagnetic and compressional wave propagation, action is being taken to reorganize the present Applied Propagation Laboratory of Watson Laboratories into the Atmospheric Laboratory, and expand its functions to include research and development in meteorology and related geophysical fields. This action is desirable not only because of the close relationship of the research involved, but also because it furnishes a going organization to absorb the new responsibilities which were delegated to AMC without the transfer of a going organization to carry them out. At this point it is considered appropriate to point out that the Air Materiel Command is in a position where, for all practical purposes, a meteorological research and development organization is being organized from the ground up, that it will be some time, possibly as much as a year, before a really active part can be played in this work. Considering the importance and extent of the field of research outlined in the letter referred to above, the twenty civilian position vacancies transferred for this work can at best be considered as only a nucleus of the eventual organization that will be needed in this field. The immediate problem, however, will be to find qualified personnel to fill the seventeen remaining of the twenty vacancies transferred, this in itself being no simple problem in view of the worldwide scarcity of highly qualified research per-

Ltr to DAAF, DC/AS for Res & Dev., "Meteorological Res & Dev Responsibili in the Air Forces", dated

sonnel in meteorology, and the present keen competition for these personnel.

3. This Command previously asked for 150 top-flight physicists in connection with Upper Air Research. This request was disapproved and is mentioned at this time because the requirement still exists not only in connection with Upper Air Research to meet overall AMC requirements pertaining to Guided Missiles and associated research and development, but in connection with the responsibilities assigned the Air Materiel Command under paragraph 2 d of the referenced letter.

4. At the present time the Electronic Subdivision has committed approximately $1,[illegible] during fiscal year 1947 (including Budget Project 690 funds mentioned under paragraph [illegible] of the referenced letter) on Atmospheric Research. Approximately [illegible] additional has been committed on [illegible] and [illegible] work which is closely allied to the atmospheric field.

5. The amount of funds estimated as required to discharge these responsibilities during the fiscal year 1948 is $[illegible]. Although the justification of Project 690 - Meteorological and Climatological Research and Development, is not listed in the 1 February 1947 revised issue of the Engineering Division Research and Development Program, Fiscal Year 1948, it is listed in the "Justification of Estimates, F.Y. 1948, for Air Corps, Army" (dated [illegible]), page [illegible] of the report, identification number [illegible]. [illegible] this amount of funds will be [illegible] by the Assistant Chief of Air Staff -4, and made available for accomplishing the research and development in meteorology and related geophysical fields.

6. With further reference to funds required for the F.Y. 1949 Project 690-41, Atmospheric Research and applied scientific research of the upper atmosphere, a total sum of $[illegible] has been specified on page 260 of the Engineering Division "Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1949 Research & Development Program", dated 20 May 1947. The amount of funds asked will be required to accomplish the work included in the responsibilities assigned to the Air Materiel Command, and it is recommended that adequate support be given to obtain the amounts needed for the Fiscal Years 1948 and 1949.

1 Incl. - cy AFDRE-SA
ltr 3-26-47, same subj.

N. F. TWINING
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding

cc to AC/AS-4

??????   18 Jul 1947

Meteorological Research and Development
Responsibilities of the Air Force

Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Washington 25 D. C.
Attention: Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research
And Development (for Major General
Curtis R. LeMay)

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sonnel in meteorology, and the present keen competition for those personnel.

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4. At the present time the Electronic Subdivision has committed approximately $1,600,000 during fiscal year 1947 (including Budget Project 680 funds mentioned under paragraph 2 of the referenced letter) on Atmospheric Research. Approximately $500,000 additional has been committed on compressional and electromagnetic wave research which is closely allied to the atmospheric field.

5. The amount of funds estimated as required to examine these responsibilities during the fiscal year 1948 is $1,900,000. Although the justification of Project 680 – meteorological and climatological Research and Development, is not listed in the 3 February 1947 revised Issue of the Engineering Division Research and Development Program, Fiscal Year 1948, it is listed in the "Justification of Estimates, F.Y. 1948, for Air Corps, Army (about May –47 – 1-20-47) page 194 of the report, identification number 7-5768, AF. It is planned that this amount of funds will be defended by the Assistant Chief of Air Staff –4 and made available for accomplishing the research and development in meteorology and related geophysical fields.

6. With further reference to funds requested for the F.Y. 1949 Project 680-11, Atmospheric Research and applied scientific research of the upper atmosphere, a total sum of $6,000,000 has been specified on page 260 of the Engineering Division "Justification of Estimates, Fiscal Year 1949 Research and Development Program", dated 20 May 1947. The amount of funds asked will be required to accomplish the work included in the responsibilities assigned to the Air Materiel Command, And it is recommended that adequate support be given to obtain the amounts need for the Fiscal Years 1948 and 1949.

1 Include. – cy AFDRE-2A
Ltr 3-26-47, same subj.

N. F. TWINING
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding

CC to AC/???

No. [redacted] – 9 July 1947

By Auth. A. C. of S., G-2
Date 22 July 1947
Initials J. J. [illegible]

WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of A. C. of S., G-2

[illegible] SECRETARY'S OF

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

F 0662
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[redacted]

[redacted]

Received July 16, 1995

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RE-CLASSIFIED AS [illegible] [illegible] AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND HAS BEEN UPGRADED AS ABOVE [illegible] WITH A "NEED TO KNOW" BASIS. ONLY THOSE AUTHORIZED PERSONS WITH MAJIC ACCESS MAY HAVE ACCESS. [illegible] SCHEDULE TO COMMENCE ONLY WITH AN APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL E.O. WITH APPROVAL OF U.S. MAJESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

By authority of: Lt. General John A. Samford, Dir. NSA

Approved by: Allen Dulles, Director, CIA

Date: [illegible] 1, 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
ULTRA

J. C. S. FILE COPY

C.C.S. FILE [illegible]

[redacted]

INTERPLANETARY PHENOMEMNON UNIT SUMMARY

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT File ref. 001947122-A.1206

1. The extraordinary recovery of fallen airborne objects in the state of New Mexico, between 4 July - 6 July 1947: This Summary was prepared by Headquarters Interplanetary Phenomenon Unit, Scientific and Technical Branch, Counterintelligence Directorate, as requested by A.C. of S., G-2, at the expressed order of Chief of Staff.

2. At 2332 MST, 3 July 47, radar staions in east Texas and White Sands Proving Ground, N.M., tracked two unidentified aircraft until both dropped off radar. Two crash sites have been located close to the WSPG. Site LZ-1 was located at a ranch near Corona, approx. 75 miles northwest of the town of Roswell. Site LZ-2 was located approx. 20 miles southeast of the town of Socorro, at Lat. 33-40-31, Long. 106-28-29, with Oscura Peak being the geographic reference point.

3. The AST personnel were mainly interested in LZ-2 as this site contained the majority of structural detail of the craft's airframe, propulsion and navigation technology. The recovery of five bodies in a damaged escape cylinder, precluded an investigation at LZ-1.

4. On arrival at LZ-2, personnel assessed the finds as not belonging to any aircraft, rocket, weapons, or balloon test that are normally conducted from surrounding bases. First reports indicated that the first crash investigators from Roswell AAF that LZ-1 was the remains of a AAF top secret MOGUL balloon project. When scientists

[redacted]

[redacted]

Need names

from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory arrived to inspect IZ-2, it became apparent to all concerned that what had crashed in the desert was something out of this world.

5. Interviews with radar operators and officers from the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Fort Monmouth, N.J., [illegible] were tracking these objects on-and-off since June 29 from Station "A", all indicated that these targets had periodically remained stationary for minutes at a time, then would resume thier original course, flying from the southeast to northwest. SCEL antennas had locked onto a flight of three objects on 3 July and lost them around 2330 MST on 4 July (a V-2 was scheduled for launch which is why SCEL Station "A" was able to do a track). It has been learned that at least six radar stations in east Texas (see detailed report in attchment A), and radar stations at Alamogordo AAF and Kirtland AAF, had also picked up these objects on the 4th as well. Using topographical maps and triangularization, a last known position and bearing was calculated which helped search parties to locate the general area. Detachment 3 of the 9393rd Technical Services Unit, assigned to Alamogordo AAF, was responsible for the locating and transportation of the large sections of the craft.

Greer

6. A special radiobiological team accompanied by a SED and security detail from Sandia Base under orders from Colonel S. V. /HASBROUCK/ USA, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, secured the immediate area surrounding the crash site. Select scientists from

[redacted]

[redacted]

the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, most notably DR. /J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER./was identified at LZ-2 as well as other members. Among PAPERCLIP specialist identified at LZ-2 were DR. /WERNHER VON BRAUN/(Fort Bliss); DR. /ERNST STEINHOFF/(AMC); and DR. /HUBERTUS STRUGHOLD/(AEROMEDICAL LAB, RANDOLPH FIELD).

7. Because of the stringent security measures that were in place at both crash sites, the team was not able to gain access to the Explain? several locations were wreckage and bodies are being held. CIC member of the team was able to learn that several bodies were taken to the hospital at Roswell AAF and others to either Los Alamos, Wright Field, Patterson AAF, and Randolph Field for security reasons. It is believed that this dispersion was on the orders of General Thomas Handy, Fourth Army Hdqrs. Remains of the powerplant were taken to Alamogordo AAF and Kirtland AAF. Structural debris and assorted items were taken to AMC, Wright Field. Other remains were transported across the WSPG to the storage facilities of the NRL. All this was accomplished by 1730 MST 7 July.

8. On 7 July, Lt. General Nathan Twining arrived at Alamogordo AAF for a secret meeting with AAF Chief of Staff Spaatz and to view recovered remains of craft from LZ-2. On 8 July, Twining visited Kirtland AAF to inspect parts recovered from powerplant. On 9 July, Twining and staff flew to WSPG to inspect pieces of craft being stored there and on 10 July, made inspection of R&D facilities at Alamogordo and then returned to Wright Field. It is believed that Twining and staff is preparing a detailed report of both incidents and briefings later to follow. It is also the belief of CIC that General Eisenhower will see a showing of recoveries sometime in [illegible] late August this year. The President was given a limited briefing

[redacted]

[redacted]

at the Pentagon by AC/S AAF General Hoyt Vandenberg on 10 July. FBI interest was curtailed and access to stored craft at Los Alamos was denied upon request of Deputy COS Lt. General Collins. Inquiries to bases involved was restricted by General Vandenberg during the duration of recovery efforts. All teletype, telephone and radio transmissions were monitored for any disclosures of the finds. To maintain secrecy of site LZ-2, the CO of Roswell AAF was authorized to give a brief press release to local paper in which 8th AF Hdqrs. promptly denied rumors that the Army had flying saucers in their possession which effectively killed press interest. Civilians who might have seen or handled some of the wreckage, or viewed bodies were detained under the McNab law until all remaing evidence was secured in restricted bases. Witnesses were debriefed by CIC and warned of the consequences of talking to the press. So far, secrecy seems to be working.

9. All civilian and military personnel involved with the recovery operations had "need to know" access with proper security clearances. Though several MPs suffered nervous breakdowns resulting in one committing suicide, MP details from Alamogordo and Kirtland performed security functions very well. Ground personnel from Sandia experienced some form of contamination resulting in the deaths of 3 technicians. The status of the fourth technician is unknown. Autopsies are scheduled to determine cause of death. CIC has made appropriate security file entries into dossiers with cross references for future reviews.

I think the dossier
should be [illegible]
[illegible]

Liaison Committee Chairman
apprised on 28th.

10. With the pending approval of JAMES FORRESTAL as new Secretary of Defense, it is certain that he will be briefed on certain aspects of the discoveries. The only Cabinet member to date that may know of the details is Secretary of State Marshall. It has become known to CIC that some of the recovery operation was shared with Representative

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

/JOHN F. KENNEDI,/Massachusetts Democrat elected to Congress in 46. Son of JOSEPH P. KENNEDI, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. KENNEDI had limited duty as naval officer assigned to Naval Intelligence during war. It is believed that information was obtained from source in Congress who is close to Secretary for Air Force.

11. As to the bodies recovered at LZ-2, it appeared that none of the five crew members survived entry into our atmosphere due to unknown causes./DR. DETLEV BRONK/has been asked to assist in the autopsy of one well preserved cadaver to be done by MAJOR CHARLES B. REA. NC From what descriptions the team was able to learn and from photographs taken by O2 intelligence photographers, the occupants appear in most respects human with/some anatomical differences/in the head, eyes, hands and feet. how? They have a slight build about five feet tall, with grayish-pink skin color. They have no hair on their bodies and clothed with a tight fitting flight suit that appears to be fire proof (some of the bodies looked as if they had been burned on head and and hands). Their overall stature reminds one of/young children./It is believed that there were male and female genders present, but was hard to distinguish.

what bodies? 12. The most disturbing aspect of this investigation was-- there were other bodies found not far from LZ-1 that looked as if they had been disected how? as you would a frog. It is not known if army field surgens had performed exploratory surgery on these bodies. Animal parts? were reportedly discovered inside the craft at LZ-2 but this cannot be confirmed. The team has reserved judgement on this issue. cattle, sheep killed

13. Our assessment of this investigation rests on two assumptions: 1) Either this discovery was an elaborate and well orchestrated hoax (maybe by the Russians), or; 2) Our country has played host to

[redacted]

[redacted]

beings from another planet.

14. Until more data can be acquired from other intelligence sources, it is the opinion of the team, that the investigation be expanded to include sources that might elucidate other possibilities not found by contemporary science. It is also recommended that appropriate budgets be allocated to facilitate future assignments that the unit may be called upon to perform. Until further orders, this investigation will continue.

Copy

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
ANDREWS FIELD
WASHINGTON 20, D. C.

12 Aug 1947

SAC 311 (12 Aug 47)

SUBJECT: Control for Restricted Data

TO: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: AC/AS-1, Air Provost Marshall

1. A representative of the AC/AS-2, Eighth Air Force, during a recent visit to this Headquarters, requested comment as to the feasibility of establishing a central control for all Restricted Data on file in that Headquarters. Such procedure appears contrary to the spirit of AAF Letter 46-24, 10 March 1947, Par. 24(1).

2. Comments are requested to be used as a basis of a reply to the Eighth Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

ALAN MARGRAU
CWO, USA
Asst Adj Gen

SAC WANTED TO KEEP CERTAIN AAF PERSONNEL FROM ACCESSING THE OUT-GOING MESSAGES FROM ROSWELL AAF TO SAC HEADQURTERS THAT WOULD IDENTIFY AAF PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRANSPORT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL TO WRIGHT FIELD, AND THE PERSONNEL WHO WERE REPONSIBLE FOR DISPOSITION OF WRECKAGE AND BODIES FOUND NEAR SOCORRO AND CORONA, NEW MEXICO.

2 SEP 47

Research and Development
Laboratory

Analytical Report

TSRKD-QR/LC

2 September

SUBJECT: *Flying Saucer*

TO:
Commanding General
Air Material Command
Wright Field
Dayton, Ohio
ATTN: AC/AS-2
Brig. Gen. C.P. Cabell
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
Washington 25, D. C.

1. As requested by your letter of 16 July 1947 this office has produced its conclusions on the manufacture, function and possible origin of the above referenced subject. On-site preliminary study data provided by personnel of T-2 and T-1, search and recovery team of the AFSWP, 'Paper Clip' personnel, select personnel of the Army Air Forces Scientific Adviso Group and personnel of the Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Committee was utilized in the construction of our analyses.

2. The analyses of the Office of Research and Development are:

a. Aerodynamics and design evaluation studies performed by the Aircraft, Power Plant and Propeller Laboratories of Engineering Divisi T-3 personnel, has concluded that some nation has reached a stage of fligh development in which the present ideas are entirely obsolete.

b. A notable advance in reducing drag and high-lift, wing load is evident in the "cleaned up" refinement in the extreme. The absence of rivetting and surface over-lapping indicates a "simplistic" concept that confronts our technology to match the "careful and well-considered compromises in respect to weight, aerodynamic refinement, and design."

c. The designers have managed to offset Bernoulli's theorem that allows the "total pressure in a flow" to be less at all points; we can liken this to the concept of 'conservation of energy' and thus negating friction losses, which would dissipate heat.

d. The airfoil design of the circular wing is similar to th NACA 230 series with the exception to the wing plan form and thickness rang requirements. The parasite drag appears to be controlled by the refinement the design and the elimination of protuberances. The induced drag lessens wi the circular span inversely with the low aspect-ratio of the wing.

e. The fuselage/hull appears to fall into the seaplane type in concept by manifesting excellent hydrodynamic characteristics of low "porpoising" tendacies. Conventional surface controls are absent in the wing and cabin portions of the recovered sections though what appears to be tabs or flaps are identified. Because there are no vertical or horizontal stabilizers on the craft, there are no fore-and-aft positions of the wing relative to the fuselage/hull. Wing incidence seems to be pre-selected via an in-flight trim computer to reduce drag attitude when the wing is at the angle of attack required at high speed and provide stability to lift the weight of the craft.

Basic ltr fr R&D, to CG, AMC, ATTN HQ, AAF, WASH. D.C., AC/AS-2, MAJIC EYES, subj "Flying Saucer".

f. A general description of the craft is presented:

(1) Metallic skin of a high polished finish. A comparison of AISI B1112 steels indicates that the metals used to construct the craft exceed structure, chemical composition and mechanical properties currently under development. Metal specimens were subjected to AISI 8620, AISI 3140, AISI 4140, AISI E4340, AISI 5140, AISI 8640, AISI E52100, and AISI 430, 410 and 347 machining tests with negative results.

(2) Craft designed for high altitude flight. Automatic exhaust orifices were identified. A gyro-controlled wing stabiliser apparently maintains craft in a hover mode.

(3) Power plant may consist of a spherical reactor (hydrogen isotobe type) connected to propulsion motors.

(4) 100 ft. in diameter with central section approximately 30 ft. Central cabin may have three flight decks: top level for flight control; central section for equipment and lower section for power plant and landing gear. Circular wing may have rotating section and adjustable leading edge.

(5) Top (dome) may have the ability to recede into central section for high performance operations. Observation blisters are retract to provide observation top and bottom of wing.

(6) Construction is based on a 6:1 ratio.

(7) Flight instruments and controls are activated by optical wave guide fibers similar to glass rods except they are flexible and have a plastic cladding wrap. All functions may be operated by touch sensitive or texture sensing stimuli. Instruments are covered by a plastic plate and seem to be color coded.

(8) Craft may have all weather navigation capability to allow 'blind flying'. Possible television viewing used.

Research and Development
Laboratory

Analytical Report IJXAD-2B/AO

2 September

SUBJECT Flying Saucer

TO: Commanding General
Air Materiel Command
Wright Field
Dayton, Ohio
ATTN: AC/A3-g
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Washington 25, D. C.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

19 SEP 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Examination of Unidentified Disc-like Aircraft near Military Installations in the State of New Mexico: A Preliminary Report

1. Pursuant to the recent world events and domestic security problems within the Atomic Energy Commission, the intelligence reports of so-called "Flying Saucers" and the intrusion of ~~unknown aircraft~~ over the most secret defense installations, a classified intelligence project is warranted. The National Security Act of 1947 established a Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council. When the Director of Central Intelligence assumes his official responsibilities, the National Intelligence Authority is abolished the files pertaining to unidentified aircraft sightings, intelligence personnel and funds of the Central Intelligence Group will be transferred to the Agency.

2. The recovery of unidentified planform aircraft in the state of New Mexico on 6 July 1947, ten miles northwest of Oscura Peak, and a debri field 75 miles northwest of the Army's 509th Atomic Bomb Group, Roswell Army Air Field, is confirmed. A subsequent capture of another similar craf 30 miles east of the Army's Alamogordo Army Air Field on 5 July 1947, has convinced the Army Air Forces S-2, Army G-2 and Navy ONI, that the craft and wreckage are not of US manufacture.

3. Until a clear directive from the President is issued, there can be no co-ordinated scientific examination of the objects in question. Currently, the core material is being secured at the Naval Research Laboratory hanger facilities at the White Sands Proving Ground, the Sandia Base facilities (Armed Forces Special Weapons Project), Alamogordo AAF and the Aero Medical Research facilities at Randolph Field, Texas.

4. The research scientists at the Air Forces Research and Development Center, Wright Field, are utilizing their test facilities and a new biological laboratory in an on-going study program. The offices of the JRDB, FBI and the State Department are assisting the Joint Intelligence Committee in acquiring any intelligence from MI5 and MI6 on possible Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft/missile research and development tests.

24

MAJIC EYES ONLY

Total pages--19

Copy No. MJ-

No. 0001 - 19 September 1947

By Auth. [redacted]
Date 2 JULY 1947
Initials [redacted]

Approved

Harry Truman

Vannevar Bu

September 24, 1947

Save keeping
for further study.

A.C. Wedemeyer

NOTE: No one, without express permission from the President, may disseminate the information contained in this Report or communicate it to any unauthorized person not possessing MAJI SECURITY CLEARANCE.

Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every precaution to avoid compromising sources, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who have a "need to know" in order to discharge their responsibility

No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of such information foreign intelligence agencies who might exploit for reasons of endangering national security interests.

Foreign powers not amicable to to strategic national security interests will attempt to exploit such information in the possession of the United States Government. They do not know and must not be permitted to learn, either the degree of our accomplishment or the particular source from which any technological advances [redacted]d in this report.

MAJIC EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: MISSION ASSESSMENT OF RECOVERED LENTICULAR AERODYNE OBJECTS AND IMPLICATIONS IN [illegible] PARTS.

PART I [illegible]

PART II--TECHNICAL EVALUATION

PART III--SCIENTIFIC PROBABILITIES

PART IV--POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

PART V--NATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURES

[illegible] [redacted]

[illegible] [redacted]

[illegible] [redacted]

[illegible] [redacted]

MEMBERS OF MISSION

Captain Charles [illegible] Buchanan
Colonel A. Robert Ginsburgh
Captain Richard [illegible] Glass
Carlisle H. Humelsine
Major General Stephen [illegible] Chamberlin
Major General George McDonald
Rear Admiral Paul F. Lee
Major General Leslie R. Groves
Brigadier General E.K. Wright
James S. Lay, Jr.
Thomas J. Lynch
Lieutenant General Nathan F. Twining

CONTRIBUTING MEMBERS:

Dr. Theodore von Karman
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
Dr. James H. Doolittle
Professor Albert Einstein

19 SEP 47
24

MAJIC [redacted]

GENERAL STATEMENT

2. On 24 June 1947, there went out over this country's newswires, with simultaneous broadcast by nationwide radio, a most sensational story. A civilian pilot of the name of Kenneth Arnold, a businessman of Boise, Idaho, a salesman of fire-fighting equipment, while flying his personal plane on [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] 9200 feet over a mountain range [illegible] Washington had seen nine disc-shaped, tailess, silvery-colored objects or craft, flipping and flashing through clear sky. The aircraft, if they were such, flew like a saucer would if skipped across the water. The aircraft emitted white flashes from their surfaces. They flew in formation as if linked together between Mt. Adams and Mt. Rainier in the Cascade Mountains. Their speed has been estimated to be in excess of 1,000 MPH. The pilot was questioned at length by Army Air Force intelligence officers and FBI agent. So far, he has stuck to his story and refuses to comment further regarding his sighting. Analysis of his report conducted by the Intelligence Department of the Army Air Forces Air Materiel Command, suggests that some kind of aircraft may have prompted the report as given by the pilot.

3. Another sighting similar to this one was reported

MA[redacted] ONLY

2

the same day by a Portland prospector by the name of Fred
JOHNSON
Johnson. According to interrogation report Mr. Johnson claims to have observed six to nine disc-shaped objects flying rapidly over the Cascade Mountains. He watched the objects through a small telescope which he used in his prospecting. The report states that he noticed the compass hand oscillated wildly from side to side, indicating some kind of magnetic disturbance was [illegible] associated with the objects.

4. On 27 June, according to interrogation of of AA[illegible] [illegible] conducted [illegible] formation of discs flew past his aircraft over Lake Meade [illegible] [redacted] the pilot [illegible] that what he saw was [illegible] way conventional aircraft.

5. Numerous sightings over military installations in the state of New Mexico were investigated by Army and Navy intelligence officers. Reports were forwarded to Military Intelligence Division for follow up. [illegible] inquiries produced [illegible] evidence that Army and Navy aeronautical research programs [illegible] responsible since all such test flights are carefully coordinated with government agencies and civilian contractors.

6. Up until 4 July, sightings have been reported, not only in the United States, [illegible] Germany, Holland, Paraguay, Scandinavia, Greece, and by ships at sea.

7. Of the 1,200 sighting reports collected since 1942, approximately 200 incidents have proven to be unknown craft operating at speeds in excess of 1200 MPH and at times attaining

altitudes u[illegible] miles or more above the earth. A comparison was made with Swedish Defence officials of the reported operating characteristics [illegible] a se[illegible] intelligence liaison officia[illegible] continuing vio[illegible] of restricted air space over sensitive Swedish military bases has not indicated any direct [illegible] to be tangible evidence thus far that would sugges[illegible] are the [illegible]

MAJIC EYES ONLY

PART I PROJECT WHITE HOT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (PRELIMINARY)

LANDING ZONE NO.1

Socorro, New Mexico--The unidentified lenticular-shaped aerodyne which has been designated ULAT-1, has been evaluated as a non-air breathing aircraft of unknown origin. Totally lacking conventional wing, fuselage, nacelle, control, and fuel systems strongly indicates it is not Russian. Consultation with Paperclip specialists concurr. Aerodynamic features exhibited in ULAT-1 represents a very high degree of engineering and sophistication not seen in this country. Dimensional homogeneity study cannot explain how this craft sustains load and lift factors necessary for flight. The power plant does not even remotely resemble any conventional type now in use. Lacking any discernible intake or exhaust features, it is the opinion of AMC and ONR that this craft was designed to operate outside of the earth's atmosphere. The unconventional conclusions reached by members of this fact finding mission remain tentative at this time. Some members expressed the view that ULAT-1 may be the product of an advanced culture from another planet that is much older than ours and has utilized the science and intellect for interplanetary space travel. It is not precisely known if the occupants purposely had the objective of exploration out of curiousity, or with the intent of surveying for other reasons. So far, no hostile action or intent has been observed since they made their

MAJIC EYES ONLY

~~MAJIC EYES ONLY~~

presence known. Given the fact that our atomic bomb tests, atmospheric exploration with rockets, and [redacted]ed in New Mexico, could have precipitated the events that led to the incident and subsequent actions taken by the military.

Operating under the assumption that the fallen object was a long-range Russian reconnaissance platform collecting aerial photographic intelligence data, military intelligence personnel were instructed to secure the craft, debris and all occupants as rapidly as possible. Concerns over possible exposure to civilians of unknown biological and chemical agents dictated the quarantine measures taken. Radiation hazards were assumed and appropriate protective measures were taken as well.

In the interest of National Security priorities it was necessary to detain civilian witnesses for interrogation to satisfy intelligence requiements, and quash rumors that could alert potential espionage agents known to be in the vicinity.

Several bodies were discovered. Because on-site medical personnel were unsure of the physiological and histological make up of the occupants, special preparations and preservation methods were employed. Autopsy information obtained so far suggests that the occupants mimic the featuers associated with ORIENTALS, [redacted] Outwardly, they appear human-like with but one exception, autopsy notes mention a rarely observed [redacted]s present which supports the premise that these beings originate from another planet.

~~MAJIC EYES ONLY~~

PART II TECHNICAL EVALUATION (PRELIMINARY)

ULAT-1

1. Upon close examination of the exterior surfaces of the craft's fuselage, metallurgists found the skin to be of a ferrous metal white in color. The metal exhibits all the characteristics of high-grade steel. It was determined that the steel was cold-formed and heat-treated. Tensile stength was estimated in excess of 150,000 pounds per square inch. Shear tests give the metal a durability rating above 175,000 pounds per square inch, making this fuselage extremely strong and heat resistant.

2. Static and pressure flow simulations were impressive. The low profile ratio of 6-to-1 gives the aerodyne a great advantage in overcoming the restrictions of the boundary layer effect in high performance operations.

3. Spar flanges are constructed in unusual kinematic design which is believed to allow strain relief at supersonic speeds. There were no visible signs of plate-stiffeners. There were no fasteners, weld, rivets, or fittings, holding the fuselage together.

4. Lack of wings, flaps, stabilizers, and surface control features, suggests that the craft is a lifting body.

5. There are no air intakes or exhaust.

6. There are no cables

7. There are no identifiable electronics (wiring, ignition, lights, instrument, compartment, engine, motors, vacuum tubes, solenoids, generators, heaters, etc.)

8. The power plant (severely damaged) [redacted] neutronic engine. [redacted] detected. Heavy water and deuterium (light hydrogen) elements appear to be the primary ignitor. A series of coils and heavy magnets connected to the neutranic engine via an oddly arranged group of electrodes (metal not yet identified) appears to be the motive force. One small motor was examined. It is encased in a pure aluminum capsule directly underneath the main air compartment. There is a small exhaust aperture attached that has what can be only described as an helicoid mechanism [redacted] The auxilliary motor may be articulated.

9. Navigation and engine contols may be activated by tactle manipulation. Viewing may have been achieved by a form of television imagery. Symbolic notation appears to be the form of flight and control indicators. Flat panels of unknown metal has been suggested as a device associated with the operation of the aerodyne was discovered and analyzed. It's mode of operation and purpose is unknown.

The absence of provisions, berthing compartments and storage areas, suggest the notion that this craft may be a short range reconnaissance platform. The only recognizable

features examined were five [illegible] [illegible] ments with arm [illegible]
fashioned for vertical and [illegible] [illegible] flight. A leaf [illegible]
back of a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[redacted] [illegible] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mode of operation is believed to be instrumentation and suggests that the aerodyne from reconstruction of available wreckage [redacted] biosensory and optical stimuli for these reasons:

a. Absence of indicator lights;

b. Absence of any circular dials;

c. Absence of linear dials, or moving pointers;

Absence of counters;

e. Absence of scopes;

f. No mechanical signal indicators.

12. There were no identifiable control types found among the assortment of artifacts that would indicate the operation of the propulsion unit was manually activated. [illegible] knobs, push-buttons, toggle switches, levers, balls, handwheels, handcranks, or foot-pedals were observed in interior space of the flight cabin.

13. The apparent lack of additional clothing and equipment reinforces the belief that the occupants were engaged in a purely exploratory flight.

14. It is not presently known if electromagnetic radiation effects from the power plant had contributed to pilot error or death before impact. If inadequate shielding was the primary cause of pilot error, [redacted]s detected.

15. It is believed by some of the crash inspection personnel that sudden decompression and change in atmospheric pressure may have contributed to pilot error. Clothing removed from occupants do not resemble any pressure suits currently

being tested by the Army or the Navy for extreme altitude experiments. Since temperature and humidity factors for the occupants are unknown, it is impossible to determine if decompression and temperature change affected circulatory and dexterity functions. Although it is believed the occupants may have been overcomed by some yet to be discovered pollutant or noxious fumes originating inside the craft.

16. Rotation or possibly rapid oscillation could have been a contributing factor in pilot error. It is not known if organic effects played a part either since since medical data is non-existant in which to make any judgement as to the exact cause of death or machine failure.

17. The most probable cause put forward to date for the crash is believed to be excessive acceleration combined with steep descent. The seating arrangement was transversely designed about the vertical axis of the occupants in a positive direction of flight. The panels removed from the craft resemble the ones taken from the occupants, suggesting a symbionic relationship between operator and the functions of the aerodyne's operation. A very tentative working theory was expressed by the scientific members of the inspection team that pilot-aerodyne interaction may occur via electronic-nonword symbols percieved through the tactile manipulation of the fingers, feeding impulses to the brain and visa versa. All of which may suggest a non-inert quality of the materials existent as being a product of artificial intelligence.

18. The following elements were analyzed and found to exist in the small neutronic power plant that was found inside ULAT-1:

a. UF6 in metallic form;

b. hydrogen-fluoride gas;

c. water and uranium tetrafluoride;

d. powdered magnesium and potassium chlorate;

e. metal similar to lead with a chocolate brown color;

f. U-235 in metallic form;

g. plastic-like material similar to NE 102;

h. Beryllium;

i. pure aluminium;

h. Thorium isotope material;

j. Plutonium powder.

19. Scientists from Los Alamos and Sandia Base were alarmed that the power plant could possibly function as a bomb if the elements described above were processed in similar fashion as was done for the lens and shotgun detonators. This originally was the first conclusion. After further evaluation, it was determined that since no recognizable firing circuits were identified, the threat of detonation did not exist.

20. The only evidence of circuitry found on the motor was thin plastic-like sheets fashioned like platters emossed on the exterior of the spherically-shaped casing coated by a thin film of pure silver. Under high power magnification it was observed a series of fine grid-like lines intersecting groups of dots arranged in circular patterns.

PART III SCIENTIFIC PROBABILITIES

1. Based on all available evidence collected from recovered exhibits currently under study by AMC, AFSWP, NEPA, AEC, ONR, NACA, JRDB, RAND, USAAF SAG, and MIT, are deemed extraterrestrial in nature. This conclusion was reached as a result of comparisons of artifacts [redacted] discovery in 1941. The technology is outside the scope of US science, even that of German rocket and aircraft development.

2. Interplanetary space travel is possible provided adequate funding, necessary resources are made available, and national interest is piqued.

3. Our solar system is not unique. Chances are favorable for intelligent life on other planets notwithstanding similar development not unlike our own.

4. Being that our culture is relatively young (in relation to the cosmic scale), it is possible that other cultures may have developed faster, or are much older and have avoided the pitfalls common in our historical and scientific development.

5. Human origins may not be constrained to one planet. Our genus may be found among solar systems similar to our own.

6. The laws of physics and genetics may have a genesis in a higher, structured order than once previously thought.

PART IV POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Given the existing political climate in the US and the unstable conditions in Europe, it is the considered opinion of the members, that if the Administration went public with the information as found in this report now, the results would be damaging, even fatal to the world political structure as it now exists. The following considerations were reviewed and debated which led the mission to the following opinions:

a. Public trust of the political institutions may be eroded and possibly be held in disrepute.

b. A complete revisioning make take place among institutions of higher learning, thus calling into question the certainty of scientific knowldge.

c. The ability of the Armed Forces to secure National Security would be put in jeopardy and possibly lead to undue public fear and disorder.

d. [redacted]

e. History and religion in the political context would probably suffer the most damage causing unprecedented upheaval in social and psychological well-being.

f. Political repercussions may occur in our diplomatic efforts of containing the Communist threat to our democratic interests.

g. If such an announcement were made by the current Administration, it could be percieved by opposing party as a trick, laying open to accusations of unethetical posturing and manipulation of the public's mind.

PART V NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, [redacted] is presented an unprecedented situation with regard to maintaining secrecy related to the information contained in this report.

In the early months of 1942, up until the present, intrusions of unidentified aircraft have occaisionally been documented, but there has been no serious investigations by the intelligence arm of the Government. Even the recovery case of 1941 did not create a unified intelligence effort to exploit possible technological gains with the exception of the Manhattan Project. We now have an opportunity to extend our technology beyond the threshold that we have achieved, [redacted] Aside from technological gains, we face an even greater challenge, that of learning the intent of such a presence. There are questions that remain unanswered, such as: What forces face us? What kind of defense do we have? Where do they come from and what kind of weapons do they possess? Where can we stage our forces in advance, [redacted] How wide a front? How many craft can we expect? And [redacted]

[redacted]

The members of the mission are prepared to submit a seperate report on just this problem alone. And it would take a dozen volumes to explain how these problems should be met. Our only point, however, is that a combined intelligence and research operation would be a vast, intricate, covertly planned marshalling of resources, human and material, to solve a specific, clearly defined problem.

We have to find effective methods of persuasion with other government agencies without creating a sense of impending doom. The first task is to carefully appraise the problem. The second is to evaluate the known resources and probable strategy of the visitors. The third is to inventory our own ways and means, ascertain how much resources we can bring to bear, and how fast. The third is to devise our strategic plan. And last is to work out with infinite pains the tactical details and the myriad secondary problems of funding and security.

It is the unaminous opinion of the members that Operation MAJESTIC TWELVE be a fully funded and operational TOP SECRET Research and Development intelligence gathering agency. It is also recommended that a panel of experts be appointed to chair and oversee the functions and operations of said agency. It's members should have appropriate security clearances and full cooperation [redacted] the National Security Council, the Pentagon, [redacted]nt, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, Joint Research and Development Board, Army Security Agency, and the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. [redacted] are highlighted:

1. Propeller-driven bomber aircraft and jet engines, armed with conventional and atomic bombs.
2. Jet fighter aircraft, including some of supersonic speed, armed with rockets and guns.
3. Propeller-driven aircraft, valued for their endurance.
4. Guided anti-aircraft missiles, and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns.
5. Short and medium-range guided missiles. Drone aircraft.
6. Atomic charges, in bombs, missiles and torpedoes.

In the arena of nuclear weapons we feel there is a certain advantage to be gained [redacted] It is speculated by some that if reduced size and miniture circuitry were introduced into the proposed hydrogen bomb program, it would give US Strategic Air Forces a great deterance capability over the Russians. Current studies at MIT of micro-electronics taken from ULAT-1 may give us the strategic advantage so desired. It is strongly recommended that funding be allocated in this area.

There is a good chance that the Russians may try to make use of the flying saucer scare by public news media

[redacted]

and diplomatic means of a technological breakthrough in aircraft and missile development. We feel that such a disclosure would most certainly cause great embarressment to our elected officials and to the military, not to mention the panic felt by the citizenry. To counter such a threat, it is recommended that a counterintelligence program be drawn up and held in abeyance if at such time the situation should present itself. It might be suggested that we should make a preempted use of these objects for the purpose of psychological warfare once the true nature of these objects are known and understood.

To further assist and aid all MAJCOM in the US and overseas, it is recommended that a standard intelligence reporting system be implemented through standard reporting channels with technical data forwarding instructions. At present, there are no specific intelligence guidlines available to military commanders in dealing with sightings and material evidence collection. It would be advisable for the respective Secretaries of the Armed Forces to devise a security policy of plausible denial, if and when the public becomes aware of the reality of these objects and the interest of the military of such incidents.

In conclusion, for reasons of national security and the public well being, the US must be perceived as being the top of the heap, and every effort must be made to insure that there is, and never has been, a threat to the country.

CONFIDENTIAL(IA)

20 SEP 47

Area Medical L oratory

20 Sept 1947

Memorandum for Lt. General Twining

Subject: Preliminary Results of Post-mortem Examination
of the Air Accident Report filed 17 July 1947

Attn: Maj. O.O. Benson

1. Pursuant to your telephone request of July 10th, herewith is enclosed the results of the clinical laboratory examination of one well preserved cadaver, recovered by Army medical staff, Alamogordo AAF.

Malcolm C. Crow
Brigadier General, USA
The Air Surgeon

Distribution:
- Dr. Detlev Bronk
- Dr. Randolph Lovelace
- Flight Surgeon, AAF School of Medicine, Randolph Field, Texas
- AAF Scientific Advisory Group
- War Department Intelligence (G-2)
- Intelligence (AC/AS-2)

Enclosures: Reslts to Par/Path Rpt.

RESULTS TO PERSONNEL

1. Duty status: unknown.

   (a) Fatal injuries

   No parachute used

2. NATURE

   (a) Collision in full flight with object other than conventional aircraft

3. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

   (a) Complete wreck

4. PERSONNEL ERROR

   80% due to pilot error

   20% due to Poor technique

5. MATERIEL

   Artifacts collected and assembled indicate that the unidentified aircraft may have experienced a 50% malfunction in its flight contr systems; 10% malfunction in its movable surfaces; and the remaining of the materiel is undetermined.

   (a) Handling qualities are unknown due to the extreme damage the craft suffered upon impact.

   (b) The functions of the instruments found in the cockpit area ar unknown at present; so there is no way to determine if craft was a manned or remotely controlled.

   (c) Equipment assembled indicates that power plant, flight contro and movable surfaces may be serviced by flexible glass condui

6. MISCELLANEOUS

   (a) Weather does not appear to be a significant factor in causing th craft to collide with an unidentified object.

   (b) Darkness and night vision does not indicate to be a probable cau for the accident. Radar film does not show a collision course prior to crash. Though debris collected does indicate that craft experienced break-up in the air before impact.

   (c) Alamogordo tower had cleared craft for approach to AREA 2 Apron and terrain provided the pilot an acceptable alternative for a emergency landing.

C

Analysis of Factors Contributing to "Pilot-Error" Experiences in Operating Experimental Aircraft Controls

DC/AS for Research & Development 22 Sep 1947
1

Office of The Air Surgeon, AC/AS-1 Lt.Col. Tucker/lb/3091

Inclosed for your information is a copy of Research Memoranda TSRAA-694-12 from Psychobiology Branch, Aero Medical Laboratory, subject as above. Incidents of errors in Experimental Aircraft controls were obtained through accident reconstruction and written 621 Proj.reports.

The recent air accidents at White Sands Proving Ground, as outlined by 28 May Collection Branch, Air Intelligence Requirements Division Report dealing with mutant experiments of extreme altitude flight, capsule ejection, and decompression effects, could be classified under six major catagories as follows: (1) substitution errors, (2) forgetting,(3) adjustment errors, (4) reversal errors, (5) unintentional activities, and (6) unable to reach controls.

In regards to radio-biological hazards, the Army Air Forces Tactical and Tecnical Liaison Committee, inconjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission, has initiated action to determine the requirements for procedures to assure the relative safety of those concerned with "special" flight operations. The Army Air Forces Tactical and Technical Liaison Committee requested a "Research Flight Surgeon" representing Headquarters, Army Air Forces to conduct radio-biological hazard studies incident to the work of this Project. These studies were performed at Kirtland Field and all data was classified "Restricted Data" under the provisions of AAF Letters 46-22 and 46-22A.

As to the actual causes of the two incidents on 25 March and 4 July 1947, of the loaned S- Aircraft (PF), analysis of the engine design and thrust stress factors, P9 personnel and Atomic Energy Commission consultants in conjunction with advisory people from Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory Group, and Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, could not fully agree as to the exact cause of engine failure in both cases. One plausable problem has been examined which might help in correcting "Pilot Error" operation. Interaction of symbolic instrumentation with tactil manipulation of flight controls and pilot shielding in high performance operation, has been a continuing factor of study by Research and Development.

Recent inquiries from other commands and government agencies requesting information about experimental projects as being the cause of so-called "Flying Saucers," has prompted the control of Restricted Data. A case in point was the request by Eighth Air Force AC/AS-2 to Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, that a central control of Restricted Data be established contrary to AAF Letter 46-24, 10 March 1947, Par. 24(1). To insure tighter security and access to Project Restricted Data, a new policy has been in affect. Under a recent decision by the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, "Top Secret - Restricted Data" can now be transmitted by couriers who have cleared for access to "Restricted Data. The present War Department Courier Service did not meet the requirements as mentioned. Presently Headquarters, Research and Development has assumed this responsibility.

FOR DETAILED HISTORY OF THE "S" CRAFT SEE ATTACHED.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

[illegible]

SECRET

September 24, 1947

XEROX 2050
835.90/R2437

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presentation of Report TO THE PRESIDENT RE UFA

In regards to our recent conversation on this matter and our understanding that release of this report would be best done prior to the scheduled National Security Council meeting, I suggest that it would be better to discuss the report during the meeting. This would give the members a better picture of the situation rather than having it released in piecemeal.

I further suggest that Twining present the findings [illegible] briefing to be given by the Director of Central Intelligence with a detailed showing of visual as well as written materials.

If Twining cannot be present to explain the technical and scientific aspects of the report, I recommend that a qualified representative from the War Department be made available if assistance is required.

It is my thought and belief given the circumstances involved, that the War Department not release the report to Congressional Committee oversight, and that the findings not become public.

Suggestion approved

Harry Truman

SECRET

FILED

[redacted] [redacted]

Put in [illegible] yellow files J-1

9. [redacted]

10. Maintaing the MAJESTIC security has been successful in part because of compartmental function of classified activities of the level achieved by the security system of the Manhattan Project, and new legislation protecting nuclear weapons development.

11. In protecting the security operations of MAJESTIC, it has been necessary to [redacted] individuals who would compromise the intelligence efforts. While distasteful [redacted]t times, the use of [redacted]easures have been executed. The untimely death of Secretary Forrestal, was deemed necessary and regrettable.

12. General Statement: If such a crisis in government failed [illegible] and assure the public's trust against an invasion from another planet, [redacted] that the following would occurr: "The pattern is familiar—employment of subversive agents; infiltration tactics; incitement of disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people."

13. Referenced REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT [redacted] 47, PARTS 1-7, dated 19 September 1947, mentions: "In compliance with your directive . . . of 9 July 1947, the attached "REPORT ON FLYING SAUCERS" is respectfully submitted. In consonance with your instructions, advisors from State, Treasury, War and Navy Departments assisted me on a two-week fact finding mission concerning the reality of other-world visitation. The principle areas were visited. Successful efforts were made to [illegible] all levels of scientists [illegible] work in classified [illegible] in defense [illegible] companies. [illegible] groups were held with [redacted] approximately 1,200 memoranda and reports from intelligence and security individuals were received and considered. The report presents against a global background my estimates of the situation, current and projected, in U.S., and U.K., and recommendations deemed to be sound courses of action for formulating plans and policies concerning defenses of allied countries of the United States."

Project White Hot

-37582

14. As a result of the Twining Report, the President was compelled to sign into law the National Security Act of 1947 which came into effect on 19 September. This did not help the DCI in carrying out the directives of the NSC in matters of intelligence collection concerning the flying saucer problem. The Intelligence Advisory Board was not allowing the new CIA to function [redacted] flying saucer data, [redacted]

092/44

COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: [illegible]

I have learned that you seldom see the Army summaries of "Magic" material. For some time, the last two months in particular, I have had our intelligence liaison organization concentrating on a workable presentation on "Magic" for my use, as well as for the other officials concerned, particularly yourself. A highly specialized organization is now engaged in the very necessary process of separating the wheat from the chaff and correlating the items with past information in order that I may be able to quickly and intelligently evaluate the importance of the product.

Recently I have had these summaries bound in a Black Book both for convenience of reading and for greater security in handling. Sometimes two or three of these booklets are gotten out in a single day. I think they contain all of the worthwhile information culled from the tremendous mass of material now available and that are accumulated each twenty-four hours. The recent discovery of the machines has added a tremendous amount of such material and will continue to give us a great deal from day to day. The problem is how to avoid being buried under the mass of information, and I think the present arrangements satisfactorily meets that difficulty.

I am attaching two of the current booklets which I hope you will glance through in order to familiarize yourself with the manner in which the information is presented. I will send these booklets each week to you direct at the White House.

/S/

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: NSC
CS
AFOSI
SAG/ F
ONI
A

MAR 1948

[redacted]

APPROVED

Harry

Received 11-19-94

ER-1-2735

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAJIC

Director
Dep. Director
Adm. Officer
Proc. & Control
Records & Pub.
Asst.
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MAJESTIC TWELVE PROJECT

1st Annual Report 9/48 ?

A-1762.1-J1

A REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL PANEL TO INVESTIGATE THE CAPTURE OF UNIDENTIFIED PLANFORM SPACE VEHICLES BY U.S. ARMED FORCES AND AGENCIES

PANEL

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Major General Luther D. Miller, Chief of Chaplains, United States Army
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Brigadier General George F. Schulgen, Director, Plans and Policies, United States Air Force
Rear Admiral Paul F. Lee, Chief, Office of Naval Research, United States Navy
Admiral John Gingrich, Director, Security and Intelligence, AEC
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman, General Advisory Committee, AEC
Jerome C. Hunsaker, MIT, National Academy of Sciences
Detlev W. Bronk, Chairman, National Research Council
Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director of Aeronautical Research, NACA
Dr. James H. Doolittle, Shell Oil

FOR INCLUSION

TOP SECRET Central Intelligence Agency Information Report CIA/SI 28-55 entitled: A DIGEST OF WORLD WIDE UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECT INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL AS CONTAINED IN THE ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY SIGNALS, RADAR, COMMUNICATIONS, AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

Approved for Rele
Date

Note: This report has been coordinated with the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Air Technical Intelligence Center, [redacted] and the Intelligence Advisory Committee

495

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 APR 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, JOINT INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES AGENCY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Project 63 (UF-103-M)

REFERENCE: JIOA Memorandum No. 902 dated 25 May 1948

1. In connection with paragraph 1 of reference, the Central Intelligence Agency does not believe that any further action by CINCEUR will be necessary.

2. Pertinent information from reference and its attachments has been given to the Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior, and to the National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce for their information, and Central Intelligence Agency has asked to be advised of action or information obtained by those agencies as a result.

RHHillenkoetter

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Approved for Release
Date 7 NOV [illegible]

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No. 105-AC 47/1-101

Intelligence Report

"UNIDENTIFIED" FLYING AIRCRAFT (PF)
PROJECT "WHITE SHOT"

(AMC) Lt Colonel A. J. Hemstreet, Jr, USAF, Chief, Technical Analysis

(TS)Project No. XS-621

Approved by:
/S/

HAROLD E. WATSON, Colonel, USAF
Chief, Intelligence Department

For the Commanding General:

/S/

WILLIAM F. McCOY
Brigadier General, USAF
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

Release Date:
October 1949

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Received
July 16, 1995

[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE [redacted]

Information Report

ANALYSIS OF THE [redacted]

[redacted]IDENTIFIED LENTICULAR

AERODYNE TECHNOLOGY

[redacted]

30 October 1950

WARNING

This document contains information critical to the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U. S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unuathorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ANALYSIS OF TH[redacted]SCURA PEAK, NM

WRECKAGE OF UNIDENTIFIED LENTICULAR

AERODYNE TECHNOLOGY

CONCLUSIONS

1. Current analysis covers the area of:

   a. Flight dynamics

   b. Power plant and propulsion

   c. Construction

   d. Avionics and navigation

2. The majority of technical information is drawn from the published Department of Defense[redacted]Special Studies Project, Unidentified Lenticular Aerodyne Technology Transfer (ULATT), Exploitation Program, Projec[redacted]Project[redacted]roject[redacted] Projec[redacted]Projec[redacted]d Project[redacted]TS).

3. An effort is underway to coordinate the study activities of [redacted]der a central UFO technical intelligence collection and dissemination operation with the code word[redacted]ll function under the directive of th[redacted]d the intelligence agencies of the armed forces.

4. The use[redacted]"last line of defense," has been ruled out as the power plant recovered fro[redacted]New [redacted]has been determined to be a thermal reactive potential, thus [redacted]

5. This consensus o[redacted]on 16 November 1947, led to the extraordinary top secret meeting held on 14 July 1949, at Blair House, where the President proposed that the "know how" of any new technology be shared with Canada [redacted]

DISCUSSION

1. Since the data on lenticular-shaped planform aerodyne flight dynamics became available to SAF, problems in calculations of the resistance of bodies of revolution, moving through the air with a velocity superior to the velocity of sound could not be solved.

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

2. Dr. [redacted] USAF Scientific Advisory Board, has developed a theoretical analysis of the flight dynamics of the unidentified lenticular-shaped planform aerodyne recovered from a crash site near [redacted] July 1947. [redacted] submitted a working equation under the following assumptions:

a. The viscosity of the fluid flow can be neglected.

b. The pressure is a given function of the air density.

c. The flow is a vortexless motion.

3. Assumption (a) implies that the frictional resistance of the lenticular-shaped planform aerodyne be neglected; this is of course not quite justified from conventional point of view. However, it would seem that the frictional resistance and the "boundary layer" resistance due to the effect of compressibility can be considered seperately; in other words, it can be assumed that the shape of the compressibility waves and their contribution to the resistance is altered by very small holes, thus not altered by viscosity. Assumption (b) enables two limiting factors: the adiabatic and the isothermic compression or dilatation of fluid flow elements. The first factor corresponds to no heat conduction at all; the second postulates that the heat conduction is so perfect that there is no temperature change whatever in the part of the fluid involved in the flow around the aerodyne. The first factor is probably closer to reality, so the adiabatic theory can be used. According to the Helmholtz laws of vortex motion, no vorticity can be created in a perfect fluid if the external forces are conservative and the pressure is a function of the density only. Therefore assumption (c) is justified by the two previous assumptions, (a) and (b).

MHD

4. Dr. Hannes Alfven has been consulted due to his work in electrically conducting fluids in magnetic fields. Analysis of the fusion reactor and the surface tension qualities of the outer skin of the aerodyne suggested that the craft moves through the air by [redacted] It is believed that the craft travels through space by utilising an ionising plasma and the planet's magnetic lines of force flowing into the atmosphere. This may help explain how the fusion reactor can function in a space enviroment.

5. Structural and design analysis performed by Air Force Air Material Command has tentatively concluded that the "metals" and "plastics" of the [redacted] are [redacted] There are no visual indications that the aerodyne was piloted by radio transmission. All controls appear to be manual. Construction methods are unknown at this time. A comparison of known lamination techniques suggests that the craft was "molded" and fused together by a process, for lack of a better term, "seamless" in nature.

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Information Report

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CHARGING UNITED STATES WITH THE USE OF BW IN KOREA

CIA/SI 29-51

20 August 1951

WARNING

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COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA CHARGING UNITED STATES WITH USE OF BW IN KOREA

CONCLUSIONS

1. Current propaganda takes the form of:

   a. Outright prevarication

   b. Distortion of facts

   c. Imputation of insidious motives to innocent acts

2. The majority of propaganda is directed from Moscow toward the Far East and Western Europe - while a proportionately small amount of material, mostly from newspapers, is planned for "home" consumption.

3. An effort is underway to reach the Chinese, whose political and military affection need to be solidly won, and those West Europeans whose remilitarization by and for the West would present a precarious situation for the USSR.

4. Charges of inhuman methods of warfare by bacteriological means would have a definite emotional and psychological effect upon those nations considered "on the edge" in political affiliation.

5. The wide "Hate America" campaign launched by the USSR propagandists endeavors to disillusion and demoralize the defenders of Korea and advance the cause of staunch Communism in the Far East.

DISCUSSION

1. Shortly before the outbreak of the present Korean hostilities, Kim Song Yun, chief of the Epidemic Prevention Bureau, Ministry of Public Health, North Korea, warned Koreans of the possibility of summer epidemics emanating from South Korea where no preventive measures had been undertaken to combat them. Mr. Yun stated it would be difficult to foretell what kind of epidemics might be permitted to spread northward from South Korea.

2. When the Communist Army captured Seoul, it purported to discover in the intelligence offices of the General Staff of the South Korean Army documents written in rather technical detail and designated "Plan A" and "Plan B." Some chapters entitled

"Destruction," "Arson," and "Bacteriological Dissemination," supposedly mapped out reconnaissance work for 1950 and described how rivers and reservoirs of North Korea were to be infected with bacteria. Whether the capsules of bacilli were to be obtained from American Camp Detrick or from Japanese stocks was left in question.

3. USSR press reported an alleged typhus epidemic raging in American occupied areas of Korea and that the population was receiving no medical aid. It was further claimed that, within two weeks, each village in the region had been penetrated with the disease with an increase in the overall death rate up to ninety (90) per cent. American authorities were reported as inoculating only servicemen and Syngman Rhee government officials, and it was also charged there had been numerous cases where seriously ill persons had been killed. Actually, the situation is quite different in that:

a. Shortly after the beginning of the war, ROK Ministry of Health, with vaccine furnished by ECA, began a vaccination program against smallpox for civilians, concentrating especially upon children under fifteen years of age. No records were kept, and the efficiency of the program cannot be ascertained.

b. United Nations reported vaccination of millions of Koreans against smallpox, typhus, typhoid, and cholera.

c. There are confirmed reports of typhus epidemics and a substantiated presence of smallpox in the Wonsan area. Many Communist troops are suffering from both diseases. All civilian doctors have been mobilized; penicillin and other drugs have been confiscated for Communist Army needs; civilians have been evacuated.

4. It is also purported that a serious skin disease is caused by a new United Nations' weapon and that the disease, where it is encountered, is responsible for fifty (50) per cent casualties. This propaganda may refer, of course, to casualties from the United Nations' use of napalm incendiary weapons.

5. Soviet propaganda also depicts American forces as prepared to use bacteriological weapons against the Korean people to excuse the failure of their troops in the field. MacArthur's headquarters in Japan was purported to have been producing bacteria with the aid and assistance of unpunished Japanese war criminals. For this activity the Yoshida government had appropriated 1.5 million yen.

The propaganda then resolved into a condemnation of MacArthur by Soviet scientists and an assurance that they (the Soviets) are discovering methods to combat such warfare.

6. Reports have also been disseminated by Communist sources that plague-carrying fleas have been employed by American forces to spread plague in Korea. It is claimed MacArthur sent eighteen Japanese bacteriologists, in 1946, to War Department laboratories to continue the culture of BW agents.

7. Chinese Communist radio broadcast from Peiping, allegedly quoting from the American magazine, "Weekly Newspaper" (NEWSWEEK) and Allied war prisoners, states Chinese Communist prisoners were subjected to bacteriological experiments on a small island outside Wonsan. Moscow, in a broadcast quoting Peiping sources, states that the Chinese Red Cross has revealed the Americans are testing bacteriological weapons on captured Chinese volunteers and gruesome experiments are being conducted under the guise of epidemic control. These facts were reportedly admitted by the United States magazine, NEWSWEEK, 9 April 1951. The Chinese Red Cross called on all the sixty-eight countries belonging to the International Red Cross and on all peace-loving peoples to punish this vicious enemy. Actually, the excerpts from the NEWSWEEK item referred to involved an article about a Navy epidemic control laboratory ship off Wonsan harbor on the east coast of Korea . . . where Navy landing parties have been capturing a number of Chinese Reds from the tiny island and have taken them back to the ship where they are tested for symptoms of bubonic plague because of reported epidemics among enemy troops which may endanger our troops. The ship is an infantry landing vessel on which a laboratory complete with mice and rabbits is installed.

An American naval medical officer immediately and publicly denied these charges and stated that the United States does maintain an "epidemic control ship" docked near a small island off the coast of South Korea. For the benefit of United Nations' forces, this laboratory provides facilities for studying all types of diseases contracted by the military personnel so that epidemics may be prevented. This officer further stated that no prisioners have been taken aboard nor has any experimental work been performed.

8. Pak Hun Yong, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, protested in a message to the Chairman of the United Nations General Assembly and the President of the Security Council against the use of bacteriological weapons by American forces. He cited the following incidents:

a. American Far East Command, under orders from General MacArthur, has been preparing BW with the aid of Japanese finances and personnel.

b. Documents, "Plan A" and "Plan B," found in ROK headquarters in Seoul, outlined, for 1950, sabotage plans, based on use of bacteria, against vital North Korean installations, towns, and army units.

c. American armed forces, temporarily holding areas of North Korea, contaminated the inhabitants of these areas with smallpox. In this connection, Yong pointed out no cases occurred in areas not occupied by the Americans and that outbreaks in Japan were undoubtedly caused by infected American troops involved in covert dissemination (of the germs) in North Korea.

Yong then concluded that Americans have thereby violated Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, prohibiting the use of.... bacteria in warfare and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea demands the arrest and trial of MacArthur and Ridgway who have followed in the steps of the Japanese war criminals.

9. The Department of State of the United States has issued to all consular offices a statement of policy guidance advising that such charges should not be dignified by direct refutation. On the contrary, every opportunity should be used to demonstrate that the epidemics were the result of Communist leaders' disregard of troops and civilian population as shown by their failure to take adequate measures to prevent disease. Emphasis should be directed to the fact that United Nations forces, ROK civilians, and POW's are subject to inoculation and sanitation programs throughout the Republic of Korea. (The United Nations fosters this preventive measure.)

10. Last March (1951), the United Nations command in Korea knew some sort of epidemic, feared to be bubonic plague, was raging north of the 38th parallel. Brigadier General Crawford Sams, United Nations Army Chief of Public Health and Welfare, volunteered to obtain details. With three other officers, Sams entered North Korean territory and learned that the epidemic was not plague but hemorraghic smallpox. For this exploit, he received the D.S.C. The Communists, learning of his mission, broadcast the fantastic story that the United States had deliberately planted germs in North Korea thereby causing the epidemic, and, with the clear intention of perverting these facts, IZVESTIA published a statement, supposedly attributed to a United Press release, which recounted a fantastic story of the "miraculous salvation of the United Nations forces from a smallpox epidemic as the result of a special raid by a group of American doctors in the North Korean rear." For this "heroic exploit," according to the purported United Press report, the American Brigadier General Crawford SOAMES (Sams), who is "head of the public health and social security department at the headquarters of the United Nations forces," received a very high

military award since Soames' detachment "discovered" the presence of a smallpox epidemic in North Korea.

11. Moscow propagandist again quoted an alleged Associcated Press dispatch of 18 May 1951, furnishing details of United States preparations for BW by using Korean PW's as guinea pigs aboard the American landing vessel No. 1091 off Koje (Koje-do) Island. The ship was reported to have installed " a modern laboratory, completely equipped with all gear her scientists would need."

TASS, again quoting the alleged Associated Press dispatch of 18 May 1951, adds to the above the charge that the landing vessel was relocated from Wonsan to Kojede (Koje-do) Island, 40 kilometers S-W of Pusan, in order better to utilize the PW's confined in some half-dozen nearby convict prisons. According to TASS's version of the Associated Press dispatch, 3,000 experiments on oral bacteria and rectal bacteria are being made daily by a 38-man medical team. Brigadier General Crawford Sams is mentioned again as participating in these experiments.

12. The propaganda picture was further enlarged by a Moscow Korean-language broadcast which claimed that 3,000 Korean families have been banished from Japan and that General Ridgway's headquarters were making every possible effort to conceal where the expelled Koreans were sent and what became of them after their deportation. The broadcast raised the conjecture that some of these Koreans had been taken to some deserted island and used for testing new types of bacteriological weapons.

13. A special delegation from the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), an international Communist organization, has been dispatched to Korea to investigate United Nations "war crimes." Their report is being widely publicized by Communist propaganda media and will, undoubtedly, provide background for additional stories of atrocities.

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I. PURPOSE:

The aforementioned panel under the direct presidential directive signed on 26 September 1947, has been tasked with responsibility of providing answers to a most troublesome and disturbing phenomenon, that of other-world visitation and what it portends for the human family. It is in this vein that the panel has addressed the problem and in providing possible answers.

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. Nature of the Investigation.

B. Panel's Contribution to the TOP SECRET MAJESTIC Research and Intelligence Program.

C. A Review of the Military Assessment with Selected Comments Drawn from Conclusions of the JIC and IAC Members.

D. Problems in Relation to Technology.

E. Problems in Relation to Nuclear Weapons Development.

F. Problems in Relation to Biological Warfare Programs.

G. Problems in Relation to Genetic and Pharmaceutical Development Programs.

H. Problems in Relation to New Materials Development.

I. Problems in Relation to Planned Future Rocket Development Programs.

J. Problems in Relation to Nuclear Propulsion Development Programs.

K. Problems in Relation to Intelligence Gathering and Analysis.

L. Problems in Relation to Foreign Policy and National Security.

M. Problems in Relation to Doomestic and Constitutional Issues.

N. Problems in Relation to Social, Religious and Scientific Reaction.

O. Problems in Relation to the Cold War Development.

P. Problems in Relation to the Government Policy of Control and Denial.

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III. CONCLUSIONS

1. Current studies of other-world visitation are in three phases:

   a. Technology exploitation

   b. Interplanetary travel

   c. Cultural communication

2. On 19 September 1947, the IAC, JIOA, and the JIC, reviewed a Top Secret intelligence report titled REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 1947, PARTS 1-V, MAJIC EYES ONLY, DTG 000190947, the report mentions: "In compliance with your directive . . . of 9 July 1947, the attached "REPORT ON FLYING SAUCERS" is respectfully submitted. In consonance with your instructions, advisors from State, Treasury, War and Navy Departments assisted me on a two month exploratory mission concerning the reality of other-world visitation. The principle investigators and storage areas were visited. Successful efforts were made to reach scientists of all levels as measured by their work in classified defense projects. Conferences were held with national security officials and leaders of private industry. Approximately 1,200 memoranda and intelligence reports were considered. The report presents this situation against a global background my estimates, current and projected, in both the U.S., and allied countries, and recommendations deemed to be sound courses of action for formulating plans and policies in light of recent developments.

3. All efforts have been made to identify the country or private concern wich could have the technical and finacial resources necessary to produce such a long-range flight. So far, no country on this earth has the means and the security of its resources to produce such.

4. A consensus reached by members of the panel, that untill positive proof that the Russians did not attempt a series of reconnaissance flights over our most secure installations--the sightings and recovered objects are interpalnatary in nature.

5. The occupants of these planform vehicles are, in most respects, human or human-like. Autopsies, so far indicate, that these beings share the same biological needs as humans.

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Nature of the Investigation.

An analysis has been made of the first one-hundred intelligence reports in the ATIC Interrogation Reports and the ULATT EXPLOITATION-MAJESTIC SERIES 1-25, prepared by the Military Intelligence Section of GHC/IPU, in order to establish what material of flying saucer intelligence value concerning the ULATT is available in these reports.

1. The ATIC Interrogation Reports, numbered 1 to 93 (the last dated December, 1950), present significant information on a broad variety of subjects and areas where witnesses were detained subsequent to the post-1947 incident. The un-published documents ~~consolidate~~ records of interrogation derived from the accumulated reports on interviews of selected witnesses from New Mexico and military personnel involved in removal of evidence.

2. In this digest, primary attention has been paid to information of bio-medical intelligence interest, particularly in the BW programs. Bio-medical intelligence is only one of the substantive fields covered by these Interrogation Reports.

3. For the most part, the sources interrogated were not trained observers, and their stories indicate they have been subject to the familiar pitfalls common to all eye witnesses. It must be emphasized that, because the interrogators used were not always specialists in this phenomena of celestial sciences, there is much lack of detail.

4. Because of the unique nature of the material under study, a
multi-layered security structure has be
een in effect. Most of the
results have been given to private rese
earch and development labs for
further study.

5. MAJESTIC SS&P are currently foc
cused on Psy-Op development for
Cold War CI activities.

6. Utilization of Paperclip specia
alists has yielded valuable
results in new weapons research in area
as of flight dynamics, biological
and chemical agents, mind control, and
intelligence gathering techniques.

[redacted]

B. Panel's Contribution to MAJESTIC

1. The contribution of the President's Special Panel to the MAJESTIC TWELVE PROJECT has supplemented information on the ULATT Program which could not be obtained in any other way. Although only a small part of the project, interrogation in technical and bio-medical field has produced at least 8,973 items for the files of Military Intelligence, GHC/IPU. Of these items, 1,764 have been published (up to December, 1950) in the ULATT EXPLOITATION-MAJESTIC SERIES. The coverage of the New Mexico incidents, from the over-all intelligence point of view, has been very good. (After the Panel's review was initiated, GHC/IPU published in March 1951, two summary "MAJESTIC SERIES," No. 98 and No. 99, of the series titled "New Medical Facilities for Biological Warfare; New Genetic and Pharmaceutical Development Programs." These summary reports have apparently made of much of the AEC file material since 6,014 items are now reported as published "Medical Items" in the "Interrogation Reports" - see MAJESTIC SERIES, No. 98, page 1.)

2. For the clarification of published reports or for elaboration of the information of fragmentary nature, resort may be had to the AEC files of unpublished data as well as to the possibility of reinterrogating the sources.

C. Review of the Military Assessment

With current deployment obligations, troop commitments, and few air groups with stand-by fighters with radar capability, the Joint Chiefs are unable at the present time, to effect a complete and all-encompassing defense plan that would guarantee the protection and well-functioning of the national political order. Personnel, material, and logistical requirements for such a defense would deplete current resources. If such a crisis should occurr--in government failure to defend and assure the public's trust, it is the belief of the Joint Chiefs, that the following would issue: insecurity and mistrust; employment of subversive agents; infiltration; incitement of disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy and undermine popular support of government and its leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people.

D. Technology

At present, the ability to reconstruct the technology that may be eons ahead of us, the boost to our current efforts would be incalculable. Areas such as aircraft and missile design would benefit only after a working understanding has been achieved. Weapons sciences will follow.

E. Nuclear Weapons Development

Miniturization of atomic bomb components is the goal of the AEC and the AFSWP. Studies at MIT indicate that such a technology is within reach before the decade is out. The apparent use of micro-circuitry found on the recovered planform indicates that miniturization, low-power transmission, light conductor/sensitive components are required for interplanetary space travel. Atomic engines and nuclear propulsion technologies could be advanced based upon current use of hydrogen and electro-magnetic research and weapons components development in U.S. and U.K.

F. Biological Warfare Programs

BW programs in U.S. and U.K., are in field test stages. Discovery of new virus and bacteria agents so lethal, that serums derived by genetic research, can launch medical science into unheard of fields of biology. The samples extracted from bodies found in New Mexico, have yielded new strains of a retro-virus not totally understood, but, give promise of the ultimate BW weapon. The danger lies in the spread of airborne and bloodborne outbreaks of diseases in large populations, with no medical cures available.

G. Genetic and Pharmaceutical Development Programs

Current research in U.S. and U.K., can be accellerated when studies are complete. Understanding the human makeup through EBE reserach will bring a varied wealth of information in how cells replicate themselves and may help in developing new drugs and markets. Healthcare industries are considered the best source of R&D for DoD programs.

H. New Materials Development

Conclusions reached by the Air Materiel Command in 1948, upon the close examination of the material structure of the Corona and Oscura Peak, N.M. sites, compelled the Air Force to launch a new machinability research program. Samples tested and evaluated by the AMC, suggested that future materials would have to incorporate new alloys and composites, if space exploration and hypersonic dynamics are to be achieved. As a result, new machining techniques are underway for high-temperature alloys and titanium.

I. Planned Future Rocket Development Programs

There have been a number of failed high-altitude rocket launches to study radiation effects on living organisms. The Air Force's Project BLOSSOM, conducted at Holloman AFB, is but one example. V-2 rocket launches at the White Sands Proving Ground, N.M., have been knocked down by undetermined jamming. The source of the jamming is believed to come from UFO sightings on or near the range. Guidance systems are believed to be vulnerable and this presents a clear and present danger. Such keeper flights carrying nuclear weapons are too horrific to contemplate. Shielding of systems and circuits are underway.

J. Nuclear Propulsion Development Programs

The AEC and NEPA are currently conducting research for advanced technologies in atomic engines and radical propulsion studies. Systems studies at Los Alamos, N.M., Oak Ridge, Tenn., and at Langely, Va., are attempting to duplicate the water drive and plastic core elements found on the engine being kept at HAFB. Intergration of hydrogen base feuls and electro-hydrodynamic technology, may open up for us development of super-aerodynes with mach 5 capabilities.

K. Intelligence Gathering and Analysis

Based on what is known of the technology and intelligence of the visitors, it is fairly certain that there will be other sightings and encounters of a spectacular nature. As to purpose and modus operandi, we are not certain, but it is clear, that if these visitors had conquest in mind, it would not be difficult for them, given their ability to penetration our airspace at will, and their ability to jam radio, telephone, television, and teletype transmissions, let alone power grids. So far, reports and sightings are blatant and deliberate, thus allowing our intelligence agencies to gather good data. As to the analyses of such reports, only a continuous wave of sightings and encounters world-wide, would provide enough data for a clear understanding of intent.

L. Foreign Policy and National Security

To date, only Great Britain, Canada, and the Soviet Union, are contacted and appraised in the event invasion is eminent. It is the current policy of the Administration that no other foreign countries will be consulted or advised. The national security status of the MAJESTIC operation exceeds that of the H-bomb development.

M. Domestic and Constitutional Issues

In dealing with clear violations of civic law and guarantees as defined under the Constitution, it has been discussed among members of MAJESTIC TWELVE, that such protection of individual rights are out-weighed by the nature of the threat. Only a declaration of war or a national emergency, would give the government the power to enact martial law and recend individual rights.

N. Social, Religious and Scientific Reaction

It has been the downfall of great nations and cultures when a new reality is not readily accepted by the masses. The social order was severely ravaged by the last world war, with great damage to the religious dogma of "earth without end," thus making a government disclosure irresponsible and inherently dangerous. The scientific community would predictably question such a reaction as a world suffering from a Buck Rogers delerium and attack anyone of their own ranks for believing such fantasy. Science itself, may undergo a traumatic transformation, with belief structures in shambles, putting the institutions under scrutiny by the layman, thus eroding any credibility. Science would be left with an image of credulity.

O. Cold War Development

This is one of the most dangerous phenomenon of the twentieth century. To misidentify a flight of space objects for actual Russian bombers, or to dismiss Russian bombers as phantoms, is the most idiotic approach to take. Even though governments may distrust each other, it is the responsibility and creed of the military and intelligence professional to prevent wanton death and destruction of his country. It is advisable to maintain some form of direct communication with a hostile enemy before taking false assumptions of his response if falty data wrongly indicates such. Even using the "Flying Saucer" ruse to create fear and confusion among your enemies leaders, could result in accidental war. Even our early analysis of the recovered planforms in 1947, led to the wrong assumption that the Russians were preparing a sneak attack on the continent.

P. Government Policy of Control and Denial

One of the most difficult aspects of controlling the perception in the public's mind of government attempts of denial and ignorance--is actual control of the press. Until a clear intent is established with diplomatic relations firmly in hand, it is the recommendation of the President's Special Panel with concurrence from MAJESTIC TWELVE, that a policy of strict denial of the events surfacing from Roswell, N.M., and any other incident of such caliber, be enforced. A inter-active program of controlled releases to the media, in such fashion to discredit any civilian investigation, be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the 1947 National Security Act.

ANNEX A

1. The Panel's review of the AEC and AFSWP investigation of Site L-1 and the Air Force Site L-2, has led the Panel to conclude that the objects under study, are the result of a high altitude ejection of a escape cylinder from a fatal mid-air collision of two unidentified circular planform aircraft of interplanetary nature.

2. Of particular interest to the Panel was Site L-2, located at Lat. 33-40-31, Long. 106-28-29, as this site yielded the most material for analysis.

3. Site L-2 may be closely associated with Site L-1, due to the similarity of material recovered and that the impact at Site L-1 and debris pattern suggests that the craft hit the ground at a sharp angle and continued to remain airborne until coming to rest at Site L-2.

4. The craft found at Site L-2, is either the remains of a rocket-plane, or, a powered-glider. What remained of the power plant was examined and determined to be of a magnetic drive propulsion powered by a fusion reactor of sorts.

5. Lack of wiring, fuel systems, cables, motors, hydraulics, intakes, exhaust, and surface controls, strongly suggests that the craft was designed to travel outside of our atmosphere.

6. The second craft that impacted at Site L-3, provided very little evidence that it too was similar in design, as the impact was vertical in nature and at very high speed. It is believed that the debris discovered on 2 July 1947, by a local rancher was the result of a mid-air collision with an X-plane from HAFB; another unidentified object; or possibly collided with both. Radar film and tower logs do not explain the merging of three radar targets prior to collision and subsequent crashes.

7. There were -- five recoverd bodies, two of which were found in a severely damaged escape cylinder, and the remaining three were found some distance away from the cylinder. All five appeared to have suffered from sudden decompression and heat suffication (recovery and autopsies of the occupants are covered in detail in a seperate study GRAY SUIT within Projects 612 and 621, ULATT EXPLOITATION-MAJESTIC SERIES 4, p. 40-102), as a result of damage sustained from unkown causes.

8. The Panel was concerned over the contamination of several SED personnel upon coming in contact with debris near the power plant. One technician was overcomed and collasped when he attempted the removal of a body. Another medical technician went into a coma four hours after placing a body in a rubber body-bag. All four were rushed to Los Alamos for observation. All four later died of seizures and profuse bleeding. All four were wearing protective suits when they came in contact with body fluids from the occupants.

9. Autopsies on the four dead SED technicians are not conclusive. It is believed that the four may have suffered from some form of toxin or a highly contagious desease. Tissue samples are currently being kept at Fort Detrick, Md.

10. The Panel was also concerned with the detection of air-borne release of radiation over the state of New Mexico. AFTAC detachment from McClellan AFB has conducted several airborne monitor flights over Site L-2. Radiation readings indicate a high neutron count was recorded as the plane flew over the site. Neutron count dropped off as the plane flew a considerable distance from the site. A report has been filed with the USAAIDS. ?

11. Detection of a high altitude explosion was recorded by a Project MOGUL constant level balloon on 4 July 1947. Radar from White Sands Proving Ground and HAFB also detected a surge.

12. Parachute recovery team from HAFB were dispatched to Site L-2. Upon arrival, the team, realizing the nature of the crash, radioed instructions and marked crash site for the investigators that arrived later.

13. In the opinion of the senior AEC medical officer, current medical equipment and supplies are wholly inadequate in dealing with a large scale outbreak of the alien virus.

14. Facilities at Los Alamos and Mayo clinics were considered as lacking in the current climate.

15. On 26 September 1947, the first meeting of the MSC-1 was held to discuss the New Mexico incidents and how to implement the policy established by MJ-12 SS&P.

ANNEX B

1. Upon the creation of the MAJESTIC TWELVE GROUP by special executive order dated 24 September 1947, and given powers of authority by PDD/1-1, dated 26 September 1947, the Panel was empowered to convene and conduct a review of all available evidence and data collected by government and military intelligence agencies.

2. Because of the unique nature of the 1947/48 crisis, the Panel recommended to MAJCOM-1 that the authority of the Secretary of Defense be invoked in order to implement NSCID No. 1/1.

3. A meeting was held on 8 December 1947, between CIA and IAC concerning the IAB. Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Panel, requested the DCI to convey the contents of a letter from Dr. Bush to Secretary Forrestal, thus breaking the deadlock over issues concerning authority and policy making dealing with the New Mexico incidents and subsequent exploitation of the finds.

4. On 13 January 1948, the NSC, with input from the Panel recommended to the President that third party group from outside of the Government be established for the purpose of conducting a impartial and objective survey of the activities and personnel of the CIA.

5. As a result of the DCI's lack of timely intelligence estimates and poor coordination of intelligence activities for MAJESTIC the NSC Survey Group issued its findings. At the suggestion of the Panel Chairman, the IAC met on 16 June 1948, at which the conclusions of the Survey Group were reviewed.

6. On 18 February 1949, the IAC met for the purpose of proposing some changes to a CIA draft proposal on MAJCOM activities.

7. General Joseph McNarney, with the assistance of Carlisle Humelsine and Robert Blum, prepare NSC 50/1. On 7 July 1949, the NSC adopted the recommendations of NSC 50/1 which directed the DCI to enlist the activities of the IAC in MAJESTIC intelligence activities.

8. MAJCOM-1 meets with the President in May 1950.

9. Admiral Hillenkoetter leaves position as DCI on 7 October 1950.

10. MAJCOM-1 with assistance of the Panel persuades the President to establish the Psychological Strategy Board on 4 April 1951.

11. Panel member and MAJCOM-4 meet with MAJCOM-1 on 10 October 1950 along with members of IAC. The Chief of Global Survey Group desired estimates requested by the Pentagon concerning possible defense project for MAJESTIC LOGISTIC SSP-1.

12. On 6 December 1950, MAJCOM-4 alerts MAJCOM-1 of a breach in DEW Greenland of a UFO on a south-westernly course. HQ IPU alerted and dispatched a scientific team to El Indio-Guerrero on the Texas-Mexico border. MAJCOM-4 orders a recovery team from Project STORK and MOON DUST to crash site. Teams transport debris from crash site to ADC HAFB and to AEC laboratories at Sandia, New Mexico.

13. MAJCOM-1 enlists the Panel's aviation consultants for the purpose of advising the "Princeton Consultants."

14. On 28 December 1950, MAJCOM-1 is provided with the "Black Book" summaries prepared by the Watch Committee. Begining every Friday the President is briefed on world situation and on MAJESTIC via the CIA weekly Current Intelligence Review.

15. At the request of Panel member Cardinal Francis Spellman met with the President to discuss the containment within the Catholic Church and its hierchy of religious speculation if mass sightings occur. Such containment was successful during the 1947 sightings when Cardinal Spellman met with the Secretary of War on 29 June. The President has been briefed on Defense Plan 4P, which was written in part by the Panel member.

16. In support of the MAJESTIC program for developing atomic engines, Panel members and their association with the AEC, the Armed Forces and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, have consulted MAJESTIC for the development of nuclear fission reactor for powered flight studies.

17. Atomic engines for aircraft built here on earth faces many difficulties because of size and weight of the reactor and radiation shielding. Such a nuclear power plant would give an aircraft unlimited range.

18. Panel members contributed to the writing of ULATT EXPLOITATION-MAJESTIC SERIES 5 title Hypersonic Small-Disturbance Theory, which gives consideration to a three-dimensional body fixed in a steady, uniform, hypersonic stream. The theory assumes that shock waves can be approximated by abrupt discontinuities and the planform body being thin, so that the slope of the local surface in the stream direction is uniformally small.

ANNEX B (Cont'd)

19. MAJCOM-4, a member of the Panel was instrumental in supporting the the creation of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board which MAJCOM-5 endorsed.

20. MAJCOM-5 recommended to the Air Force Chief of Staff, that the Top Secret report Where We Stand, be the basis for ULATT development. MAJCOM-5 urged the COS to enact the ideas of another report Science, the Key to Air Supremacy. Major General Curtiss LeMay Staff Director of Research and Development seconded MAJCOM-5's views.

21. The Panel Chairman argued for funding for air defense projects that would be useful in combating the new menace instead of developing ballistic missiles, which have proved to be useless.

22. On June 15 1947, Dr. Theodore von Karman chaired the first meeting of the SAB and discussed how the Air Forces could prepare for a possible air attack in light of the numerous UFO sightings over the U.S.

23. On 14 May 1948, MAJCOM-4 arranged for the promulgation of Air Force Regulation 20-30, which restored the powers of the SAB as agreed upon by Karman and LeMay in 1946.

24. MAJCOM-4 had a prepared speech read at a meeting of scientific advisers on 7 April 1949, highlighting new Air Force R&D organization and structures on UFO research for ULATT. Karman enlisted the aid of a Panel member to persuade MAJCOM-4 to endorse a seperate establishment free from AMC and Pentagon control.

25. On 2 January 1950 a plan was presented to the Air Staff Council for seperate R&D for ULATT.

26. On 23 January 1950, Research and Development Command and the Air Staff Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development was created.

27. In May 1951, Panel member MAJCOM-4 endorsed Karman's creation of AGARD and his presentation at the Pentagon of a lecture called "Mobilization of Scientific Effort in Western European Countries."

ANNEX C

1. Military commanders are taught a basic premise that the ideal defense as characterized by Karl von Clausewitz,--is a "shield of blows." When an enemy attack begins the defender yields the initiative, using his prepared positions and knowledge of the battle ground to slow its momentum and to strike the enemy with repeated, unexpected blows. Such a defense can work, only when the enemy is detected, his strength known, his weaponry identified, and, his tactics and movements are revealed.

2. In the annuls of warfare mass disappearances of soldiers and their equipment are rare but are on record. In the eighteenth century during the Spanish War of Succession, 4,000 soldiers were reported to have disappeared, together with their weapons and equipment (horses included). In 1885, about 600 French colonial soldiers disappeared near Saigon, French Indo-China, without a trace of them nor their equipment. On August 21 1915, members of the New Zealand Army Corps' First Field Company signed sworn statements that they saw the One-Fourth Norfolk Regiment disappear in a unusually thick brown cloud wich seemed to move and rose upward and vanished. There were no traces of the regiment nor their equipment. No explanation can be found in the historical records of the Imperial War Museum archives. In 1939, over 2,900 Chinese Nationalists troops were reported missing from their camp, just south of Nanking. Again, men, equipment, guns, were missing though camp fires and mess tents were undisturbed. During the Pacific campaign, there have been instances where whole platoons and larger units seemed to have disappeared without any sign of combat or a struggle. Men, equipment, weapons--vanish without a trace. In all instances the disappearances occurred in tropical climate and in the heat of battle or near combat zones.

3. Missing aircraft, pilots and crews, are of special concern to the military when no explanations fit the usual reasons outside of combat. One such incident is the disappearance of a flight of five U.S. Navy TBM-3 Avenger torpedo bombers from NAS Fort Lauderdale on 5 December 1945. While no explanation as to why navigation instruments on all five aircraft could have failed at the same time, and efforts to rescue the 14 crewmen were unsuccessful, it is believed that Flight 19 encountered a phenomenon of celestial nature. The last known radio transmission from the instructor pilot was heard by a ham operator, "Don't come after me . . . they look like they are from outer space. . . I'm at 2,300 feet. Don't come after me." After one of the most intensive air-sea rescue operations in U.S. naval history, the Naval Board of Inquiry said, we were not able to make even a good guess as to what happened."

4. On 7 January 1948, a ANG F-51 pilot was lost near Godman AFB, Kentucky. After being directed to lead his flight of four F-51s by the tower, Captain Thomas Mantell pursued a large metallic object alone after two pilots returned to Godman AFB, and finally his wingman was ordered to return to the field. It is believed that Mantell was following a large, structured object not in the flight path of a classified Navy SKYHOOK balloon. Mantell radioed Godman tower that he was at 22,000 feet and still climbing. At one point Mantell said that the object had paced his aircraft for several minutes, then would speed up. His last transmission to the tower was, "It appears to be a metallic object . . . and it is of tremendous size . . . It appears to be a metallic object or possibly the reflection of sun from a metallic object." When Godman personnel arrived at the crash scene, Mantell's F-51 was found in many pieces, not large sections as one would find from a free stick descent The wreckage contained unusual damage as if Mantell's plane was repeatedly hit by shotgun blasts. Some of the metal had pitted surfaces and unusual scoring. All rubber material had disintegrated in a soft powdery substance. There was no indication of gunfire damage or foul burn. The crash site and debris exibited an unusually high amount of radiation of undetermined nature. The site was cleared of debris and covered. Mantell's plane was subsequently sent to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio for examination. A autopsy was conducted on the body and interned in storage for future study. It is believed by the Air Force investigators that Mantell's plane had been destroyed by a ionisation phenom men, possibly from the propulsion wash of the object's exhaust.

5. From 1949 to late 1950, there have been several crashes of B-36 bombers on routine artic patrol that bear all the earmarks of the Mantell incident. None of the crews were found. The atomic bombs were not recovered, thus creating a serious problem for the Air Force when nuclear weapons are lost over friendly countries.

6. The death of two Air Force counterintelligence officers in the crash of their B-25 aircraft enroute to Hamilton AFB, California, after interviewing two auxiliary CG men who reported six UFOs over Maury Island, Washington, in June 1947. CIC agent Crisman had spoken to Kenneth Arnold, who on 26 June 1947, had reported a flight of UFOs over Mt. Rainier, Washington, and filed his report after he had spoken to Captain Davidson and Lieutenant Brown. The material given to Davidson and Brown was believed to come from Maury Island and may be celestrial fragments containing metal from a nuclear reacter from a UFO. Fragments were turned over to CIA agent Shaw, and Crisman was ordered to the Alaskan ADC for assignment in Project IVY.

[redacted]

7. Aerial interference with military aircraft has demonstrated the ability to observe our air operations in war and peacetime conditions. During the war over 900 near-miss incidents were reported by allied pilots and crews in all theater of operations. One of the most dramatic near-miss encounters occurred on 14 October 1943, 8th AF Mission 115 over Schwienfurt, Germany. B-17 crews reported many formations of silverly discs flying down into the B-17 formations. Several times during the bombing mission, large objects were seen following the discs descent into the formations. Unlike previous reports, no engine failures or airframe damage was reported. After the surrender of Nazi Germany, GAF fighter pilots were interrogated by AF intelligence concerning Mission 115. GAF did not have any aircraft above our bombers at that time.

8. On 1 August 1946, a C-47 piloted by Captain Jack E. Puckett, Assistant Chief of Flying Safety for TAC, experienced a near-miss of a cylindrical-shaped aircraft about 100 meters in length. The incident occurred at an altitude of 4,000 feet, northeast of Tampa, Florida. Just 1,000 yards on a collision course, the UFO flipped over sideways, crossing the flight path of Puckett's C-47. Three other crew members observed the UFO and described it as being over twice the length of a B-29 and cylindrical in shape with luminated windows. Observers on the C-47 reported a stream of fire trailing the object. The crew and Puckett watched the UFO for over three minutes. TAC radar stations had tracked a large target approaching the C-47 and then performed a right-angle course change while flying at speeds of excess of 600 mph.

9. On 1 October 1948, a ANG F-51 pilot engaged a blinking luminus UFO in a dogfight-style encounter over Fargo, North Dakota.

10. On 24 April 1949, engineers and technicians from the White Sands Proving Ground observed a elliptically-shaped object moving in a eastward course at very high altitude. The object was discovered while tracking a Skyhook balloon through a theodolite. The object appeared whitish in color and pale yellow at the tail end. The object was estimated to be two-and-a-half times as long as it was wide. It was difficult to see any structure of the object as it was moving at a very high speed. The object was observed through a theodolite for approximately one minute before disappearing in a steep climb. The object was estimated to be traveling at an altitude of over 60 miles.

ANNEX C (Cont'd)

11. From 1944 to early 1951, our atomic bomb and component plants have been the target of UFO reconnaissance. Of late, our NEPA projects are of special attention to the visitors. During some of the flights, radiation levels have risen sharpely, then dropping suddenly to normal. In some instances plutonium production has been halted due to contamination of plant personnel during these sightings of low-level flights.

12. On 25 October 1950, the Superintendent of Security, Oak Ridge, filed a security report for X-10. He stated that a round object, about ten feet in diameter, burnished yellow in color, hung low over the Control Zone. The object would move slightly from one side to the other and emit a low hum sound.

13. On 24 October 1950, the Assistant Chief of Security, NEPA Division, Oak Ridge, observed a similar object near the restricted area (Restricted Fying Zone). The object emitted a varying color of light from red to green, to blue to orange. This sighting was confirmed by a Air Force officer also of NEPA Division, Oak Ridge. Radar from Knoxville Airport tracked several slow moving targets flying over the Southeast sector of the "Restricted Zone". Fighters were vectored to the radar targets but the pilot reported no visual contact.

14. Naval aircraft with nuclear weapons delivery capability have reported a sudden drop in neutron counters. Aircraft carrier storage of nuclear weapons have also reported unusual neutron counts. During recent NATO naval maneuvers, the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt has been trailed by numerous UFOs for long periods on-and-off since 1950. ?

CONCLUSIONS:

The future of American citizens and the world for that matter are jeopardized today by developments as portentious as those leading to World War II. Given the growing challenge from the Soviet Union and her satellites and the intrusion of extraterrestrials, the United States is compelled, therefore, to initiate realistic lines of action to protect United States strategic interests.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended:
That the United States Government provide as early as practicable moral, advisory, and material support to the MAJESTIC-12 Project in order to contribute to the early establishment of peace in the world in consonance with the enunciated principles of the United Nations, and to protect United States strategic interests against forces which now threaten them.

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A20707 5/4/54/050

Oct 24 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Communications Intelligence Activities

The communications intelligence (COMINT) activities of the United States are a national responsibility. They must be organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources in all participating departments and agencies and to satisfy the legitimate intelligence requirements of all such departments and agencies.

I therefore designate the Secretary of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT, which Committee shall, with the assistance of the Director of Central Intelligence, establish policies governing COMINT activities, and keep me advised of such policies through the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

I further designate the Department of Defense as executive agent of the Government, for the production of COMINT information.

I direct this Special Committee to prepare and issue directives which shall include the provisions set forth below and such other provisions as the Special Committee may determine to be necessary.

1. A directive to the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB). This directive will replace the National Security Council Intelligence Directive No.9, and shall prescribe USCIB's new composition, responsibilities and procedures in the COMINT fields. The directive shall include the following provisions:

a. USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the Special Committee, and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of the new directive. Only those departments or agencies represented in USCIB are authorized to engaged in COMINT activities.

Downgraded per NSC Information Security Oversight Office, 28 Jan 1981

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b. The Board shall be composed of the following members:

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the Chairman of the Board.

(2) A representative of the Secretary of State.

(3) A representative of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) A representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(5) The Director of the National Security Agency.

(6) A representative of the Department of the Army.

(7) A representative of the Department of the Navy.

(8) A representative of the Department of the Air Force.

(9) A representative of the Central Intelligence Agency.

c. The Board shall have a staff headed by an executive secretary who shall be appointed by the Chairman with approval of the majority of the Board.

d. It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the following procedure, with respect to any matter relating to communications intelligence which falls within the juristiction of the Director of NSA.

(1) The Board shall reach its decision by a majority vote. Each member of the Board shall have one vote except the representatives of the Secretary of State and of Central Intelligence Agency who shall each have two votes. The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, will have no vote. In the event that the Board votes and reaches a decision, any dissenting member of the Board may appeal from such decision written 7 days to the

Special Committee. In the event that the Board votes but fails to reach a decision, any member of the Board may appeal within 7 days to the Special Committee. In either event the Special Committee shall review the matter, and its determination thereon shall be final. Appeals by the Director of NSA and/or the representatives of the Military Departments shall only be filed with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) If any matter is voted on by the Board but-

(a) no decision is reached and any member files an appeal;

(b) a decision is reached in which the representative of the Secretary of defense does not concur and files an appeal; no action shall be taken with respect to the subject matter until the appeal is decided, provided that, if the Secretary of Defense determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that the subject matter presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action, his decision shall govern, pending the result of the appeal. In such an emergency situation the appeal may be taken directly to the President.

(3) Recommendations of the Board adopted in accordance with the foregoing procedures shall be binding on the Secretary of Defense. Except on matters which have been voted on by the Board, the Director of NSA shall discharge his responsibilities In accordance with his own judgement, subject to the direction Of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) The Director of NSA shall make such report and furnish such information from time to time to the Board, either orally

in writing, as the Board may request, and shall bring to the attention of the Board either such reports or otherwise any new major policies or programs in advance of their adoption by him.

e. It shall also be the duty of the Board as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of NSA;

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence activities among all departments and agencies authorized by the President to participate therein;

(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subject to the provisions of NSCID No.5, to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence; and

(3) to consider and make recommendations concerning policies relating to communications intelligence of common interest to the departments and agencies, including security standards and procedures, and, for this purpose, to investigate and study the standards and practices of such departments and agencies in utilizing and protecting COMINT information.

f. Any recommendation of the Board with respect to the matters described in paragraph e above shall be binding on all departments or the members of the Board. Recommendations approved by a majority, but not all of the members of the Board shall be transmitted by it to the Special Cimmittee for such action as the Special Committee may see fit To take.

g. The Board will meet monthly, or oftener at the call of the Chairman or any member, and shall determine its own procedures.

2. A directive to the Secretary of Defense. This directive shall Include the following provisions.

a. Subject to the specific provisions of this directive, the Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or in part authority over The Director of NSA within his department as he sees fit.

b. The COMINT mission of the National Security Agency (NSA) shall Be to provide an effective, unified organization and control of the communications intelligence activities of the United States conducted against foreign governments, to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures pertaining thereto. As used in this directive, the terms ‘communications intelligence: or ‘COMINT” shall be construed all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts and the intended recipients,* but shall include censorship and the production and dissemination of finished intelligence.

c. NSA shall be administrated by a Director, designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be eligible for reappointment. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3 star rank during the period of his incumbancy.

d. Under the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with approved policies of USCIB, the Director of NSA shall be responsible for accomplishing

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• See Public Law 513- -81st Congress 1950.

the mission of the NSA. For this purpose all COMINT collection and production resources of the United States are place under his operational and technical control. When action by the Chiefs of the operating agencies of the Services or civilian departments or agencies is required, the Director shall normally issue instructions pertaining to COMINT operations through them. However, due to the unique technical character of COMINT operations, the Director is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements under his operational control task assignments and pertinent instructions which are within the capacity of such elements to accomplish. He shall also have direct access to, and direct communication with, any elements of the service or civilian COMINT agencies on any other matters of operational and technical control as may be necessary, and he is authorized to obtain such information and intelligence material from them as he may require. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense by the Chief of Service or head of civilian department or agency concerned.

e. Specific responsibilities of the Director of NSA include the following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans and policies for the conduct of the U.S. COMINT activities.

(2) Conducting COMINT activities, including research and development, as required to meet the needs of the departments and agencies which are authorized to receive the products of COMINT.

(3) Determining; and submitting to appropriate authorities, Requirements for logistic support for the conduct of COMINT activities, together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should apply.

(4) Within NSA's field of authorized operations prescribing requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of COMINT material within and among the COMINT elements under his operational or technical contro[1]; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervising control, including inspections if necessary, to ensure compliance with the regulations.

(5) Subject to the authorities granted the Director of Central Intelligence under NSCID No.5, conducting all liaison on COMINT matters with foreign governmental communications intelligence agencies.

f. To the extent he deemd feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximizing over-all efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, the Director shall centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT functions for which he is responsible. It is recognized that in certain circumstances elements of the Armed Forces and other agencies being served will require close COMINT support. Where necessary for this close support, direct operational control of specified COMINT facilities and resources will be delegated by the Director, during such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to military commanders or the Chiefs of other agencies supported.

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g. The Director shall exercise such administrative control over COMINT activities as he deems necessary to the effective/perfomance of his mission. Otherwise, administrative control of personnel and facilities will remain with the departments and agencies providing them.

h. The Director shall make provision for participation by representatives of each of the departments and agencies eligible to receive COMINT products in those offices of NSA where priorities of intercept and processing are finally planned.

i. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary responsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective employment of the best available human and scientific resources in the field of cryptologic research and development.

j. Nothing in this directive shall contravene the responsibilities of the individual departments and agencies for the final evaluation of COMINT information, its synthesis with information from other sources, and the dissemination of finished intelligence to users.

3. The special nature of COMINT activities requires that they be treated in all respects as being outside the framework of the general intelligence activities. Orders, directives, policies, or recommendations of any authority of the Executive Branch relating to the collection, production, security, handling, dissemination, utilization of intelligence, and/or classified material, shall not be applicable to COMINT activities, unless specifically so stated and issued by component departments or agency authority represented on the Board. Other National Security Council Intelligence Directives to the Director of Central Intelligence shall be construed as non-applicable to COMINT activities, unless the National Security Council has made its directive specifically applicable to COMINT.

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/s/ HARRY S. TRUMAN

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DISPATCHED
N.S.C.
JUN 29 3 [illegible] PM '61

TOP SECRET June 28, 1961

NATIONAL SECURITY MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Review of MJ-12 Intelligence Operations as they relate to Cold War Psychological Warfare Plans

I would like a brief summary from you at your earliest convenience.

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SENSITIVE

5 November 1961

Operations Review
by Allen W. Dulles

THE MJ-12 PROJECT

The Overview. In pursuant to the Presidential National Security Memorandum of June 28, 1961, the U.S. intelligence operations against the Soviet Union are currently active in two broad areas; aircraft launch vehicles incorporating ELINT and SIGINT capabilities; and balloon borne decoys with ECM equipment.

The Situation. The overall effectiveness about the actual Soviet response and alert status is not documented to the point where U.S. intelligence can provide a true picture of how Soviet air defenses perceive unidentified flying objects.

Informational sources have provided some detail on coded transmissions and tactical plans whose reliability is uncertain, and thus, do not give us precise knowledge of Soviet Order of Battle. Current estimates place Soviet air and rocket defenses on a maximum alert footing with air operations centered on radar and visual verification much the same as ours.

Future psychological warfare plans are in the making for more sophisticated vehicles whose characteristics come very close to phenomena collected by Air Force and NSA elements authorized for operations in this area of intelligence.

Basis for Action. Earlier studies indicated that Americans perceived U.F.O. sightings as the work of Soviet propaganda designed to convince U.S. intelligence of their technical superiority and to spread distrust of the government. CIA conducted three reviews of the situation utilizing all available information and concluded that 80% of the sighting reports investigated by the Air Force's Project Blue Book were explainable and posed no immediate threat to national security. The remaining cases have been classified for security reasons and are under review. While the possibility remains that true U.F.O. cases are of non-terrestrial origin, U.S. intelligence is of the opinion that they do not constitute a physical threat to national defense. For reasons of security, I cannot divulge pertinent data on some of the more sensitive aspects of MJ-12 activities which have been deemed properly classified under the 1954 Atomic Ene[illegible]of 1954.

I hope this clarifies the necessity to keep current operations w[illegible]A activities in sensitive areas from becoming official disclosure. From time to time, updates will be provided through NIE as more information becomes available.

(Signed) Allen W. Dulles

This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States within
of the Espionage Laws, Title 18,
U. S. C., Section 793 and 794. The transmission
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Authority of Director of Central Intelligence Clarified

The following letter is considered to be of fundamental importance to the CIA's responsibility in **collecting** UFO Intelligence and redefines the authority of the DCI. This letter was written in 1962, signed by President Kennedy, and directed to John A. McCone, who succeeded Allen W. Dulles as Director in late 1961. Prior to this letter, uncertainty had prevailed among the various units in the UFO intelligence community as to whether the DCI was simply head of another agency or chief of the entire system. The letter reaffirms that the Director is both the President's personal representative and the government's chief intelligence officer.

> In carrying out your newly assigned duties as Director of Central Intelligence it is my wish that you serve as the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer, and as such that you undertake, as an integral part of your responsibility, the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort. As the Government's principal intelligence officer, you will assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to me and to other recipients as appropriate. In fulfillment of these tasks I shall expect you to work closely with the heads of all departments and agencies having responsibilities in the foreign intelligence field.
>
> In coordinating and guiding the total intelligence effort, you will serve as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, with a view to assuring the efficient and effective operation of the Board and its associated bodies. In this connection I note with approval that you have designated your deputy to serve as a member of the Board, thereby bringing to the Board's deliberations the relevant facts and judgements of the Central Intelligence Agency.

With the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned you will maintain a continuing review of the programs and activities of all U.S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities with a view to assuring efficiency and effectiveness and to avoiding undesirable duplication.

As head of the Central Intelligence Agency, while you will continue to have over-all responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the direction of the detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as Director of Central Intelligence.

It is my wish that you keep me advised from time to time as to your progress in the implementation of this directive and as to any recommendations you may have which would facilitate the accomplishment of these objectives.

TOP SECRET NOT FOR PUBLICATI

COUNTRY New York, US

SUBJECT Marilyn Monroe

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE DISTR 3 August 1962

NO PAGES [redacted]

REFERENCES MOON DUST Project

DATE OF INFO 3 August 1962

PLACE ACQ [redacted]

[illegible]

Wiretap of telephone conversation between reporter Dorothy Kilgallen and h close friend, Howard Rothberg (A); from wiretap of telephone conversati of Marilyn Monroe and Attorney General Robert Kennedy (B). Appraisal of Content: [redacted]

1. Rothberg discussed the apparent comeback of subject with Kilgallen and the break up with the Kennedys. Rothberg told Kilgallen that she was attending Hollywood parties hosted by the "inner circle" among Hollywood's elite and was becoming the talk of the town again. Rothberg indicated in so many words, that she had secrets to tell, no doubt arising from her trysts with the President and the Attorney General. One such "secret" mentions the visit by the President at a secret air base for the purpose of inspecting things from outer space. Kilgallen replied that she knew what might be the source of visit. In the mid-fifties Kilgallen learned of secret effort by US and UK governments to identify the origins of crashed spacecraft and dead bodies, from a British government official. Kilgallen believed the story may have come from the New Mexico desert in the late forties. Kilgall said that if the story is true, it would cause terrible embarrassment to Jack and his plans to have NASA put men on the Moon.

2. Subject repeatedly called the Attorney General and complained about the w she was being ignored by the President and his brother.

3. Subject threatened to hold a press conference and would tell all.

4. Subject made reference to "bases" in Cuba and knew of the President's pla to kill Castro.

5. Subject made reference to her "diary of secrets" and what the newspapers would do with such disclosures.

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET CIA COPY

HEGEMAN-HARRIS COMPANY
INC.
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

TELEPHONE COLUMBUS 5-7200

September 19, 1963

Doctor Donald H. Menzel
Harvard College Observatory
Cambridge 28, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Menzel:

Please accept my deepest apologies for the delay in answering your letter of 2 August, as well as the acknowledgment of the receipt of your book. I was away for some time during the summer and the Navy Department forwarded your letter to my home where I was a long time receiving it.

Thank you very much for your book. To my mind, it was very well done and I enjoyed it and found it of great interest. I should say that you have effectively put to rest all surmises about flying saucers being from "outer space". You have done a thorough and praiseworthy job.

As I told you at the last "Ends of the Earth", I resigned from NICAP about 20 months ago feeling that it had degenerated from an organization honestly trying to find out something definite about possible unknowns, into a body bickering about personalities. The Air Force, too, could have helped by not being so secretive.

At all events, you have done a fine job and I am very grateful you were so kind as to send me your book.

Again with thanks and the hope of seeing you at the next "Ends of the Earth", please believe me

Most cordially,

R. H. Hillenkoetter
Vice Admiral, U.S.N. (Ret.)
Vice President

AMP

TOP SECRET

10/27/65
Copies to L. Boyd
W. Wellman
Adm Hillenkoetter

[redacted]

draft

TOP SECRET

November 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Director [redacted], Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Classification review of all UFO intelligence files affecting National Security

As I had discussed with you previously, I have initiated [redacted] and have instructed James Webb to develop a program with the Soviet Union in joint space and lunar exploration. It would be very helpful if you would have the high threat cases reviewed with the purpose of identification of bona fide as opposed to classified CIA and USAF sources. It is important that we make a clear distinction between the knowns and unknowns in the event the Soviets try to mistake our extended cooperation as a cover for intelligence gathering of their defence and space programs.

When this data has been sorted out, I would like you to arrange a program of data sharing with NASA where Unknowns are a factor. This will help NASA mission directors in their defensive responsibilities.

I would like an interim report on the data review no later than February 1, 1964.

/S/ John F. Kennedy

11/20/63

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET
UMBRA

NSA INTERCEPT OF THE "HOT LINE"
COMSEC FILE DATED 11/12/63

ETCRRM TX HOURLY TEST
FROM: OOTP
TO :PUSSR
SUBJ : UFO WORKING GROUPS

WHCA
SOD
DCIA
DNSA
NMCC
CJCS
SECSTATE
NSC

"Mr. Premiere a situation has developed that affects both our countries and the world and I feel it necessary to convey to you a problem that we share in common."

"Mr. President I agree."

"As you must appreciate the tension between our two great nations has often brought us to the brink of showmanship with all the tapestry of a Greek comedy and our impasse last year was foolish and deadly. The division that separates us is through misunderstanding, politics, and cultural differences. But we have one thing in common which I would like to address to your working group on the UFO problem."

"Yes, yes...I agree with your assessment. We nearly tied the knot that divides us permanently. Our working group believes the same way as yours. The UFO problem presents grave dangers to our countries and to the whole world. If we allow suspicions and miscalculations to force our military defense systems to react to this problem...God will never forgive us."

"Then you agree Mr. Premiere that we should cooperate together on this issue?"

"Yes, Mr. President."

"Mr. Premiere, I have begun an initiative with our NASA to exchange information with your Academy of Sciences in which I hope will foster mutual concern over this problem and hopefully find some resolution. I have also instructed our CIA to provide me with full disclosure on the phantom aspects and classified programs in which I can better assess the situation. Can you persuade your KGB to do likewise."

"Mr. President, I cannot guarantee full cooperation in this area but I owe it to future history and the security of our planet to try. As you must know I have been somewhat limited in my official capacity as Party Chairman to order such cooperation in this area. We too feel that the UFO is a matter of highest importance to our collective security. If I can arrange for a secret meeting between our working groups at a secret location and at a time designated by you, I feel that this much on my part can happen."

"Mr. Premiere, if a meeting at this level can convene it will be a important first step. It will lead to more dialog and trust between our countries and reduce the ever present threat of nuclear war."

"Yes, Mr. President it will."

"Then we are in agreement."

"Yes."

“Until we talk again, this conversation is classified top secret between us.”

“Yes. Until we talk again.”

COPY
FILE

Received 6/30/99
Timothy Cooper

June 23, 1999

Mr. Timothy Cooper
P.O. Box 1206
Big Bear Lake, CA 92315

Mr. Cooper:

I am a retired CIA counterintelligence officer who worked for Jim Angelton from [redacted] secret files [redacted] sensitive files that would connect MJ-12 to JFK's murder. This document did not exist officially and has never been disclosed within the agency. AWD was very fearful of disclosure to unauthorized channels and leaks in the White House. I literally snatched the "Directives" from the fire and have kept them safe from review. To allow a review would compromise future directors and put the agency in a difficult position.

I feel the time is fast approaching when the files of the Majestic/Jehovah project will be pried loose and the public's right to know should begin. We in CI have monitored civilian UFO research for a long time and have played a major role in keeping the UFO community busy. [redacted] that the MJ-12 Directives be sent to you and hopefully, be disseminated in a responsible manner.

I think your decision to work with Dr. Wood was a good one. He has credibility and good science skills. I hope you have read the BLUE BOOK/MAJIC Report with an open mind and a critical eye for detail. This, you might say, is the missing BLUE BOOK files (don't confuse these with Project BLUE BOOK). You need proof and here it is. I don't think you realize it but you and Dr. Wood have started a shit storm. Nixon's SCEO ordered all MJ-12 documentation purged and destoyed. This one was not. This carbon copy is the only link to MJ-12 and don't expect any more in the future. Eveything is now on computers and there is no existing paper trail to my knowledge. If you play your cards right, you should make progress with what you have. I caution you to be car~~f~~eful about who you talk to and trust with this information.

FILE

P.S.
Not everyone has
good intentions
watch your ass

Central Intelligence Agency

From: Director of Central Intelligence (MJ-1)

To: MJ-2
MJ-3
MJ-4
MJ-5
MJ-6
MJ-7

Ref: Project MAJESTIC a[illegible] JEHOVAH (MJ)
Project EVIRO
Project PARASITE
Project PARHELION

In the context of the above it has become necessary to review and evaluate duplication of field activities in light of the current situation. To eliminate this problem, I have drafted new directives for your review and consideration. Please evaluate each draft on its own merit with the goal of finding acceptable solutions in which all can agree on. As you must know LANCER has made some inquiries regarding our activities which we cannot allow. Please submit your views no later than October. Your action to this matter is critical to the continuance of the group.

Tab (A) President's EYES ONLY
Tab (B) "NEED-TO-KNOW"
Tab (C) DoD 5200.1
Tab (D) Project BLUE BOOK
Tab (E) Freedom of Information
Tab (F) PSYOP
Tab (G) BW
Tab (H) Project ENVIRONMEN

DO [illegible]T REMOVE FR[illegible] SAFE

Original carbon

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DRAFT

Directive Regarding President's EYES ONLY

In the likely event that the subject of unidentified flying objects or unconventional aerial weapons is a subject matter under discussion with the Chief Executive, National Security Council Staff, department heads, the Joint Chiefs, and foreign representatives, a clarification of the question is in order to ascertain the reason(s) for bringing up the subject. A standard response should be suffice to redirect the question. Under no circumstances should a member suggest or by inference, that the subject is classified as a national security threat. In the unlikely event that UFO's overtly display hostile intent towards the security of the United States, as a group, and after consultation, should a full disclosure be made in accordance with the law as required.

[illegible]

Directive Regarding "NEED-TO-KNOW"

In order to facilitate cooperation with current activities of the group, effective immediately "NEED-TO-KNOW" should [illegible] granted to the Director, FBI for maintenance of [illegible] such time FBI involvement is no longer required. [illegible] back channel contacts should not be compromised by this action.

DRAFT

[illegible] Regarding DoD 5200.1

Until [illegible]200.1 will be utilized only in the perf[illegible] special task functions with military intelligence liai[illegible] as specified in SCEO and 54/12 policy directive.

DRAFT

Directive Regarding Project [illegible] BOOK

[illegible] BOOK will continue in its [illegible] intelligence [illegible] activities and counterintelligence functions as specified in current NIE. Reference to BLUE BOOK is authorized only when responding to public and congressional inquiries.

C1

DRAFT

Directive Regarding Freedom of Information

Priority requests forwarded to members by authorized individuals or institutions are temporarily denied until the threat of exposure is eliminated and the assurance that no residuals are present before requests are acted upon.

DRAFT

Directive Regarding [illegible]

PSYOP [illegible] the existing structure [illegible] condition GREEN until such time they are told to [illegible]. Units designated for GREEN are authorized to interrogate and [illegible]tain any and all targets.

DRAFT

Directive Regarding BW

Designated MJ projects should be held in readiness [illegible] perform SPIKE and HOUSE CLEANING operations in major population centers in the event conventional methods are not satisfactory. Specialists from MK-ULTRA and ARTICHOKE are hereby activated to conduct DOMESTIC.

DRAFT

Directive Regarding Project ENVIRONMENT

When conditions become non-conducive for growth in our environment and Washington cannot be influenced any further, the weather is lacking any perturbation....it should be wet.

[redacted]

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CATEGORY 4
DECLASSIFY ON JAN 12 1996

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[redacted]

"WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. FORMERLY RESRICTED DATA. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS. HANDLE AS RESTRICTED DATA IN FOREIGN DISSEMINATION. SECTION 144b, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, 1954.

Process in accordance to DoD 5200.1-R 4-400 and applicable NSAR, DIA, DARPA, CIA, and DoD issuances except when MAJSEC directives require approval prior to downgrading of classification level compliant to SCEO's

Design of the non-nuclear components of a propulsion system generally follow standard practices for similar components in chemical rocket engines. These are detailed elsewhere in the literature and are not given here. The most important considerations in overall engine design are those concerned with optimizing the choice of design parameters to yield best overall system performance. . . ."

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Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act 1954
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ISOTOPE THERMAL THRUSTERS AND APPLICATIONS

John S. Martinez
Manager, Propulsion Research Department
TRW/Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Redondo Beach, California, U.S.A.

I. Introduction.
II. Isotope Heat-Source Technology
III. Thruster Design Details
IV. Stage Design
V. Low Thrust Orbital Mechanics and Mission Analyses
VI. Aerospace Safety Considerations
VII. Summary

I. INTRODUCTION

Within the past two or three years it has become increasingly apparent that there exists a wide range of useful applications for lightwieght, high radioisotope-powered thermal thrusters. The most promising of these thrusters employs radioisotope alpha sources to heat low molecular weight working fluids (such as H_2) which then are expanded through a nozzle to produce thrust. . . . The possiblity of employing isotopes for propulsion purposes has been mentioned several times in the literature[1,2] during the past in connection with high thrust (nuclear rocket scale) application and quickly rejected as ~~impractical~~ impractical for the following reasons:

(1) lack of availability of isotopes (in megawatt quantities)
(2) low specific power (hence, heavy weight of isotopes), and
(3) inability to modulate power level.

Recently it has been established that all these limitations can be overcome through proper design and through appropriate choice of mission and thrust level. . . . Isotope power output cannot be turned on and off. However, simple, single-pass thrusters can be constructed which maintain their thermal and structural integrity under both flow and no-flow conditions. When propellant flows through the thruster most of the isotope heat is absorbed in the propellant and the remainder is radiated by the outer shell of the thruster to its surroundings. When flow terminates, all of the isotope heat is radiated away from the thruster with only slight increase in maximum thruster temperature. Thus, although it is not possible to modulate the heat generation rate it is possible to modulate thrust. . . . there are a large number of missions which radioisotope propulsion systems promise to perform more economically than any other form of chemical, nuclear or electric propulsion system. Included among these are:

(1) Transfer from low to high orbit. . .
(2) Deep space probes. . .
(3) Sustaining low altitude orbits. . .
(4) Special scientific probes(field mapping and micrometeroite measurements while spiraling out from low earth orbits, etc.).
(5) Attitude control of large spacecraft.

One of the isotope thrusters under study in the U.S.A.+ uses a Po-210 alpha source to generate $\frac{1}{4}$ lb of thrust, weighs between 25 and 30 lb and delivers' impulses in the 700 to 800-sec range. . . a miniture version of the direct-cycle nuclear rocket which is under development in the Rover program TRW/STL has dubbed this thruster POODLE.

---

[1] R.W. Bussard and R.D. DeLauer, Nuclear Rocket Propulsion, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1958

[2] H.S. Seifert, M.M. Mills and M. Summerfield, The Physics of Rockets, reprinted from the Am. J. Phys., 15, Nos. 1,2 and 3 (1947)

+ By the Space Technology Laboratories (STL) Division of the Thompson Ramo Wooldridge (TRW) Corporation under joint USAEC and USAF sponsorship.

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* AGARD (Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development) was a scientific panel that advised the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) on "problems, prospects, and possibilities in the nuclear propulsion field".

In its preface to the book NUCLEAR THERMAL AND ELECTRIC ROCKET PROPULSION Fundamentals, Systems, and Applications AGARD/NATO First and Second Lecture Series in cooperation with the Universite Libre de Bruxelles 12-21 November 1962 28 September-2October 1964 by R.A. Willaume (AGARD Director Plans and Programmes), A. Jaumotte (Faculte des Sciences Appliquees, Universite Libre de Bruxelles), R.W. Bussard (Space Technology Laboratories, Course Director). Published by Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1967, it made this tribute to Theodore von Karman:

> "Through the vision and foresight of the late Dr. Theodore von Karman, founder and General Chairman of the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development of the NATO nations, a lecture series was planned and held in November, 1962. . . This first lecture course was concerned principally with the exposition of the fundamentals of nuclear thermal and electric propulsion (italics mine) and was held in order to acquaint a high level technical group from the NATO nations with the basics of a relatively new field which promised much for the future of aerospace propulsion systems. . . The enthusiastic reception with which the material was met by the European technical community involved, prompted both Dr. von Karman and R. Willaume to initiate plans for a second lecture series aimed at exploring more specific features of each class of nuclear propulsion systems. . . ."

The table of contents contain the following subjects:

- Fundamentals of Nuclear Propulsion
- Isotope/Thermal Thrusters and Applications
- Fast and Moderate Reactors and Applications of Low-Power Nuclear Rockets
- Nuclear Rockets Based on Graphite Reactors
- Technology: Applications and Development Status
- Operational Considerations, Radiation Hazards and Safety
- Nuclear Space Power Systems: Reactors, Conversion Equipment and Power Systems Technology
- Advanced Technology for Large Space Power Systems
- Electric Propulsion: Systems, Flight Mechanics, Power Sources, and Mission Applications

Retyped notes
Von Karman's lectures
thoroughly useful.
[redacted]

In order to summerize the material covered at the 1962 and 1964 lectures, [redacted]eactors and electric drive systems [redacted] It must be remembered that it was von Karman who pushed the Air Force to utilize nuclear energy as a power source for high speed aircraft and rockets in the mid-forties. Also, he advanced the knowledge gained from the practical applications of flying-wing designs that were more than 50 years ahead of its time. Also another point of note. It was President John F. Kennedy that ~~as well~~ advocated space exploration as no American president did. Again, it was von Karman and German scientists that designed and created the NASA Gemini and Apollo programs that allowed human beings to go to the moon and return.

FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION--R.W. Bussard, TRW Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Redondo Beach, California.

OUTLINE

I. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
   A. External Ballistics
   B. Internal Dynamics
II. REACTOR NEUTRONICS
   A. Basic Principals of Fission Reactor
   B. Criticality and Time-Dependenc

In light of recent developments I see no reason to keep this file classified. I would suggest deletion from propulsion studies and forge ahead with A.F. work. I do not see any problems with dissemination.

R.E. Haynes

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III. RADIATION LEAKAGE AND SHIELDING
  A. Radiation Sources and Hazards
  B. Heat Exchanger and Nozzle Performance
  C. Attenuation Mechanics and Shield Design
IV. HEAT TRANSFER AND FLUID FLOW
  A. Heat Transfer Mechanisms
  B. Heat Exchanger and Nozzle Performance
V. MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS AND PROPERTIES
  A. Propellants and Their Performance
  B. Fuel Element Materials
  C. Moderators and Reflectors
VI. REACTOR DESIGN AND ENGINE CYCLE CONSIDERATION
  A. Reactor Design Principles
  B. Engine Cycles and Selection

PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS-

A. EXTERNAL BALLISTICS

1. "the basic equations of motion. . . derived from Hamilton's "principle of least action" "

"Euler-Lagrange equations for the motion of a conservative dynamical system"

". . . include the non-conservative accelerating force F from rocket motor."

2. "In considering the transfer of a rocket vehicle from one planet to another it is not sufficient to consider only the free Newtonian orbits between planetary radii. . . . We must also account for the gravitational fields of the launching and target planets. . . . For high acceleration vehicles the velocity increment requirements at each end of the journey can be taken as the root-sum-square values. Then the total one-way mission velocity requirement will be the linear sum of the two subtotals needed at each end point. . . . For a round-trip mission this must be doubled."

3. "Other losses of interest are those due to atmospheric drag, to atmospheric effects (nozzle back pressure, etc.) and to propellant consumption for turbine drive use."

4. "The types of propulsion systems proposed for low-acceleration vehicles are often such that the exhaust speed may be varied as desired over a wide range. This is particularly true of nuclear/electric ion plasma propulsion systems."

B. INTERNAL DYNAMICS

1. "The rationale of system analysis is to provide guide lines for design of the vehicle and/or engine. This can be done only if ways are found to connect internal engine parameters with external performance parameters of the vehicle. In rocket flight this can be done because the size or mass of most of the internal components is set by either the power or energy cost of the vehicle flight, and these in turn determine the external behavior. . . . These are the tank and structure, propellant, dead load, nuclear rocket motor, and turbo pump plant. . . Tank and structure mass is related to propellant mass and density. . . Turbo pump mass is related to discharge pressure and volumetric flow rate by where the second equality is derived by use of the rocket thrust equation. Nuclear rocket motor mass is roughly linearly proportional to power output."

2. "Ground launching. . . poses more difficult reactor design and development problems than does launching from free-fall. . . . Another feature of interest in use of heat exchanger nuclear rocket motor propulsion systems arises from the interrelation of reactor specific mass and propellant specific impulse. . . it is clear that a connection does exist if increased gas temperature is to be gained by varying choice of fuel element materials, since materials which offer highest melting point may be denser than those for lower temperature use."

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II. ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE TECHNOLOGY

A. GENERAL DISCUSSION

Minimum performance goals and nuclear aerospace safety requirements establish design criteria for the thruster, the isotope capsule and the fuel form within that capsule. For instance, to be useful, isotope thrusters must operate at high temperatures.

In recent years the program conducted by the AEC's Division of Isotopes Development has made great strides toward development of stable, refractory fuel forms capable at the required temperatures. This section discusses isotope heat-source technology which encompasses both isotope technology and capsule technology.

B. ISOTOPE TECHNOLOGY

I. Introduction

Radioisotopes, when they decay, emit thermal energy in a completely predictable fashion and at a rate governed by their half-lives. They, therefore, represent a compact, reliable source of heat which will continue to function independently of the surrounding enviroment. Radioisotpoes aer obtained either as by-products of fission reactor operation or are formed by neutron bombardment of target material in a reactor.

Alpha particles, because of their large mass and high positive electrical charge, have an extremely small range in solid material (measured in microns). For this reason almost 100% of their energy is converted into heat within the fuel capsules. Similarly, beta particles are completely stopped by ¼ in. of aluminum so that their kinetic enrgy is almost entirely converted into heat within the fuel capsules+.

One disadvantage associated with alpha emmitters is the helium buildup within the conatinment vessel. Upon emmission from the nucleus of the isotope, alpha particles, which are helium nuclei, combine with free electrons and form helium atoms. . . It is not yet known whether the-helium gas formed escapes by diffussion is absorbed interstitially, or merely remains as free gas and increases the pressure within the fuel capsiqle.. . No definite conclusion has yet been reached. Pending better resolution of this question all current designs are based on the assumption that the helium appears as a pressure-producing perfect has within the capsule.

2. Selection Criteria

. . . for potential high-temperature heat source application indicates the following possibilities: Sr-90, Pm-147, Pu-238, Po-210, Cm-244, Ru-106, Ce-144, and Cs-147.

The choice of an isotope for a given space application depends on the following factors:

(1) Temperature capability of available fuel forms must stisfy mission requirements.
(2) Half-life must be adequate for mission requirements.
(3) Power density must be sufficient to prevent excessive weight penalties.
(4) Isotope must have a potential availablity which is compatible with mission requirements.
(5) Isotope projected costs must be reasonable.
(6) Radiation levels must be compatible with mission limatations.

+ The beta particles are decelerated by interaction with electronic fields surrounding the nuclei of the material through which they are passing. As a result of this interaction some of the energy of the decelerated beta particle is emmitted in the form of electromagetic radiation known as bremsstrahlung.

T[illegible] SECRET
FORW[illegible]

NICAP CASES

AF EVAL

8	7	6	5	4	3	2	CASE	DATE	LOCATION
						✓	N 1	23 Jun 47	Cedar Rapids, Iowa
✓			✓			✓	2 Mng	24 Jun 47	Mt. Ranier, Wash.
					✓		3 U/I	28 Jun 47	Nr Lake Mead, Nevada
					✓		4 U/I	28 Jun 47	Maxwell AFB, Ala.
				✓			5 A/C	29 Jun 47	White Sands, N. M. # 90
			✓			✓	6 Chaff	4 Jul 47	Portland, Oregon
							7	4 Jul 47	Nr. Boise, Idaho listed as #10 at Emmit
							8	4 Jul 47	Seattle, Wash. incident #11
							9	4 Jul 47	Redmond, Oregon Poss. [illegible] to #6 at Milwaukie [illegible]
			✓		✓		10 U/I	6 Jul 47	Fairfield-Suisun AFB, Calif.
					✓		11 Rope	6 Jul 47	S.Central Wyoming
					✓	✓	12 A/C	8 Jul 47 A/C	Muroc AFB/Rogers Dry Lake, Calif.
			✓		✓	✓	13 B	8 Jul 47 B	" " " " " "
					✓	✓	14	8 Jul 47 Debris	" " " " " "
					✓	✓	15	8 Jul 47 Falling "Object"	" " " " " "
						✓	16 U/I	9 Jul 47	Nr.Boise, Idaho
						✓	N 17	10 Jul 47	S. New Mexico
				✓			N 18	Summer 47	Pittsburg, Kansas
			✓		✓		N 19	August 47	Media, Pa.
							N 20	8 Dec 47	Las Vegas, Nevada
			✓				21 B	7 Jan 48	Fort Knox, Ky.
							N 22	5 Apr 48	White Sands, N.M.
					✓		N 23	28 May 48	
			✓				N 24	July 48	Pasco, Wash.
							25	4 Jul 48	Nr. Longmont, Colorado
							N 26	Summer 48	Erie, Pa.
						✓	N 27	Summer 48	Easton, Pa.
✓					✓		N (?) 28	Summer 48	Labrador
✓			✓			✓	29 meteor	23 Jul 48	Nr. Montgomery, Ala.
✓						✓	30 U/I	1 Oct 48	Fargo, N.D.
✓					✓		31 A/C	15 Oct 48	Japan
✓							32 ?	1 Nov 48	Goose Bay, Labrador case no. 19 for [illegible]
							33 a/c	6 Nov 48	Japan Soviet recon. a/c (no. 14 for Nov
					✓	✓	34 B	18 Nov 48	Nr. Washington, D.C.
✓					✓		35 B	23 Nov 48	Fursten-Feldbruck, Germany
					✓		36 U/I	3 Dec 48	Fairfield-Suisun AFB, Calif.
			✓				37 U/I	1 Jan 49	Jackson, Miss.
						✓	38 U/I	24 Apr 49	White Sands, N.M.
							N 39	5 Jun 49	Stephensville, Newfoundland
						✓	40	10 Jun 49	White Sands, N.M. poss. case #19 for Jun
			✓	✓			41 U/I	3 Jul 49	Longview, Wash.
							N 42	August 49	N.M.
✓					✓	✓	N 43	Fall 49	Key atomic base
					✓		N 44	23 Oct 49	Nr. Baja, Calif.
					✓		N 45	2 Feb 40	Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona
				✓			N 46	22 Feb 50	Key West, Fla.
✓			✓		✓		47 Venus [illegible]	8 Mar 50	Dayton, Ohio
							48	10 Mar 50 a/c	Orangeburg, S.C. Vapor trail case no 36 for March
				✓			N 49	13 Mar 50	Clarksburg, Calif.
			✓				N 50	13 Mar 50	Mexico City, Mexico

N.M. Cases were pulled from Project Sign files and classified (TS)
1 [illegible], NM
2 Socorro, NM
3 [illegible], NM

[illegible] SECRET
FORWA[illegible] JCOM

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NICAP CASES

A/F CASE	DATE	LOCATION
N 51	16 Mar 50	Dallas, Texas
N 52	17 Mar 50	Farmington, N.Mex.
N 53	18 Mar 50	Nr. Bradford, Ill.
54 UI	20 Mar 50	Nr. Little Rock, Ark.
N 55	26 Mar 50	Reno, Nevada
N 56	26 Mar 50	Nr. Washington, D.C.
57	9 Apr 50	Shelby, N.C. case #4
N 58	24 Apr 50	Balearic Islands
59 [illegible]	27 Apr 50	White Sands, N. Mex. Photos [illegible]
N 60	27 Apr 50	Goshen, Ind.
N 61	11 May 50	McMinnville, Oregon
N 62	20 May 50	Flagstaff, Ariz.
N 63	29 May 50	Nr. Washington, D.C. Motion Picts
N 64	29 May 50	White Sands, N.Mex. (28 MAY?)
N 65	12 Jun 50	California
N 66	21 Jun 50	Hamilton AFB, Calif.
N 67	24 Jun 50	California desert
68	30 Jun 50	Nr. Kingman, Kansas case No. 51
N 69	July 50	Cincinnati, Ohio
N 70	11 Jul 50	Osceola, Ark.
71 MC	15 Aug 50	Great Falls, Mont. Mariana Photos
N 72	3 Oct 50	Pomona, Calif.
N 73	5 Oct 50	San Fernando, Calif.
N 74	27 Nov 50	Huron, S.D.
N 75	27 Nov 50	Evansville, Wisc.
N 76	Dec 50	Nr. Cheyenne, Wyo.
N 77	27 Dec 50	Bradford, Ill.
78 [illegible]	16 Jan 51	Nr. Artesia, N. Mex.
79 A/C	20 Jan 51	Nr. Sioux City, Iowa
N 80	14 Feb 51	Alamogordo, N.Mex.
81 INSUFF DATA	19 Feb 51	Kenya, Africa
82	22 May 51	Nr. Dodge City, Kansas poss. assoc. w/ case #8 Southfalls, Mont
N 83	1 Jun 51	Dayton, Ohio
N 84	14 Jul 51	Nr. White Sands, N. Mex.
N 85	23 Jul 51	March Field, Calif.
N 86	Summer 51	Augusta, Ga.
N 87	August 51	Central, N.Mex.
N 88	3 Aug 51	Nr. Pinckney, Mich.
N 89	11 Aug 51	Portland, Ore.
90 BIRD	25 Aug 51	Lubbock, Texas
91	26 Aug 51	Washington State Larson AFB, on 26th
92 B	10 Sep 51	Nr. Sandy Hook, N.J.
93 B	23 Sep 51	Nr. March AFB, Calif.
94 A/C	Fall 51	Korea 18 Oct 51
95 U/I	9 Oct 51	Terre Haute, Indiana
96 U/I	10-11Oct 51	Nr. Minneapolis, Minn.
N 97	7 Nov 51	Lake Superior
N 98	9 Nov 51	N.Mex.
N 99	10 Nov 51	Albuquerque, N.M.
? 100	1952	London, Ont., Canada
56A A/C	30 Mar 50	Selma, Alabama

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NICAP CASES

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CASE		DATE	LOCATION
101	meteor	20 Jan 52	Fairchild AFB, Wash.
102	B	21 Jan 52	Mitchel AFB, N.Y.
103		22 Jan 52	North Alaska Radar outpost
104	A/c	29 Jan 52	Wonsan, Korea
N 105		20 Feb 52	Greenfield, Mass.
N 106		10 Mar 52	Oakland, Calif.
107		29 Mar 52	Nr. Misawa, Japan
N 108		29 Mar 52	Butler, Missouri
N 109		8 Apr 52	Nr. Big Pines, Calif.
N 110		17 Apr 52	Nellis AFB, Nevada
N 111		23 Apr 52	Watertown, Mass.
112		May 52	Barra da Tijuca,Brazil
113		8 May 52	Atlantic Ocean off JacksonvilleFl
114		13 May 52	National City, Calif.
N 115		June 52	Tombstone, Ariz.
N 116		1 Jun 52	Los Angeles, Calif.
N 117		13 Jun 52	Le Bourget, France(airport)
118		18 Jun 52	California
119	UKN	19 Jun 52	Goose Bay, Labrador
120	A/c	Summer 52	MacDill AFB, Florida 23 JULY 52
N 121		1 Jul 52	Boston, Mass.
122	A/c	1 Jul 52	Fort Monmouth, N.J.
123	Birds	2 Jul 52	Tremonton, Utah
N 124		10 Jul 52	Nr. Korea
125	A/c	12 Jul 52	Chicago, Ill.
126		13 Jul 52	Nr. Washington, D.C.
127	U/I	14 Jul 52	Newport News, Virginia
128	A/c	16 Jul 52	Hampton, Va.
129		16 Jul 52	~~Salem~~ Beverly, Mass.
N 130		18 Jul 52	Nr. Denver, Colo.
131	UKN	18 Jul 52	Patrick AFB, Florida
N 132		19 Jul 52	Porto Maldo, Peru
133	INV	19/20 Jul 52	Washington, D.C.
134	B	23 Jul 52	Braintree, Mass.
N 135		23 Jul 52	Culver City, Calif.
136	U/I	24 Jul 52	Nr. Carson Sink, Nevada
137	UKN	26 Jul 52	California - William case #22
? 138		26/27 Jul 52	Washington, D.C. case #13
N 139		27 Jul 52	Ann Arbor, Mich.
140	UKN	27 Jul 52	Manhattan Beach, Calif.
141	meteor	28 Jul 52	Wisconsin-Minnesota
142	meteor	29 Jul 52	Miami, Florida
N 143		1 Aug 52	Nr. Yaak, Montana
144	B	1 Aug 52	Sharonville, Ohio
N 145		1 Aug 52	Albuquerque, N. M.
146	B	3 Aug 52	Hamilton AFB, Calif.
147	U/I	5 Aug 52	Haneda AFB, Japan
N 148		5 Aug 52	Baltimore, Md.
N 149		6/7 Aug 52	Kerkrade, Holland
N 150		13 Aug 52	Tucson, Ariz.
132A	U/I	22 JULY 52	ULVADE, TEXAS
132B	U/I	23 JULY 52	SOUTH BEND, INDIANA VISUAL
142B		29 JULY 52	PORT HURON MICHIGAN (CAMERA)

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NICAP CASES

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Case		DATE	LOCATION	
N 151		13 Aug 52	Dallas, Texas	
152		20 Aug 52	Congaree AFB, S.C.	INSUFF
N 153		22 Aug 52	Elgin, Illinois	
154	VII	24 Aug 52	Nr. Hermanas, New Mexico	
N 155	✓	28 Aug 52	Le Roy, N. Y.	
N 156		28 Aug 52	Atlanta, Ga.	
N 157		29 Aug 52	Villacoublay, France	
N 158		9 Sep 52	Portland, Oregon	
N 159		16 Sep 52	Belle Glade, Florida	
160	✓	19 Sep 52	North Sea.	BALLOON 20 SEPT
N 161		20 Sep 52	Topcliffe, Yorkshire, England	
162	[illegible]	22 Sep 52	Fairfax County, Va.	
N 163		30 Sep 52	Edwards AFB, Calif.	
N 164	✓	11 Oct 52	Newport News, V .	
N 165	✓	12 Oct 52	Palo Alto, Calif.	
N 166		13 Oct 52	Oshima, Japan	
N 167	✓	27 Oct 52	Gaillac, France	
N 168		29 Oct 52	Richmond, Va.	
169	VII	29 Oct 52	Hempstead, L.I.,N.Y.	
? 170		Fall 52	N.Y. to Puerto Rico.	
171		16 Nov 52	Nr. Landrum, S. C.	REFLECTIONS
172		25/26Nov 52	Panama Canal Zone	RADAR / INSUFF.
173	A/C	4 Dec 52	Laredo, Texas	
174	[illegible]	6 Dec 52	Nr. Galveston, Texas	
N 175		8 Dec 52	Chicago, Ill.	
176		10 Dec 52	Nr. Hanford, Washington	Odessa
177	VENUS	15 Dec 52	Goose Bay AFB, Labrador	
178	[illegible]	29 Dec 52	Northern Japan	
N 179	✓	1953	Anaco, Venezuela	
(?) 180		1953	Navy Carrier	
181		9 Jan 53	Northern Japan	Mishwa AFB
182	A/C	9 Jan 53	Santa Ana, Calif.	
N 183		22 Jan 53	Santa Fe New Mex	
184	VENUS	26 Jan 53	New Mexico radar site	RADAR WX
N 185		27 Jan 53	Livermore, Calif.	
186	VENUS	28 Jan 53	Albany, Ga.	
187	VII	29 Jan 53	Presque Isle, Me.	
N 188		30 Jan 53	Yuma, Ariz.	
189	A/C	1 Feb 52	Terre Haute, Indiana	
190	B	6 Feb 53	Rosalia, Wash.	
191	Venus	7 Feb 53	Korean area (OKINAWA)	
N 192		9 Feb 53	Virginia-N.C. border	
193	Venus	11 Feb 53	Tunis-Tripoli	
194	→	13 Feb 53	Fort Worth, Texas	[illegible] a/c
195	→	16 Feb 53	Nr. Anchorage, Alaska	Vega
196	VII	17 Feb 53	Elmendorf AFB, Alaska	
N 197		7 Mar 53	Yuma, Arizona	
N 198		Spring 53	Laredo, Texas	
N 199		5 May 53	Yuma, Ariz.	
N 200		21 May 53	Prescott, Ariz.	

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NICAP CASES

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	CASE	DATE	LOCATION
	N201	23 May 53	Union of S. Africa
	N202	9 Jul 53	Columbus, Ohio
	N203	24 Jul 53	Mt. Vernon, Ohio
	N204	31 Jul 53	Port Clinton, Ohio
✓	N205	Summer 53	Yaak, Montana
	N206	1 Aug 53	Toledo, Ohio
✓	207 Rep	9 Aug 53	Moscow, Idaho
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	208 U/I	12 Aug 53	Rapid City, S.D.
	N209	14 Aug 53	Columbus, Ohio
	N210	15 Aug 53	Crestline, Ohio
	N211	21 Aug 53	Maumee, Ohio
	N212	23 Aug 53	Columbus, Ohio
✓	213	23 ~~31~~ Aug 53	Port Moresby, New Guinea
	N214	7 Sep 53	Cleveland, Ohio
✓ ✓	N215	7 Sep 53	Vandalia, Ohio
	N216	11-13Sep53	Chiloquin, Ore.
	N217	24 Sep 53	Bexley (Columbus), Ohio
✓	N218	18 Oct 53	English Channel
	N219	30 Oct 53	Mt. Vernon, Ohio
	N220	3 Nov 53	London, England
	N221	14 Nov 53	Nr. Toledo, Ohio
✓	→222 —	23 Nov 53	Kinross AFB, Michigan No case
	N223	13 Dec 53	Central Ohio
	N224	16 Dec 53	Toledo, Ohio
✓	225 U/I	17 Dec 53	Sweden
✓ ✓	→N226	1954	Dayton, Ohio
✓	227 →	1 Jan 54	Australia INCONSISTANT DATA.
✓	N228	4 Jan 54	Quantico, Va.
✓	N229	March 54	Rouen, France
✓	N230	24 Mar 54	Baltimore, Md.
✓ ✓ ✓	N231	24 Mar 54	Florida
	N232	16 Apr 54	Grand Canyon, Ariz.
	N233	26 Apr 54	Newburyport, Mass.
	N234	10 May 54	Northern Sweden
	N235	13 May 54	Washington, D. C.
✓ ✓	N236	14 May 54	Nr. Dallas, Texas
	N237	15 May 54	Vienna, Austria
✓ ✓	238 SUN DOG	24 May 54	Dayton, Ohio (RICHMOND, INDIANA)
	N239	30 May 54	Bainbridge, N. Y.
✓	240 B	1 Jun 54	Nr. Boston, Mass.
	N241	11 June 54	Nr. Baltimore, Md.
✓ ✓	242 MARS	23 Jun 54	Columbus-Vandalia, Ohio
	N243	26 Jun 54	Idaho Falls, Idaho
✓	244 U/C	30 Jun 54	Mobile, Alabama
✓ ✓ ✓	N245	30 Jun 54	Nr. Oslo, Norway
✓ ✓ ✓	246 →	30 Jun 54	Nr. Goose Bay, Labrador Mars
✓	N247	3 Jul 54	Albuquerque, N. M.
✓	N248 —	8 Jul 54	Lancashire, England
✓	N249	11 Jul 54	Hunterdon, Pa.
	N250	28 Jul 54	North Atlantic

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NICAP CASES

	CASE	DATE	LOCATION	
N	251	28 Aug 54	Oklahoma City, Okla.	
N	252	Aug.orSep54	New York State	
	253	7 Sep 54	Origny, France	[illegible] Data
N	254	9 Sep 54	Nelson, N.Z.	
N	255	15 Sep 54	Bihar, India	
N	256	16 Sep 54	Nr. Roanoke, Va.	
	257	17 Sep 54	Rome, Italy	B
N	258	19 Sep 54	Danane, French West Africa	
N	259	20 Sep 54	Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio	
N	260	Oct 54	Cherry Valley, N.Y.	
N	261	3 Oct 54	Nr. Waben, France	
N	262	4 Oct 54	North Weald, Essex, England	
N	263	7 Oct 54	Isles-sur-Suippes, France	
	264	22 Oct 54	Marysville, Ohio	Spider gossamer
N	265	24 Oct 54	Porto Alegre, Brazil	
N	266	25 Oct 54	Belgrade, Yugoslavia	
N	267	28 Oct 54	Rome, Italy	
N	268	Fall 54	Korea	
N	269	5 Nov 54	Lookout Point, N.Z.	
	270	12 Nov 54	Louisville, Ky.	B
N	271	21 Nov 54	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	
N	272	25 Nov 54	Cordoba, Argentina	
N	273	26 Nov 54	Matasquan, N. J.	
	274	26 Nov 54	Millville, N. J.	[illegible] Data
N	275	3 Dec 54	Wilmington, N. C.	
	276	5 Dec 54	North East, Pa.	mirage
	277	7 Dec 54	Upington, Cape Province,So.Afric	ukn
N	278	15 Dec 54	Nr. Nowra, Australia.	
N	279	19 Dec 54	Vienna, Austria	
N	280	20 Dec 54	Pontiac, Mich.	
?	281	54 or 55	Coos Bay, Oregon	
(?)	282	1955	Virginia,nr.Washington,D.C.	
N	283	2 Jan 55	Nr. Punta San Juan, Venezuela	
N	284	2 Feb 55	Nr. Merida, Venezuela	
N	285	11 Feb 55	Miami to New York	
N	286	22 Apr 55	Tintinara, Australia	
	287	3-9Apr 55	New Mexico, northern Calif.	
	288	25 May 55	Alexandra Park,London,England	[illegible]
N	289	16 Jun 55	Eastern U.S.	
N	290	17 Jun 55	Nr. Adelaide, Australia.	
	291	9 Jul 55	Santa Catalina Channel,Calif.	
	292	17 Jul 55	Canton, Ohio	
N	293	26 Jul 55	Lasham, Hants, England	
N	294	26 Jul 55	Washington, D. C.	
N	295	29 Jul 55	Cincinnati, Ohio	
N	296	6 Aug 55	Cincinnati, Ohio	
N	297	21 Aug 55	Chalmette, La.	
N	298	23 Aug 55	Cincinnati, Ohio	
N	299	28 Aug 55	Yonkers, N. Y.	
N	300	2 Oct 55	Akron and Alliance, Ohio	

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NICAP CASES

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CASE	DATE	LOCATION
N301	28 Oct 55	Galloway, England
N302	31 Oct 55	Nr. Auckland, N. Z.
N303	1 Nov 55	Mojave Desert, Calif. Lakeland
304	2 Nov 55	Williston, Fla.
N305	5 Nov 55	Cleveland, Ohio
N306 ✓	9 Nov 55	Philadelphia, Pa.
N307 ✓	14 Nov 55	San Bernardino Mts., Calif.
308	20 Nov 55	Oak Ridge, Tenn. Lake City
N309	23 Nov 55	Spirit Lake, Iowa
N310	6 Dec 55	Ashfield & Greenfield, Mass.
N311	11 Dec 55	Nr. Jacksonville, Fla.
N312	29 Dec 55	New Britain, Conn.
? 313	1956	North Atlantic
N314	17 Jan 56	Orangeville, Canada
N315	22 Jan 56	Gulf of Mex, nr. New Orleans
316	17 Feb 56	Paris, France Poss 18 FEB ORLY AFB
317	5 Mar 56	Honolulu, Hawaii
318 →	8 Apr 56	Nr. Schenectady, N. Y. VENUS
N319	27 Jun 56	Trieste, Italy
N320	19 Jul 56	Hutchinson, Kansas
N321	19 Jul 56	Wide area, mapped by Wichita Eag
N322	19 Jul 56	Phoenix, Ariz.
N323	29 Jul 56	Pasadena, Calif.
N324 ✓	Aug 56	Boulder City, Nevada
N325	8 Aug 56	Hartford, Connecticut
N326	11 Aug 56	West Redding, Conn.
N327	14 Aug 56	West Hartford, Conn.
N328	19 Aug 56	Newington, Conn.
N329	20 Aug 56	Citrus Heights, Calif.
N330	21 Aug 56	Wyoming-Montana
N331	4 Sep 56	Copenhagen, Denmark
332	6 Sep 56	Pasadena, Calif.
N333	11 Sep 56	Baltic Sea
N334	Early Nov 56	Malibu, Calif.
N335	8 Nov 56	Miami, Florida
N336	14 Nov 56	Nr. Mobile, Alabama
N337 ✓	19 Nov 56	Frankfurt, Germany
N338	24/25 Nov 56	Nr. Pierre, South Dakota
339 →	Dec 56	Far East Balloon / False Tgts 17th Itazuki Japan
N340	27 Dec 56	Los Angeles, Calif.
N341	21 Jan 57	APO Army base
N342 ✓	24 Jan 57	Indiana
343	13 Feb 57	Burbank, California
N344	8 Mar 57	Nr. Houston, Texas
345	9 Mar 57	Nr. San Juan, Puerto Rico
346	23 Mar 57	Long Beach, California
N347	29 Mar 57	Off East Coast, Florida
N348	4 Apr 57	Wigtownshire, Scotland
N349	12 May 57	Moab, Utah
N350	15 Jun 57	Lancashire, England
343A	27 Feb 57	Ellington AFB, Texas A/C

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NICAP CASES

CASE	DATE	LOCATION
351	18 Jun 57	Jackson, Mississippi
352	18 Jun 57	Pacific Ocean, 150 mi. off SanFra
353	30 Jun 57	Belo Horizonte, Brazil
354	Jul 57	Azusa, Calif.
355	1 Jul 57	Avon, Mass.
356	4 Jul 57	Nr. Campos, Brazil
357	9 Jul 57	Hamilton, Ont., Canada
358	31 Jul 57	Calistoga, California
359	1 Aug 57	Toronto, Ontario, Canada
360	14 Aug 57	Nr. Joinville, Brazil
361	14 15 Aug 57	Woodland Hills, California
362	20 Aug 57	Fujisawa City, Japan
362	17 Sep 57	Ft. Devens, Mass.
364	26 Sep 57	Paris, France .
365	7 Oct 57	Cape Canaveral, Fla.
366	8 Oct 57	Bua Province, Fiji Islands
367	8 Oct 57	Nr. Boston, Mass.
368	15 Oct 57	Fountain County, Indiana
369	16 Oct 57	Australia
370	28 ~~21~~ Oct(or29)57	Nr. London, England
371	22 Oct 57	Pittsburgh, Pa.
372	23 Oct 57	Kent, England
373	2 Nov 57	Levelland, Texas
374 →	3 Nov 57	White Sands, N.M. Moon/Venus
375	4 Nov 57	Alamogordo, N. M.
376	4 Nov 57	Elmwood Park, Illinois
377	5 Nov 57	Gulf of Mexico, off New Orleans
378	5 Nov 57	Keesler AFB, Miss.
379	5 Nov 57	East St. Louis, Illinois
380	5 Nov 57	Haverhill, Mass.
381	5 Nov 57	Long Beach, California Mirage
382	6 Nov 57	Nr. Danville, Ill.
383	6 Nov 57	Nr. Atlanta, Ga.
384	6 Nov 57	Montville, Ohio
385	7 Nov 57	Lake Charles, Louisiana
386	10 Nov 57	Hammond, Indiana
387	? 12 ~~11~~ Nov 57	Nr. Los Angeles, California
388	11 Nov 57	San Fernando Valley, Calif.
389	15 Nov 57	Carthage, Tenn.
390	23 ~~22~~ Nov 57	Canutillo, Texas
391	12 Dec 57	Chatham, Windsor area,Canada
,3 ← 392	? Dec 57	Pacific Ocean
393	1 Dec 57	montebello Los Angeles, Calif.
394	12 Dec 57	Tokyo, Japan
395	16 Dec 57	Old Saybrook, Conn.
396	3 Jan 58	Hawaii.
397	9 Jan 58	Marion, Illinois
398	Hoax 16 Jan 58	Trindade Isle, Brazil
399	30 Jan 58	Lima, Peru
? 400	2 Feb 58	N.S.W., Australia

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NICAP CASES

CASE	DATE	LOCATION
401	9 Feb 58	Troy, Michigan
402	3 Mar 58	Nr. Marshall, Texas ?
403	8 Mar 58	Korea
404	20 Mar 58	Henrietta, Missouri
405	2 Apr 58	Columbus, Ohio
406	4 Apr 58	Santa Monica, Calif.
407	7 Apr 58	Newport Beach, California
408	9 Apr 58	Cleveland, Ohio
409	11 Apr 58	Johannesburg, S.Africa
410	14 Apr 58	Albuquerque, N. Mex.
411	5 May 58	San Carlos, Uruguay [illegible]
412	17 May 58	Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
413	25 May 58	Kirchberg, Hunsruck,Germany
414	27 May 58	Bahia State Coast, Brazil
415	4 Jun 58	Sarasota, Florida
416	23 Jun 58	Nr. England AFB,Louisiana
417	17 Jul 58	Chitose AFB, Japan
418	26 Jul 58	Durango, Colorado
419	Summer 58	Air Force Base.SW U.S.
420	11 Aug 58	Chautauqua Lake, N. Y.
421	17 Aug 58	Kansas City, Kansas
422	24 Aug 58	Westwood, N. J.
423	7 Sep 58	Mission, Kansas
424	8 Sep 58	Offutt AFB, Omaha,Nebraska
425	21 Sep 58	Sheffield Lake, Ohio
426	2 Oct 58	Nr. Blairstown, New Jersey
427	3 Oct 58	Nr. Rossville, Ind.
428	7 Oct 58	Nantucket, Mass.
429	12 Oct 58	Aurora, Illinois
430	26 Oct 58	Baltimore, Maryland
431	26 Oct 58	Lafayette, Indiana
432	Nov 58	Dewline radar 19 Nov. ? [illegible] AF
433	5 Nov 58	Conway, N. H.
434	20 Dec 58	Dunellen, New Jersey
435	1 Jan 59	Newport Beach, Calif.
436	8 Jan 59	Nr. Walworth, Wisconsin
437	13 Jan 59	Pymatuning Lake, Penna. ?
438	23 Jan 59	Panama
439	4 Feb 59	Gulf of Mexico
440	9 Feb 59	Imperial Beach, California
441	24 Feb 59	Pennsylvania REFUEL & PR
442	26 Feb 59	London, England
443	3 Apr 59	Ocoee, Florida
444	12 Apr 59	Montreal, Canada SEARCHLIGHTS
445	14 May 59	Des Moines, Iowa
446	3 Jun 59	Nr. Bloomington, Indiana
447	11 Jun 59	Henderson, Nevada
448	27 Jun 59	New Guinea ASTRO BODIES
449	8 Jul 59	Columbus, Indiana
450	8 Jul 59	Near Columbus, Indiana

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FORWARD [illegible] JCOM

NICAP CASES

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CASE	DATE	LOCATION
451 METEOR	11 Jul 59	Pacific Ocean 900miNE of Hawaii
N 452	12 Jul 59	Nr. Ridgecrest, California
N 453	13 Jul 59	Blenheim, N. Z.
N 454	14 Jul 59	Pampulha, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais Sta ?
N 455	24 Aug 59	Nr. Emmitsburg, Md.
456 BOAT	7 Sep 59	Wallingford, Ky.
457	24 Sep 59	Redmond, Oregon VENUS
N 458	7 Oct 59	Nr. Forrest City, Arkansas
N 459	20 Oct 59	Key West, Florida
N 460	28 Oct 59	Valparaiso, Chile
(?) 461	1960	Cincinnati, Ohio
N 462	3 Feb 60	Intervale, New Haven
N 463	5/6Feb 60	Hollywood, California
464 MOON	14 Feb 60	Nome, Alaska
N 465	16 Feb 60	Laguna Beach, California
466 [illegible]	4 Mar 60	Dubuque, Iowa
N 467	25 Apr 60	Plymouth, N. H.
N 468	4 May 60	Sarasota, Florida
N 469	18 May 60	Wellington, N. Z.
N 470	22 May 60	Majorca Isle, Mediterranean Sea
N 471	24 May 60	Ocumare del Tuy, Venezuela
N 472	8 Jun 60	New York City
N 473	1 Jul 60	Nr Leefe, Wyoming
N 474	2 Jul 60	Nr Maiquetia, Venezuela
N 475	24 Jul 60	Portville, New York
476 INVERSION	13 Aug 60	Red Bluff, California
N 477	16 Aug 60	Oak Forest, Illinois
N 478	25 Aug 60	GRUMMAN. RETROGRADE SATELLITE
N 479	26 Aug 60	Mesa, Arizona
N 480	4 Sep 60	Lexington, Kentucky
N 481	5 Sep 60	Sonoma County, California
N 482	15 Sep 60	Carrizales, Venezuela
N 483	28 Sep 60	Arlington, Texas
N 484	3 Oct 60	TASMANIA
N 485	9 Oct 60	Longpoint, Illinois
N 486	27 Oct 60	Lexington, Kentucky
N 487	24 Nov 60	Ohio
N 488	Jan 61	Missile Base
489 VENUS	10 Jan 61	Benjamin, Texas
N 490	22 Jan 61	Eglin AFB, Florida
491 METEOR	7 Feb 61	Maine
N 492	7 Feb 61	Kennebunkport, Maine
N 493	28 Feb 61	Nr Lakeville, Mass
N 494	16 Mar 61	Antarctica
N 495	9 Apr 61	Kingsville, Texas
N 496	May 61	Union Mills, Indiana
N 497	19 May 61	Long Beach, California
498	20 May 61	Tyndall AFB, Florida Venus Radar; WX
N 499	25 May 61	Shepperton, Middlesex, England
N 500	29 May 61	Newark, Ohio

SECRET
FORWARD TO MAJCOM

TENTATIVE SECRET
FORWARD TO MAJCOM

NICAP CASES

A/F

CASE	DATE	LOCATION
N501	4 Jun 61	Blue Ridge Summit, Pa
N502	19 Jun 61	Exeter, England
503	4 Jul 61	Akron, Ohio CAPELLA
504	5 Jul 61	Akron, Ohio
N505	24 Jul 61	Ilha Grande, Brazil
N506	17 Aug 61	Stillwater, Minn
507 →	13 Sep 61	Crawfordsville, Indiana NASA Sodiu Sh
508	19-20 Sep 61	Nr N Woodstock, N H [illegible]
509	21 Sep 61	Pacific Ocean, nr Wake Island
510 →	2 Oct 61	Salt Lake City, Utah Sun Dog
N511	12 Oct 61	Indianapolis, Indiana
N512	21 Oct 61	Nr Datil, New Mexico
N513	30 Oct 61	Ligonier, Pa
N514	22 Nov 61	Nr Grafton, N Dakota
N515	29 Jan 62	Eastern Holland
N516	9 Feb 62	Ashton Clinton, Beds, England
N517	11 Feb 62	Parque del Este, Caracas, Venezu
N518	24-25 Apr 62	Philadelphia, Pa
N519	30 Apr 62	
520	May 62	Argentina (MAY-JULY)
N521	18 May 62	Pompano Beach, Florida
N522	20 May 62	Defiance, Ohio
N523	21 May 62	England
524 U/I	26 May 62	Westfield, Mass
525 U/I	27 May 62	Palmer, Alaska
526 U/I	30 Jun 62	Richmond, Va
N527	10 Jul 62	New Iberia, Louisiana
528	17 Jul 62	X-15 Flight (29 APR 62) chase pla
529 U/I	30 Jul 62	Ocean Springs, Miss
530 →	2 Aug 62	Liberal, Kansas 1. [illegible] 2. Jupiter
N531	8 Sep 62	Floresta, Argentine
532	15-28Sep 62	Northeast New Jersey
533 METEOR	18 Sep 62	Northeast Ohio
N534	3 Oct 62	Chicago, Ill
N535	25 Oct 62	Delta, Colorado
536 U/I	19 Nov 62	Tampa, Florida (17 NOV)
537	12 Dec 62	Amagasaki City, Japan
538	21 Dec 62	Angel Falls, Venezuela
N539	22 Dec 62	Buenos Aires, Argentina
N540	24 Jan 63	Lexington, Ky
541 →	5 Feb 63	Nr Washington, D C STAR
N542	15 Feb 63	SE of Melbourne, Australia
543	11 Mar 63	Oahu, Hawaii MISSILE
N544	11 Mar 63	El Sobrante, California
N545	12 Mar 63	Paine, Chile
N546	21 May 63	Nr Mt Gambier, Australia
N547	23 May 63	Sunnyvale, California
N548	16 Jun 63	Palmerston, North City, N Z
549	18 Jun 63	Niagara Falls, New York
N550	19 Jun 63	Burlington, Mass

TENTATIVE SECRET
FORWARD TO MAJCOM

NICAP CASES

CASE	DATE	LOCATION
N 551	21 Jun 63	Chicago, Illinois
N 552	26 Jun 63	Pine Crest, Calif
553	26 Jun 63	Rockland, Mass
N 554	18 Jul 63	Sunnyvale, Calif
N 555	20 Jul 63	Springfield, Ill
N 556	1 Aug 63	Garston, Herts., England
N 557	4 Aug 63	Wayne County, Illinois
558	7 Aug 63	Nr Fairfield, Illinois
N 559	9 Aug 63	Mount Vernon, Illinois
N 560	6 Aug 63	Sanford, Florida
N 561	13 Aug 63	Honolulu, Hawaii
N 562	13 Aug 63	Nr Ellsworth, Maine
N 563	18 Aug 63	Ft Kent, Maine
564	14 Sep 63	Susanville, Calif
N 565	20 Sep 63	Huntsville, Arkansas
N 566	26 Sep 63	Sunnyvale, Calif
N 567	4 Oct 63	East Hartland, Conn
568	23 Oct 63	Meridian, Idaho
N 569	31 Oct 63	Daylston, Victoria, Australia
N 570	3 Nov 63	Corona, New York
571	12 Nov 63	Port Huron, Michigan
572	14 Nov 63	Carson City, Nevada
N 573	20 Nov 63	Neche, N D
N 574	2 Dec 63	Grand Rapids, Michigan
N 575	5 Dec 63	Nr Carrasco, Uruguay

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UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS, THE CIA, AND CONGRESS

In December 1963, former President Truman was questioned regarding his role in organizing a secret panel within the government to collect vital information concerning unidentified flying objects and to keep him informed of any significant developments that would affect U.S. foreign relations and the balance of power with the Soviet Union. He was asked if he knew that the Central Intelligence Agency had engaged in foreign and domestic covert operations to secure evidence from various sources. He was also asked the embarrassing question 'Did you authorize Operation Majestic Twelve?' To which he replied, "I never had any thought about it after leaving office." He added, "It was not my intention when I set up the CIA it would be injected into strange activities of that sort." He was upset when this subject was brought up and it was sensed that Mr. Truman was being coy and evasive. When he was shown documents which he signed, he seemed very surprised and asked, "where did you get this?" He was told that they came from the CIA. He quietly and without further comment said, "Oh!" After some reflection, he said, "Congress was in for a greater surprise, for what legislators were asked to create in 1947...and what they thought they were creating...was an intelligence arm of the government. What they did was hand the CIA, by that I mean, the Director of Central Intelligence the authority to withhold UFO information from the public, including Congress."

This question was repeatedly brought /up, and as always, he was reluctant to offer any specifics regarding his role in establishing a secret intelligence organization dedicated to the UFO problem. Conflict arose within Congress when it was learned that several influential and controlling senators and congressmen had been briefed on several occasions by the CIA and the United States Air Force on just such an operation. Additionally, a Hoover Commission study expressed concern about the absence of congressional and other outside surveillance of government UFO intelligence activities. To the Hoover Commission, this lack of outside surveillance somewhat prophetically raised "the possibility of the growth of license and abuses of power where disclosure of costs, organization, personnel, and functions are precluded by law."

Yet, theoretically, constitutional control of Congress over CIA remains. With the burgeoning of the UFO intelligence establishment in size and importance, the question has arisen significantly on several occasions during the past twenty years whether or not Congress should regain some measure of real control over intelligence activities.

The issue of closer congressional surveillance came to a head in the first instance in Senate action early in 1956. The specific point at issue was whether Congress was to establish a standing joint committee on the CIA, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to provide a fuller and continuing look at United States UFO intelligence programs.

The CIA's UFO intelligence budget is concealed within the budgets of various government departments, mainly that of the Defense Department. The average member of Congress has no more knowledge than the average citizen of the annual expenditures or of the size and scope of CIA UFO operations. As members of the CIA subcommittees of the Committee on Armed Services and Appropriations, a few congrssional members receive occasional briefings on CIA's UFO operations from the Director of Central Intelligence (which of course is at his discretion).

Ever since CIA was established, the Director has been authorized and in fact directed to make complete disclosure of CIA UFO activities to special subcommittees in both the Senate and House. The CIA is at times completely responsive to their questions, no matter how sensitive. For example, during the first 12 weeks as DCI Admiral William F. Raborn was called to 17 meetings with these Congressional committees. The legislative log for the year 1965 shows that DCI or his senoir aides met a total of 34 times with four special subcommittees.

It is no surprise then that members of the national legislature who take seriously the constitutional provision that no money may be spent from public funds of the treasury without congressional approval, should become restless about the CIA's privileged position of UFO secrecy. Such unrest has had various manifestations. One was in Senator Joseph McCarthy's characteristic statment in the Senate debate: "I have roughly 100 pages of documentation covering...." Another, more temperate, manifestation of unrest was in the Senate resolution to establish a joint Congressional committee on central intelligence, introduced in the Eighty-fourth Congress (1955) by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana), with a total of 34 Republican and Democratic co-sponsors. This was only one--though the most important--of a score of bills before Congress at that time with a similar purpose.

The Mansfield resolution was reported favorably out of the Rules Committee on February 23, 1956, by a vote of 8 to 1, with Senator Carl Hayden (D., Arizona) dissenting. The proposal would have established a joint committee to have legislative oversight of the CIA. It was to be composed of six members from each branch of Congress. The core of its membership would have been those senators and representatives already serving as CIA subcommittee members from the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. The joint committee was to have a broad mandate to study (1) the activities of CIA; (2) problems relating to the gathering of UFO intelligence affecting national security; and (3) co-ordination and utilization of UFO intelligence by the various departments and agencies of government. All legislative proposals relating primarily to the CIA or to foreign UFO intelligence would be referred to such a committee for consideration. Senator Mansfield further proposed that the CIA keep the joint committee "fully and currently informed with respect to its joint committee activities." Of course, this proposal was not carried out by the CIA.

Arguments for a Joint UFO Committee

(a) Congressional surveillance has existed, since 1946, in the UFO atomic energy field, an area equally as sensitive as foreign intelligence.

(b) A specialized joint committee would "promote new confidence between Congress and the CIA."

(c) UFO studies of the CIA by ad hoc or temporary groups are not sufficient. The fact that most UFO reports and studies of CIA since its creation in 1947 have been highly secret has excluded Congress from details of CIA operations.

(d) A policy of "secrecy for mere sake of secrecy" invites abuse and prevents Congress and the nation from "knowing."

TAB B

Arguments against a Joint Committee

(a) Existing surveillance by members of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committee is adequate.

(b) Functions of the CIA are essentially executive in character. The agency serves the President, the National Security Council, and other departments in a staff capacity.

(c) ~~Cia~~ CIA has ~~been~~ intensely, repeatedly, and adequately investigated the UFO problem by various special commissions.

(d) The proposed UFO Committee as a joint committee raised a constitutional issue of separation of powers between executive and legislative branches. It was argued that since CIA undertakes UFO intelligence activities only in accordance with National Security Council directives, any congressional action which seeks to interfere with or pry into this relationship "would tend to impinge upon the constitutional authority and responsibility of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs."

(e) To compare CIA with the Atomic Energy Commission, or to use the atomic energy analogy, is invalid. CIA UFO activities was to be accepted "on faith." The CIA carries ~~in~~ on its work outside the United States boundaries. About this work only a few select members of Congress are advised on a "need to know."

Senate Resolution No. 210

...to keep itself fully and currently informed of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and other agencies of the Government insofar as the activities of such agencies relate to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. The committee's duties shall include, but not be limited to, review of intelligence and counterintelligence activities and legislative oversight of the coordinating of such activities among the various agencies concerned.

The CIA, it should be noted, was willing to supply the Foreign Relations Committee with substantive UFO intelligence information and had done so on numerous occasions. But it was adamantly unwilling to discuss "sources and methods" with the Fullbright Committee. If Senator Fullbright wanted to know, as he did in 1966, whether "Fullbright awards" had ever been used as "cover" for CIA UFO operations, the CIA leadership in 1966 was unwilling to discuss this or any other matter with him related to "sources and methods." Raborn explained that he had authority to brief congressional committees but discussion of CIA UFO activities, methods, and sources is another matter. The National Security Act makes the Director exclusively responsible for protecting the security of the sources.and

UFO SOVEREIGNTY OVER AIR SPACE
A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

Air space is that part of space subject to the sovereignty of UFOs.

1. The problem of this right of sovereignty is the underlying issue of this paper. I can draw two statements from this:
   (a) That part of air space directly above the territory of a state is subject to the sovereignty of UFO's.
   (b) No state can exercise sovereignty over space which is not directly above its territory.
2. The object of sovereignty is the air space above its territory, which appears to be bounded:
   (a) horizontally by a plane which has the territorial frontiers for its boundaries;
   (b) vertically up to a height where the word "air" can no longer be used. In other words, those regions of space where there is no air or atmosphere cannot be called air space.

It must not be imagined that the principle of UFO sovereignty over air space has been accepted without numerous failed attempts by air defenses and heated discussions among defense intelligence agencies. It has been the subject of great controversy; and has been undergoing evolution to the present time.

The problem took on a completely different aspect when the discovery of space navigation brought man face to face with the use of space by UFO's. The ensuing defense problem immediately focused on the atmosphere, and the UFO sovereignty principle of vertical property was brushed aside by the tacit admission of freedom beyond a certain altitude was recognized.

The sovereignty of the United States cannot be absolute or unlimited. It is justified by reasons of national security and of utility. The air defense of the United States has a legitimate right to interdict air navigation which poses a threat to its security, not only from a political or military standpoint, but also from the point of view of personal security of its citizens who might be injured by the fall to earth of these objects which have not complied with the necessary conditions for flying. But there are other reasons founded on the maxim of utility, since it is the United States which stands to lose the most from violation of air space above its territory.

What constitutes the greatest threat being the issue do not have complete sovereignty of our air space and the UFO also derives from this right to violate our established navigation of air space, and not only violate it, but has imposed whatever limits they deem appropriate. It has been felt among U.S. intelligence community that this power to violate does not necessarily imply total sovereignty, and that the UFO might only well be in engaged in challenging its existence without demonstrating its sovereignty.

THE STATE OF UFO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Since 1946, intelligence information regarding UFO sightings collected by various U.S. agencies yielded little in useful data that convinced authorities responsible for foreign intelligence operation that would provide a feasible defense approach to the problem. Thirty years later we find ourselves no better the wiser. The prognosis for UFO intelligence operations in the United States is not good and must be guarded. Reliable information about foreign situations and trends has never been more needed than it will be in the 1980s. There is a recent historical base and an existing functional framework for a UFO intelligence collection effort of top quality in this country. It has been allowed to fade into obscurity and mediocrity due to disbelief and inaction on the part of the defense establishment's fixation with practical measures to address a need to contain what it feels are more manageable threats. Yet at the approach of the next decade the Central Intelligence Agency and the other agencies in coordination with it are operating at a lower state of effectiveness and morale, and less public confidence, than at any time in the past 30 years. The future of U.S. intelligence is a crucial policy issue. The President, the Congress, and the people of the United States ought to give the highest priority to providing the kind of UFO data collection and analysis capability that an open society must have to survive and maintain sovereignty in a volatile and often surprisingly dangerous world.

I must admit that there is a good deal of understandable mystery associated with the phenomena, intelligence is a simple and self-evident thing. As an activity, it is the pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge; as a phenomena, it is the resultant knowledge combined with strategic intelligence, we might call the knowledge upon which our nation's foreign relations, in war and peace, must rest. In this sense, the overwhelming importance of UFO intelligence activity, the actor or agency, of the "resultant knowledge" seems self-evident. The United States, nevertheless, was almost totally unprepared for the dangers and stress of the 1940s in the field of intelligence, as in so many areas.

Now, once again, the United States stands on the brink of tragedy because it has not restored the damage done to the whole coordinated UFO intelligence collection program. The intelligence agencies have gradually wound down to a slow speed and a defensive posture, and in some ways they have come to a complete halt. Where we go from here, up or down is the pressing question. It seems the collection of UFO intelligence and its evaluation or analysis are seldom any longer questioned as legitimate and essential parts of the Washington bureaucratic process. Sometimes more scruples are expressed about wooing clandestine and illegal techniques of getting information but generally bureaucrats feel it is only fair game to try secretly to obtain UFO data is likely to affront our relations with those nations who are hiding it from us and might indeed affect the security of American institutions or lives. If national policy decisions are to be made, national efforts articulated towards a unified data base are clearly worthless.

5

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POLICY AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The major problem from the standpoint of intelligence has always been 'what to tell the president' and 'how much.' This has been the policy since 1947 when the NTK restrictions were imposed. In maintaining absolute secrecy we have deprived high level decision makers of vital UFO information out of fear that long ears in the White House would use this information for political gain. This absurd and paranoid mindset cannot be allowed to continue as long as an effective countermeasure remains untested. If national sovereignty is to be a reality in our atmosphere and space we must arm our national leaders with full disclosure of the facts as they exist and not a watered down hypothesis of 'they could be' or we think 'they are Soviet.' This simply does not serve our sovereignty and, most certainly, our craft. We have to face up to our shortcomings and cavalier approach to properly assess the problem and find a workable solution before we find ourselves caught with our pants down to use an old phrase. We do have a "historical base" to draw from and we do have an 'existing functional framework' in which to address the UFO problem. It worked for us before and it will work for us again. I propose that we reinvigorate the program that has been neglected and infused with new life and purpose. I propose that the MAJESTIC project in coordination with the Air Force's current air intelligence and space tracking system be once again a top priority within the Central Intelligence Agency and that the Nation Security Agency be allowed to not only collect vital UFO technical data, but be allowed to perform its own analysis if it proves to be more cost effective and advantageous to current intelligence operations. We can no longer afford the luxury of exclusive domain. We must allow evaluation to come from other quarters in the intelligence community and we must accept it as supporting data rather than raw intelligence. Our failure in 1953 caused us to lose precious information simply because a director refused to believe the data or a chief analyst was not convinced that UFO reports were of vital significance to the bigger picture of the Cold War. I further recommend that the Director of Central Intelligence be briefed in full when events seem to paint a clear picture of intent and that estimates be drawn up regarding foreign progress in evaluating UFO data and the obvious transfer of technology to space defense systems that could outpace us. Finally, I strongly recommend that a separate division be created with the scientific and technical departments staffed with qualified and knowledgeable analysts and intelligence officers to receive, analyze and summarize the data into a systemized data base with cross indexing to previous cases of proper evaluation.

I realize that such a proposal goes beyond the bounds of current operations and responsibility. I also realize the current political climate is not conducive to this proposed change of ????. recognize the threat and deal with it in a responsible and professional manner if we are to protect our air space, our people, and our sovereignty as a nation. The cards we are holding may not win in a game of poker and I think I would not want to be the other guy who may be holding the winning hand. What is required is nothing short of a total overhaul of our intelligence operations.

UFOS AS SPACE WEAPONS

I am not the first to suggest that some UFO's are or could be space weapons sent here to be deployed for either passive or active purposes. In 1928 dr. Hermann Oberth published a revised version of a technical study known as The Way to Space Travel that included among other things space vehicles and weapons of mass destruction. Oberth has also voiced his informed opinion that UFOs might well be such devices constructed by an advanced civilization sent here to not only observe, but interfere in Earth's political and military affairs. The role of such a phenomenon was shown by the incident of the so-called "Dark Satellite'. In 1959 an unidentified space object was detected in orbit by a US Navy space surveillance system. the Pentagon was reported to have been chewed out for failing to take the information serious as the space object was tracked for some weeks, and the possible threat which it might represent to the United States. The film recovery capsule from the failed Discoverer 5 mission of the previous August, had been deflected into a higher orbit instead of back down to Earth as planned. The implications, as we all know, were discussed at the highest levels in total secrecy.

To counter such a possibility, Project Black Eye was developed in March 1962 and was picked up by the New York Times in which General LeMay predicted that "beam-direct weapons" could be fired at a man-made satellite from across space and bring about the technological disarmament of nuclear weapons." The Soviets were already playing on these fears in August 1961 when he referred to space weapons that could be "directed to any place on Earth." This threat was echoed by Marshal Birysov, Commander of the Soviet Union's Strategic Rocket Forces who claimed that orbiting space platforms could launch rockets at any terrestrial target within the satellite's trajectory. We at the Office of Scientific Investigations knew that the Soviets did not have that capability but realized they were thinking along the lines of a Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems'(FOBS).

Such a system may have played a role in New Mexico in the summer of 1947 when a unidentified space vehicle was reportedly recovered by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Special Weapons Team after the space vehicle was disabled by microwave energy from several high-powered radar stations that had reportedly locked on to the object, causing it to crash and partially disabling a second which allegedly was recovered intact. I have repeatedly tried to gain access to documents supposedly existing elsewhere within the CIA's UFO files. As a scientist and astronomer, I found this most disheartening because since the early 1950's OSI has not been authorized to study the radar data while charged with the requirement to analyze all UFO data available to the Agency for proper analysis. This incident may have been the basis for Dr. Wernher von Braun's statement as published in Colliers 22 March 1952, Space Flight in which he theorized that small guided space weapons could be "launched from the [space] station…[and] could be accurately guided to any spot on earth." Perhaps this UFO space object offered the United States the most important and strategic advance in history.

Details of this and other incidents quickly came under a tight security umbrella as more sighting reports made it abundantly clear that an advanced weapons system was being deployed over sensitive defense and research establishments. President Truman and other leading members of the government tried to put a bold face on the prospect of U.S. defenselessness, with claims that anti-missile technologies were already at a promising stage of development. By claiming that flying saucers was a secret weapons development and placing a security curtain in front of the stories the military succeeded in convincing the Soviets for a while anyway. I remember President Johnson's crypted statements regarding the SAINI program as having the ability to intercept and destroy armed satellites circling the earth" and that they were fully "operational" and "on the alert to protect this nation." This was more of a ruse than fact. It did keep the Soviets fearful. This cover began to wear thin in the Kennedy psychological war of words and the Soviets began to call his bluff. In 1962 Kennedy issued a directive to the Air Force to accelerate the direct ascent anti-satellite program which was part of the Contingency Plan for U.S. Reaction to Soviet placing of a Nuclear Weapon in Space" drawn up by Raymond Garthoff in May 1953. The Soviet ABM program was discovered by the CIA in 1950 and Pravda confidently printed a disclosure made by Marshall Melinowsky in late 1961 during the 22nd Party Congress that "[T]he problem of destroying enemy missiles in flight has been successfully resolved." Even Krusshoev repeated the point that Soviet forces could now 'hit a fly in space.' "It was apparent to both sides that UFO incursions were best concealed through the use of "armed satellites" and "enemy missiles" as long as the elusive "UFO" continued to evade anti-satellite defenses.

The misidentification problem was also voiced by former DCI Hillenkoetter and warned that someday our response to erratic moving "satellites" and "missiles" would leave us blind and open to a surprise attack and possibly lead to accidental nuclear war. During the tense standoff during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, scientific and technical intelligence worked around the clock to secure as much data on Soviet nuclear capability and advise the White House and the military advisors at all our embassies on what we had in UFO patterns and characteristics. Our data warned that these objects could emulate radar signatures and trajectories that closely resembled what we knew of Soviet ICBMs and indicated that the Soviets would probably do the same. Fortunately, the worse case scenario did not happen. Past Defense Conditions Two alerts gave us enough information to draw this conclusion but still left our radar early warning system unprepared for last years air space violations of Loring AFB, Maine; Malstrom AFB, and Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; which brought our nuclear forces to standby alert. Air Force Office of Special Investigations ran out of possible plausible explanations for these incursions over nuclear weapons storage facilities. One fatal act of aggression could have resulted in actions taken by NORAD and SAC that would have brought us to the brink. And, I might add, in an exposed position, whereby Soviet intelligence could have read our response and contingency plans for nuclear attack if they had been able to. As far as I know, the UFO incidents did make some headlines and there were security leaks.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE NATIONAL ESTIMATE

Including Soviet use of UFOs in the National Intelligence Estimate, the single most influential document in national security policy making should be included as recommended by Lyman Kirkpatrick, former CIA Executive Director, who told several of us that UFO-type mechanisms of our government and that statements on Soviet progress in this area will affect us in the future.

The significance of such an estimate was well illustrated of the NIE prior to the 1962 airborne detection incident and the Cuban missile crisis which predicted that the Soviet Union was not likely to apply a policy of such enormous risks as placing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba. Fortunately the world escaped from the worst consequences of such a bad guess. During the UFO incident and followed by the missile crisis an estimate was hastily produced which warned that the Soviet Union might risk nuclear war through such action than give in to President Kennedy's demand that UFO decoy deployment be eliminated from negotiations and that the missiles be removed. Even more fortunate was the inaccuracy of that estimate. To illustrate my point, on 26 August, 1957, the Soviets announced the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile. This was "intelligence" of a high order. The uncovering of a secret UFO decoy missile was even higher. What was the significance, the reliability, of this information? Asked about it at a private meeting the following day, Secretary of State Dulles made the strange reply that the reliability of the discovery was anybody's guess and that the "intelligence community is making a careful study of the public announcement but was even more reserved about commenting on the UFO decoy project and policy.

Behind the scenes, the CIA had for some years been charting as precisely as possible the course of Soviet missile progress and knowledge of UFO tracking data. By making use of classified radar and other detection devices and such information sources as espionage and reconnaissance aircraft, intelligence analysts such as myself working the Office of Scientific Intelligence, had tried to, for example, keep a running score of Soviet UFO sighting and progress in missiles and in other significant areas. To our surprise, none of the NIE's mentioned Soviet UFO decoy use with their ICBM program. This was a glaring omission and a dangerously inaccurate estimate.

One of the chief problems of the intelligence community at the outbreak of the Korean War was that crucial intelligence was available from State, Defense, and CIA, but that these departments merely routed the raw intelligence around to the appropriate agencies without coming up with joint National Estimates. CIA, in particular, was criticized for "failing to fulfil its duty "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security." The important requirement that decision makers be proved with complete and hard estimates as to future enemy capabilities or actions was recognized by General Smith who assumed responsibility for the UFO program in 1950.

In order for national estimates to be broad in scope and defined in depth to include vital UFO technical data, I propose the following:

1. To periodically brief the President and selected members of the National Security Council on national security implications resulting from UFO misidentification.
   (a) The President, the Director of Central Intelligence, a member of the NSC, or perhaps amore likely—the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to render an informed decision on UFO policy in a proper context of defense.
   (b) To include in any NIE on Soviet UFO decoy capability, missile, warhead, and booster vehicle propulsion and range factors from OSI as augmented intelligence for final intelligence product.

2. Terms of reference be defined by the Board of National Estimates. This group can initiate study or as usually the case, tact in response to a specific UFO date request from an intelligence consumer.
   (a) Define the problem, divide into feasible components and then assign to appropriate intelligence agencies. Staff studies should include the Office of National Estimates and assign a representative to integrate material received.

3. A straight estimate be divided into two categories—the knowable and the unknowable.
   (a) Coordinate UFO data collection with Project Blue Book at the Top Secret level and forward to OSI.
   (b) Task military intelligence with requirements for forwarding raw UFO reports to OSI through the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
   (c)Coordinate feedback to appropriate intelligence agencies.

4. Ultrasecret net estimate handled by the NSC rather than the Board of Estimates or the U.S. Intelligence Board.

5. The Watch Committee and National Indications Center be allowed to alert CIA of any unusual or impending changes in Soviet power structure through a crash estimate when needed.

6. A Joint Committee be formed to appraise the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Material Assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee (MAJIC) in the coordination between CIA and authorized intelligence agencies concerned with physical and trace evidence recovery operations in foreign countries.

Past and current members of the Council of Foreign Affairs be brought in the intelligence loop on an on call basis to provide quick and ready reviews to hard questions regarding Soviet back channel contacts and sources on advancing Soviet and allied progress in missiles, spacecraft, launch vehicles, payload capability and political discussion among their scientific defense communities.

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THE STATE OF U.S. SOVEREIGNTY OVER AIR SPACE
A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

Since 1946, intelligence information regarding UFO sightings
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which appears to be bounded: due to disbelief and inaction on the
part (a) horizontally by a plane which has the territorial
measures to frontiers of its boundaries yet it feels are more
(b) vertically up to a height where the word "air" can no
Central Intelligence Agency. In other words those regions of space
with it where there are no air or atmosphere cannot be called air,
and with their space confidence, than at any time in the past 30
years. The future of U.S. intelligence is a crucial policy issue.
This has not been imagined that the principle of UFO sovereignty
over air space has been accepted without numerous failed attempts
by air defenses and heated discussions among defense intelligence
agencies. It has been the subject of great controversy and has
been undergoing evolution to the present time.

The problem took on a completely different aspect when the mystery
of space and of space exploration brought a new face to space and the use
of space by UFO's as the ebbing defense problem immediately focused
on the atmosphere, and the UFO sovereignty principle of vertical
property was brushed aside by the tacit admission of freedom beyond
a certain altitude in space relations in war and peace, must
In this sense, the overwhelming importance of UFO intelligence
of the sovereignty of the United States has not been [illegible]
be minimized, evident just [illegible] security and of
reality. Unrepeated [illegible] of the United States has [illegible]
flight to intercept UFO navigation which poses a threat to its
security not only from a political or military standpoint but
also [illegible] personal security of [illegible]
who might [illegible] fail to [illegible] which
have [illegible]
[illegible] conditions [illegible]
[illegible] the main [illegible]
as the United [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] space and the [illegible]

1. The problem of this right of sovereignty is the underlying
Air space is that part of space subject to the sovereignty of UFO's.

A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM
UFO SOVEREIGNTY OVER AIR SPACE

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THE STATE OF U.S. UFO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS SOLUTION

Since 1946, intelligence information regarding UFO sightings as collected by various U.S. agencies yielded little in useful data that convinced authorities responsible for foreign intelligence operations that would provide a feasible defense approach to the problem. Thirty years later we find ourselves no better the wiser. The prognosis for UFO intelligence operations in the United States is not good and must be guarded. Reliable information about foreign situations and trends has never been more needed than it will be in the 1980s. There is a recent historical base and an existing functional framework for a UFO intelligence collection effort of top quality in this country. It has been allowed to fade into obscurity and mediocrity due to disbelief and inaction on the part of the defense establishment's fixation with practical measures to address a need to contain what it feels are more manageable threats. Yet at the approach of the next decade the Central Intelligence Agency and the other agencies in coordination with it are operating at a lower state of effectiveness and morale, and with less public confidence, than at any time in the past 30 years. The future of U.S. intelligence is a crucial policy issue. The president, the Congress, and the people of the United States ought to give the highest priority to providing the kind of UFO data collecting and analysis capability that a modern society must have to survive and maintain sovereignty in a volatile and often surprisingly dangerous world.

that the National Security Agency be allowed to not only collect vital UFO technical data, but be allowed to perform its own

I must admit that there is a good deal of understandable mystery associated with the phenomena; intelligence is a simple and self-evident thing. As an activity it is the pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge; as a phenomenon it is the resultant knowledge. [illegible] combined with strategic intelligence we might call the knowledge upon which our nation's foreign relations in war and peace must rest. In this sense, the overwhelming importance of UFO intelligence activity, the factor or agency, and of the resultant knowledge seems self-evident. The United States, nevertheless, was almost totally unprepared for the dangers and stresses of the 1940s in the field of intelligence, as in so many [illegible]

[illegible]

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PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POLICY AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The major problem from the standpoint of intelligence has always been "what to tell the president" and "how much." This has been the policy since 1947 when the NTK restrictions were imposed. In maintaining absolute secrecy we have deprived high level decision makers of vital UFO information out of fear that some in the White House would use this information for political gain. This absurd and paranoid mindset cannot be allowed to continue as long as an effective countermeasure remains untested. If national sovereignty is to be a reality in our atmosphere and space we must arm our national leaders with full disclosure of the facts as they exist and not a watered down hypothesis of "they could be" or "we think they are Soviet." This simply does not serve our sovereignty and, most certainly, our craft. We have to face up to our shortcomings and cavalier approach to properly assess the problem and find a workable solution before we find ourselves caught with our pants down to use an old phrase. We do have a historical base to draw from and we do have an existing functional framework in which to address the UFO problem. It worked for us before and it will work for us again. I propose that we reinvigorate the program that has been neglected and infused with new life and purpose. I propose that the MAJESTIC project in coordination with the Air Force's current air intelligence and space tracking system be once again a top priority within the Central Intelligence Agency and that the National Security Agency be allowed to not only collect vital UFO technical data, but be allowed to perform its own [illegible] analysis if it proves to be more cost effective and advantageous to current intelligence operations. We can no longer afford the luxury of exclusive domain. We must allow evaluation to come from other quarters in the intelligence community and we must accept it as supporting data rather than raw intelligence. Our failure in 1953 caused us to loose precious information simply because a director refused to believe the data or a chief analyst was not convinced that UFO reports were of vital significance to the bigger picture of the Cold War. I further recommend that the Director of Central Intelligence be briefed in full when events seem to paint a clear picture of intent and that estimates be [illegible] drawn up regarding foreign progress in evaluating UFO data and the obvious transfer of technology [illegible] could outpace us. Finally I strongly recommend that a [illegible] division be created within the [illegible] and technical [illegible]

[illegible] to receive, analyze [illegible] the data into [illegible] base with [illegible]

[illegible]

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UFO's AS SPACE WEAPONS

I am not the first to suggest that some UFO's are or could be space weapons sent here to be deployed for either passive or active [illegible] purposes. In 1928 Dr. Hermann Oberth published a revised version of a technical study known as *The Way to Space Travel* that included among other things space vehicles and weapons of mass destruction. Oberth has also voiced his informed opinion that UFO's might well be such devices constructed by an advanced civilization sent here to not only observe, but interfere in Earth's political and military affairs. The role of such a phenomenon was shown by the incident of the so-called 'Dark Satellite'. In 1959 an unidentified space object was detected in orbit by a US Navy space surveillance system. The Pentagon was reported to have been chewed out for failing to take the information serious as the space object was tracked for some weeks, and the possible threat which it might represent to the United States. The film-recovery capsule from the failed Discoverer [illegible] of the previous August, had been deflected into a higher orbit instead of back down to Earth as planned. The implications, as we all know, were discussed at the highest levels in total [illegible] secrecy. *Pravda* confidently printed a disclosure made by Marshall Malinowsky in late 1961 during the 22nd Party Congress [illegible] such a possibility. Project Black Eye was developed in March 1962 and was picked up by the *New York Times* in which General [illegible] predicted that "beam-directed weapons" could be fired at a man made satellite from across space and bring about the technological disarmament of nuclear weapons. The Soviets were already [illegible] on these facts in August 1961 when he referred to space weapons that could be "directed to any place on Earth." This threat was echoed by Marshal Biryusov, Commander of the Soviet Union's Strategic Rocket Forces who claimed that orbiting space platforms "could launch rockets at any terrestrial target within the satellite's trajectory." We at the Office of Scientific Investigation knew that the Soviets did not have that capability but realized they were thinking along the lines of a Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) nuclear capability [illegible] all our embassies [illegible] the White House [illegible]

Such a system may have played a role in New Mexico in 1947 when an unidentified space vehicle was reportedly recovered by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project [illegible] rather the space vehicle was disabled by microwave [illegible] high-powered radar [illegible] the object, causing it to crash and [illegible]

[illegible] since the early 1950 [illegible]

[illegible] published in [illegible] which he theorized that [illegible] space [illegible] launched from the space [illegible] could [illegible]

[illegible] United States [illegible]

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Details of this and other incidents quickly came under a tight security umbrella, as more sighting reports made it abundantly clear that an advanced weapons system was being deployed over sensitive defense and research establishments. President Truman and other leading members of the government tried to put a bold face on the prospect of U.S. defenselessness, with claims that anti-missile technologies were already at a promising stage of development. By claiming that flying saucers was a secret weapons development and placing a security curtain in front of the stories the military succeeded in convincing the Soviets for a while anyway. I remember President Johnson's cryptic statements regarding the SAINT program as having the ability "to intercept and destroy armed satellites circling the earth" and that they were fully "operational" and "on the alert to protect this nation." This was more of a ruse than fact. It did keep the Soviets fearful. This cover began to wear thin in the Kennedy psychological war of words and the Soviets began to call his bluff. In 1962 Kennedy issued a directive to the Air Force to accelerate the direct ascent anti-satellite program which was part of the Contingency Plan for U.S. Reaction to Soviet Placing of Nuclear Weapons in Space drawn up by Raymond Garthoff in May 1963. The Soviet ABM program was discovered by the CIA in 1960 and Pravda confidently printed a disclosure made by Marshall Malinowsky in October 1961 during the 22nd Party Congress that "[T]he problem of destroying enemy missiles in flight has been successfully resolved." Even Khrushchev repeated the point that Soviet forces could now "hit a fly in space." It was apparent to both sides that UFO incursions were best concealed through the use of "armed satellites" and "enemy missiles" as long as the elusive "UFO" continued to evade anti-satellite defenses.

[illegible] of the public announcement but was even [illegible]

The misidentification problem was also voiced by former DCI Hillenkoetter and warned that someday our response to erratic moving "satellites" and "missiles" would leave us blind and open to a surprise attack and possibly lead to accidental nuclear war. During the tense standoff during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, scientific and technical intelligence worked around the clock to secure as much data on Soviet nuclear capability and advise the White House and the military to be aware of all countermeasures on what we had in UFO patterns and characteristics. Our data warned that these objects could emit radar signatures and trajectories that closely resembled [illegible] that the Soviets could [illegible] probably [illegible] happen. [illegible] Defense Condition [illegible] enough information to draw [illegible]

[illegible]

OMEGA

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES

[illegible] including Soviet use of UFOs in [illegible] technical data, I propose [illegible]
Estimate, the single most influential document in the National Intelligence
policy making should be included as recommended in national security
former CIA Executive Director, who told several of us by Lyman Kirkpatrick,
decoy projects are the most important documents that UFO-type
mechanisms of our government and that statements in the intelligence
in this area will affect us in the future more likely--the Assistant on Soviet progress
to the President for National Security Affairs
The significance of such an estimate was well illustrated to render
NIE prior to the 1962 airborne detection incident and the Cuban of the
missile crisis which predicted that the Soviet Union was not likely
to apply a policy of such enormous risks as placing nuclear-tipped
missiles in Cuba. Fortunately the world escaped from the worst
consequences of such a bad guess. During the UFO incident and
Followed by the missile crisis an estimate was hastily produced
which warned that the Soviet Union might [illegible] nuclear [illegible] throughout
[illegible] deployment of [illegible] President Kennedy [illegible] demand that UFO
missiles be removed. Even more fortunate was the inaccuracy of
that estimate [illegible] on 26 August 1957, the
Soviets announced the successful testing of an intercontinental
ballistic missile [illegible] intelligence [illegible] high order. The
uncovering of [illegible] UFO [illegible] was even higher [illegible] what was
the significance the reliability, of this information? Asked
about it in a private meeting the following day, Secretary of State
Dulles made the strange reply that the reliability of the [illegible]
[illegible] "intelligence community is
making [illegible] of the public announcement [illegible] discovery
more reserved about commenting on the UFO decoy project and policy.

(b) Task military intelligence with requirements for forwarding
Behind the scenes, the CIA for some years had been charting
precisely as possible the course of Soviet missile progress and
knowledge of UFO tracking data to [illegible] by making use of classified radar
and other detection devices and such information sources as espionage
and reconnaissance [illegible] intelligence analysts such as myself
working in the Office of Scientific Intelligence had tried to, for
example, keep a running score of Soviet UFO sightings and progress
in [illegible]
of the NIE mentioned [illegible] UFO decoy [illegible] to our surprise, [illegible]
[illegible] their ICBM [illegible]
[illegible] inaccurate estimate.

[illegible]

In order [illegible] estimates to be broad in scope and defined in depth to include vital UFO technical data, I propose the following:

1. To periodically brief the President and selected members of the National Security Council on national security implications resulting from UFO misidentification. [illegible] the First [illegible] liber(a) the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, a World, the member of the NSC, or perhaps more likely—the Assistant hinges on to the President for National Security Affairs to render understand an informed decision on UFO policy in a proper context of humankind defensible.

(b) To include in any NIE on Soviet UFO decoy capability, Some say missile warhead, and booster vehicle propulsion and range than all factors from OSI as augmented intelligence for final accomplish intelligence product; ones are misleading; more important than comparisons of temporary ones are of comparisons of quantity and quality of reference be defined by the Board of National Estimates. This group [illegible] study and usually the case, technology responsive specific UFO data requests from an intelligence consumer.

Sim(a) Define the problem, divide into feasible components and technology then assign to appropriate intelligence agencies. In all cases (b) Staff studies should include the Office of National were hardly [illegible] and assign representatives to integrate material some relatively minor changes. In our century, technology entered warfare in full force. In part, this was due to a new style of linking straight estimate be divided into two categories: the knowable and the unknowable.

Are (c) Coordinate UFO data collection with Project Blue Book technology burst on the the Top Secret level and forward to OSI. [illegible] great (b) at Task with the intelligence with requirements for forwarding grasped the UFO reports to OSI through the Office of the Director at best, of Central Intelligence rules—which relativity is not [illegible] (c) Coordinate: Feedback to appropriate intelligence agencies. specific quantum mechanics, to most people mean nothing—yet from [illegible] estimates should be handled by the NSC rather than the Naval Board of Estimates or the US intelligence community [illegible] unquestionably, [illegible] that out [illegible] is not the whole universe. [illegible] The [illegible] Committee and National Indications Center be allowed to alert DIA of any unusual or [illegible] changes in Soviet power structure [illegible]

[illegible]

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING DOCUMENT

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECT
IMPLICATION FOR NATION SECURITY
AND
HUMAN SURVIVAL

THIS IS NOT AN OFFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT AND DOES NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OR ITS EMPLOYEES NOR DEPARTMENT HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. CONTENTS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ADVISORY AND NO CLASSIFICATION HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN.

INTRODUCTION

In the years 1946-1955 I compiled information for a descriptive analysis of the United States intelligence community that had evolved in the decade since World War II. My attention focused primarily upon the Central Intelligence Agency. The result of my efforts, Central Intelligence, UFOs and National Security, was widely read in 1956. More than 20 years have passed since I collected all available material on "the UFO problem and the CIA" and timorously published it.

My purpose was to explore a major terra incognita of American government, the national intelligence community, the original role of which was to bring the main facts of the outside world of UFOs to the attention of policy makers. It was apparent that in this role the institution would be of crucial importance and great potential influence in decision making. Because of this, I felt that such an institutional phenomenon required as much description and analysis as its secret nature would permit.

A number of questions about such a study and its publication were raised then, as they will be now. It is possible to write a scholarly work on a largely invisible intelligence establishment the archives of which are tightly closed, whose directors and employees cannot be systematically interviewed and the product of which is almost always top secret. Is it in the "national interest" to collect and publish UFO material that is available assuming that this might give some future aid or comfort to present or future adversaries of the United States? What good purpose can be served by publishing this information? It was at once apparent that the CIA's new world role after World War II would demand a new system for decision making informed by a vast UFO/secret weapon information-gathering organization. It was also apparent, and most crucial in the context of the ideological confrontation between United States and Soviet powers, that the CIA and NSA was expected to enter into the back alleys of espionage and covert intelligence collection action. The proper UFO policy organization and system for control of this kind subsumed under an intelligence organization were bound to confront the United States with problems which would not be easily solved.

My assumption—bias if you will—about "the UFO problem and the CIA" should be stated at the outset. I believe that in the ?? contemporary world of an intelligence and code breaking system ?? required for effective decision making. The secrecy of the ?? apparatus abets its power and intelligence, is a source of increasing influence in any classified UFO intelligence system. As a source of great influence, intelligence analysis ?? operational systems demand the close attention of senior??? policy makers. Too little attention has been given to, and inadequate controls have been exerted over, the intelligence establishment since 1947.

No pretense is made that the following pages and sections give a full and complete "inside story" of the CIA's UFO intelligence collection and evaluation system, particularly of the overseas espionage and covert action operations. Of these, I shall perhaps never see more than the top of the iceberg, at least in this generation. But diligent compilation of less classified materials has allowed me to reveal the transparent structure and some of the unorthodox methods of a pervasive UFO intelligence system at work in Washington and around the globe.

Formidable difficulties exist for an astronomer on call who sets out to describe the history, structure and principal methods of UFO intelligence without compromising my secret involvement in the invisible world of the NSA. What I been allowed to do is to perform careful library intelligence that has permitted me to overcome many of these difficulties. I have never been an active member of the professional intelligence guild. Were I privy now, or had I been in the past, to top secret information about the intelligence system, security inhibitions would impinge upon my profession.

Fundamental problems exist in even attempting an accurate historical survey of certain kinds of intelligence experience because military archives remain closed to certain documents or have been destroyed systematically for security reasons. This problem is illustrated by Project Blue Book staff and the Air Technical Intelligence Center about the intelligence experience in investigating the New Mexico flying saucer radar detection near Los Alamos and White Sands facilities from 1944-1949. The files I have seen recounts how "Top Secret" intelligence digests containing the most up-to-date operational radar intelligence were destroyed as soon as they had been evaluated during certain periods of intense and reliable flying saucer incidents in that state. And even though two digests were kept for the record, one U.S. Army Headquarters, and one in U.S.A.F. Intelligence Headquarters, when Project Sign was terminated both copies were destroyed for security reasons not known to me. While one is prompted to wonder whose security may have been at stake, this practice was so common as to make unlikely an objective review of the UFO intelligence system and performance in many important past events. At any rate, this illustrates one aspect of the difficulty of scholarly research in this field. Nonetheless, the subject is far too important to be left unexplored. And on the question of whether this briefing document will aid the CIA's adversaries if it is published outside of normal channels or not, I am convinced that you know far more about the United States intelligence system than most observers outside the system will ever know.

While there have been a number of publications on the subject during the 1950's and 1960's, authentic works remain scarce, and bibliographic indebtedness will be detailed in footnotes and bibliography in the revised draft, but reference should be made to some groundbreaking treatises on UFO intelligence which influenced the development of serious scholarship in this and on my own writing on the subject.

Included are George S. Pattee's The Future of American Secret Intelligence (Washington, 1946), an analysis of World War II deficiencies, with suggestions for the structure of an intelligence system. Sherman Kent's Strategic Intelligence, written shortly after the Central Intelligence Agency was established, is an incisive discussion of intelligence as a kind of knowledge for specific UFO sighting evaluation, a type of organization and a unique activity. Dr. Vannevar Bush's Modern Arms and Free Men (Simon and Schuster, 1949), written for policy makers and defense science regarding technology's role in preserving democratic institutions and he? is believed to be now heading up the classified UFO study program. Roger Hilsman's Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe, Ill., 1956) remains the only attempt to explore the nature of intelligence doctrine among policy makers in Washington.

My original book, "Central Intelligence, UFOs and National Security, was the outgrowth of materials prepared for use by the Defense Policy Seminar of the Defense Studies Program, Harvard University, and thus my debt remains to the faculty and guest lecturers who participated in those seminars. This is true also for my Defense Program colleagues, notably Professor W. Barton Leach of the Harvard Law School, and including Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr. and Maury D. Field. Others who assisted me in various ways were Donald Menzel, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (ret.), and General Charles P. Cabell (USAF, ret.). Special gratitude is expressed for Dr. J. Allen Hynek, astronomer and consultant to the Air Force's UFO program and advisor to the CIA's Robertson Panel Report on UFO's and national security implications.

Office of Scientific Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
December 1976

L.C.R.

[redacted]

No. 128

FILE

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ORIGINAL

DRAFT

In the years 1946-1955 I compiled information for a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. intelligence community as it had evolved in the decade since World War II. My attention focused primarily upon the Central Intelligence Agency. The result of my efforts, *Central Intelligence, UFO's, and National Security*, was widely read in 1956. More than twenty years have passed. I collected all available material on "the UFO problem and the CIA" and timorously published it.

My purpose was to explore a major *terra incognita* of American government, the Central Intelligence Community, the original role of which was to bring the main facts of the outside world of UFO's to the attention of policy makers. It was apparent that in this role the institution would be of crucial importance and great potential influence in decision making. I felt that such an institutional phenomenon required as much description and analysis as possible.

A number of questions about such a study and its publication were raised then, as they will be now. Is it possible to write a scholarly work on the central intelligence establishment when the archives are closed, directors and employees cannot be systematically interviewed and the product, which is almost always secret, is in the national interest, to collect and publish UFO material that is available, assuming that this might give some aid and comfort to present or future adversaries of the United States? What good purpose can be served by publishing this information? It was at once apparent that the CIA's new world role after World War II would demand a vast UFO/secret weapon for decision making inferred by a vast UFO/secret weapon ...

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policy. organization [illegible] kind [illegible] underlying [illegible] organization were found to [illegible] which could [illegible] adequately solved.

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INTRODUCTION

My interest ... the ... pages and ... the full and complete inside story of the CIA's UFO ... collection and evaluation system, particularly of ... overseas espionage and covert action operations. ... In the years 1946-1955 I compiled information ... intelligence community that ... analysis of the United States intelligence ... My attention focused ... evolved in the decade since World War II. ... primarily upon the Central Intelligence Agency. The result of my efforts, Central Intelligence, UFO's, and National Security, was widely read in 1956. More than twenty years have passed since I collected all available material on "the UFO problem and the CIA" ... simultaneously published it. structure, and principle methods of UFO intelligence without compromising my secret involvement in the ... a major terra incognita of American ... My purpose was to explore ... intelligence community, the original role ... government, the national intelligence ... the outside world of UFO's ... of which was to bring the main facts ... It was apparent that ... of policy makers ... importance and great ... that institutions would be of ... decision making. Because of this I felt ... potential influence ... much description that such an institutional phenomenon required, as ... secret nature would permit, an accurate ... and ... of certain kinds of Intelligence expe... historical survey ... questions about such a study ... it is impossible to ... because ... they will be ... intelligence establishment ... scholarly ... whose directors and ... tightly closed ... interviewed and the product of ... employees cannot be ... in the national interest which is almost always top secret. ... that is available, assuming ... to collect and publish UFO material that ... comfort to present or future ... that it might give some aid and ... what good purpose can be served adversaries of the United States? ... by publishing this information? ... after World War II ... CIA ... informed by a ... UFO/secret weapon ... organization ... of the ideological ... the CIA and NSA ... United States and Soviet power ... foreign ... organization ...

[illegible]

UFO

No pretense is made that the following pages and sections [illegible] full and complete [illegible] of the CIA's UFO intelligence collection and evaluation system, particularly of the [illegible] overseas espionage and covert action operations. Outsiders shall perhaps never see more than the top of the iceberg, at least in this generation. But diligent compilation of lesser classified materials has allowed me to reveal the transparent structure and [illegible] of the unorthodox methods of a pervasive UFO intelligence system at work in Washington and around the globe.

Formidable difficulties exist for a astronomer on call who sets out to describe the history, structure, and principle methods of UFO intelligence without compromising my secret involvement in the [illegible] invisible world of the NSA. What I been allowed to do is perform careful library intelligence that has permitted me to overcome many of these difficulties. I have never been an active member of the professional intelligence guild. Were I privy now, or had I been in the past, to top secret information about the intelligence system, security inhibitions would impinge upon my profession.

Fundamental problems exist in even attempting an accurate also [illegible] historical survey of certain kinds of intelligence experience such [illegible] because military archives remain closed to certain documents which have been destroyed systematically for security reasons. This problem is illustrated by Project Blue Book staff and the (Air Technical Intelligence Center about the intelligence experience in investigating the New Mexico flying saucer radar detection reports from Los Alamos and White Sands facilities from 1944-1949. The files have seen records show "Top Secret" intelligence digests containing the most up-to-date operational radar intelligence were destroyed as soon as they had been evaluated during certain periods of intense and reliable flying saucer incidents in that state. And even though two digests were kept for the record, one U.S. Army Headquarters and one in U.S.A.F. Intelligence Headquarters, when Project Sign was terminated both copies were destroyed for security reasons not known to me. While one is prompted to wonder whose security may have been at stake, this practice was so common [illegible] make unlikely an objective review of the UFO intelligence system and performance in many important past events. At any rate, [illegible] illustrates one aspect of the difficulty of scholarly research [illegible] this field. Nonetheless, the subject is far too important to [illegible] left unexplored. And on the question of whether this briefing document will aid the CIA's adversaries if it is published outside of normal channels or not, I am convinced that you know [illegible] about the United States intelligence system than most observers outside the system will ever know.

While there have been [illegible] of publications [illegible] the 1950's and 1960's [illegible]

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Edward Teller's Pitch to President Reagan for SDI

I wish to bring to your attention of a very real and dangerous situation that threatens not only us, the world, but our very existence as a race. For over forty years I have been involved in developing advanced technologies in the defense of this country which would insure our security, freedom, and our form of government from surprise attack. As you must be aware, the Defense Department has initiated several space defense programs of vast proportions and at great expense. But there is a new and alarming development of which I am compelled to inform you of. A menace greater that the nuclear arms race exists. It does not originate here on earth but comes from space itself. The agent of mass destruction has no reasoning psychology other than the ultimate destruction of our civilization and our way of life as we know it.

Obtaining critical information of this menace has been hard and time consuming and the facts seem to be tangled among dark threats of ultimate destruction; our innate fear of the unknown has interfered with our ability to comprehend it. A space attack could be real in the near future bringing with it the truth that our inaction global war could be immensely accelerated. No longer can the United States be in the position which it found itself in 1947. This was realized and in January 1950 President Truman made the decision to go ahead with a defense program exceeding in scope and cost of the Manhattan Project. Late in President Eisenhower's office, several attempts was made to limit further development by prohibiting the testing of space defense weapons. A moratorium was entered into, a "gentlemen's agreement" whereby Russia and the United States concurred that testing be halted until further notice.

Unfortunately, secrecy and denial has prevented further work of which I now propose. A more detailed proposal is difficult to address in my brief, especially since I want it to be realistic and acceptable. Yet such a proposal is made here, both to give warning of what could happen and to begin a concrete discussion on the Space Defense Initiative program. The Defense Department could continue "classification" of critically key information of knowledge collected in 1947 and, therefore, its secrecy in its present form. Only a small number of documents might need to be kept secret for longer periods, but in those cases a few highly responsible persons would have to certify, year by year, that continued secrecy be maintained. What I wish to impress upon you is the need for absolute secrecy for the real reasons for a space defense. The real danger is the existence of secrecy can not be kept secret for ever. Our scientists will not turn to national defense unless they perceive an actual danger to the United States. A danger was perceived in 1939, only two years before Pearl Harbor. It is vital to the program that scientists should perceive the danger now, before it is too late. What is at stake is not only the prevention of defeat, but the prevention of cosmic war. Nevertheless, convincing the American people that military research is necessary is a difficult thing.

I am not speaking of another arms race, but rather a race of technology. One individual familiar with military technology and engineering of special intelligence, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., estimates that in 1960 the United States and the USSR spent equal percentages of their military budgets on space defense and research and development, while in 1974 that percentage was three times as high in Russia as in the United States. The quality of future space defense weapons depends more on research and development than on any other factor; the obvious recommendation is that we should spend more on it. Today we spend approximately 10 percent, so this recommendation does not seem too difficult to implement.

Space defense plays important roles in military affairs, particularly in communications and intelligence gathering. Both of these functions apt to become increasingly important in the future. An extension of our information gathering, including continuous surveillance of deep space, should have high priority. This could be done in two ways. One is to increase our ability to launch satellites of all needed varieties within a short time. The other is to provide decoys in space, thereby multiplying the number of targets the enemy would have to knock out. A combination of these two procedures could, indeed, avert the enemy from taking out all our space vehicles. A third possibility is to prepare retaliation against the enemy by destroying their space vehicles. But, at least in regard to the important item of information gathering, the enemy relies on stealth more than their spacecraft than we do; therefore emphasis on the first two approaches two approaches is recommended. In preparing decoys for space vehicles, the main objective would be for decoys to look like space vehicles that function like real ones. On the whole, this is not too difficult. Usually the main problem with a decoy is its mass. In order for a decoy to be inexpensive it must be light, but usually the light weight gives it away--for instance, in meeting air resistance, a lighter vehicle is more easily slowed down. Exceedingly little air resistance is encountered by space vehicles. Therefore, lightweight decoys for space vehicles are more feasible than decoys for almost any other application.

Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) have been developed and tested with marginal success. The possibility of RPVs exist for the enemy as well for us. The use of RPVs was first explored by the U.S. Air Force. It can also be applied to small space objects. An ingenious new circular airfoil design is now in experimental stage. A single wing is used in this design. Another design is also under development. This one uses a single wing as well, pivoting at its center at the fuselage. The wing is at right angles to the plane at takeoff and landing, but as the right wing points forward while the left points backward. A third design is the triangle-shaped wing and is the focus of intense development of which I have personal knowledge of.

There is the possibility that chemical and biological warfare may be used by the enemy. The fact that these forms of warfare may be inflicted upon us from space only fires my persistence in having the President consider my proposal seriously for a broad and comprehensive Space Defense Initiative.

There are several fronts which must be considered in my proposal to the President. We must boost spending in new, more powerful radar. We must encourage more research programs for lasers. And, we must investigate the use of microwave and pulse energy devices along with directed energy weapons in space defense systems. Particle beams are effective over vast distances and could aid in space defense against intruding enemy spacecraft.

Progress toward such an objective, since the end of World War II, has occurred in discouragingly small steps. Even so, we cannot afford to give up hope; we cannot afford to stop taking small steps. By the same token, we cannot afford not thinking of taking big ones. What I suggest is a big gamble but what if that gamble pays off through a major break through in technology? We have the talent. We have the means. All that is lacking is the political will and determination to succeed. We must not hesitate nor falter. I believe all that I propose is possible and can be done. I ask that you weigh the risks and the benefits and consider what the alternative offers if we fail.

Presidential Approval [ ] Yes
[ ] No

UFO TECHNOLOGY AND THE IMBALANCE OF POWER

by

Edward Teller

Today all on earth are close neighbors: the First World, which is liberal; the Second World, which is dictatorial; and the Third World, where changes are rapid and often violent. The fate of all hinges on the development and use of UFO technology. If we want to understand and influence the future, we should review and understand humankind's new tools.

Some say the generation just past accomplished more in technology than all generations to come. Comparisons of the past accomplishments with contemporary ones are misleading; more important than comparisons of temporary ones are of comparisons of quantity and quality. Probably the same will be said of the generation to come. If we compare the horse and buggy with a rocket to the moon, quantitative comparisons become arbitrary.

Similarly, old and new methods of warfare hardly affected by new technology are either analogous or easily comparable. But, in all cases we are talking about war and survival. The Napoleonic wars were hardly affected by new technology. The nineteenth century saw some relatively minor changes. In our century, technology entered warfare in full force. In part, this was due to a new style of linking extraterrestrial scientific ideas with terrestrial technology.

A revolution of ideas, ideas totally lacking in empirical knowledge burst on the first forty years of this century, a revolution so great that the vast majority of highly educated persons has not yet grasped the new ideas. To most of us the word relativity signifies at best, a maze of mathematical formula—which relativity is not. Terms such as atomic theory, hot and cold fusion, or the more specific quantum mechanics, to most people mean nothing, yet from these three sets of ideas, occurring entirely within one generation, have emerged developments stranger and vastly more important than the once revolutionary idea that our earth is not the whole universe, or even its center.

From the extraterrestrial scientific revolution of ideas sprang consequences of a different kind. Terrestrial science and technology have become twins. As a result, applied UFO technology is developing rapidly and in unexpected ways. With each new practical scientific application, new technologies emerge than can be used in warfare. There is no separation between UFO technology for peace and UFO technology for war, and I believe the two will remain inseparable.

Public awareness is more advanced in the case of scientific applications—in computers, for example. Exposure, however, does not guarantee comprehension. The consequences of widespread lack of understanding often manifest themselves as deep-seated fears.

We should strive to eliminate some common misunderstandings. The new events and possibilities are surprising, frightening, and large in scale. When confronted with something greater than ever before, the human mind frequently jumps to the conclusion that it is facing something infinite, something limitless. That conclusion is mistaken. When we are overly impress by progress in any given development, we lose our sense of proportion: we then enter the realm of what is called the unthinkable.*

SECRECY

Shortly after the end of World War II, Niels Bohr, the founder of atomic theory, made a statement I shall never forget. In the coming Cold war it would be reasonable to expect each side to use the weapons it can handle best. The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy. Secrecy, unfortunately, is habit-forming. We can scarcely imagine how we could get along without it. We should remember, however, that secrecy was actually of greater advantage to us when we had secrets to keep. Today, when Russia almost certainly knows all of our secrets, especially technical ones, is apt to have many secrets of which we are ignorant of.

Of course, if we reveal our greatest secret, the Russians will not reciprocate. Are we not, therefore, speaking of free energy applications to a revolutionary mode of transportation? The answer is in our hands secrecy boomerangs—instead of hurting our adversary with it we hurt ourselves.

The boomerang of secrecy is also at work in our relations with our allies. Annoyance about secrecy was a strong motive for de Gaulle to terminate full French participation in NATO.

Perhaps, the main reason for eliminating secrecy is make-believe? It does not for a free society. It affects our own law-abiding scientists, even deters them from participating in the development of super weapons. But secrecy puts no obstacle in the way of foreign governments determined to learn or rediscover the secret. To put it simply, a secret known to a million people, in fact, is no longer a secret.

When arguing for openness in extraterrestrial technology, I do not mean to actually throw open our laboratories to all foreign observers. The type of secrecy practiced by America's private companies does work. But the principles of discoveries should be open. There are no secret formulas, though the chemists sought them. (The one fact the alchemists proved was that science and secrecy are hardly compatible—except, perhaps, under the iron heel of a dictator.) What can be kept secret, at least for some time, is what we call "know-how."

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* "Greek fire," consisting of the irreconcilable elements of fire and water (actually a mixture mainly of unslaked lime, sulphur, and naphtha), which stopped the first Muhammadan onslaught on the Constaninople, was such an unthinkable weapon. It was secret, and it was outlawed by the Pope. The secret was kept much better than that of the atomic bomb. Similarly, the "fire" of an extraterrestrial type first proposed by Einstein was initially met with the same unthinkable skepticism until Otto Hahn proved its feasibility in a laboratory which sent shock waves through the scientific community in 1939. The splitting of the atom was considered "monkey shine" to many leading physicists of that day. Of course, since the theory was correct, and with a little guidance, inspiration and hard work, we did master the technique of fission with non-terrestrial metals and atomic transmutation of uranium and plutonium isotopes.

It would not be realistic to propose that secrecy should be abolished forthwith. We can, however, greatly reduce it. Today we are smothered by millions of "classified" documents. A determined move toward openness is firmly recommended. Its purpose is threefold: to stimulate research on military applications of UFO technology within our scientific community; to promote cooperation with our allies in the same field; and to inform the American public through various means the true state of UFO reality, so far as such knowledge can be made available to our intelligence.

A more detailed proposal is difficult to make especially since we want it to be realistic and acceptable. Yet such a proposal is made here, both to give an example of what could happen and to begin a concrete discussion on the important issue. We could continue "classification" of UFO documents and, therefore, secrecy, in its present form. But we could impose the condition that all classified UFO documents should be published within two years of issue. That would fully preserve tactical secrecy but exclude strategic and technical secrecy. A small number of documents might need to be kept secret for longer periods, but in those cases a few highly responsible persons would have to certify, year by year, that continued secrecy is required. The rule should be: when in doubt, classify.

MILITARY RESEARCH

We are not engaged in an arms race, but rather in a race of perfecting an integrated program of UFO technology. The former emphasizes the quantity of arms, the latter their quality and particularly the element of novelty. Comparison of quality would be difficult even in the absence of secrecy. Since secrecy prevails and since it is effective on the side of Russia, comparison becomes virtually impossible.

It is widely believed in this country that American and Russian UFO defense are roughly equivalent. In greater detail, it is stated that Russia is ahead in quantity and we are ahead in quality. It is somewhat disquieting that the Russian advantage lies in the area that is more easily checked, while we are supposedly ahead in those respects where verification is more difficult.

One individual familiar with military UFO technology and with Intelligence, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., (director of defense research and engineering for the Department of Defense for seven years under both Republican and Democratic administrations, estimates that in 1960 the United States and the USSR spent equal percentages of their military budget on UFO research and development, while in 1976 the percentage was three times as high in Russia as in the United States.

Actually, more money is necessary but not sufficient. First, a rapid budget increase is apt to lead to low efficiency. The change must be gradual. Second, more money can be spent well only if more scientific talent is available. Military UFO research is unpopular among scientists, partly on account of secrecy. (In regimented Russia, where scientists are not free to choose their careers, this latter argument is less valid. Actually, the Russian leadership seems wise enough to add inducement to coercion.) This is one reason why we should abandon or at least reduce secrecy.

But our scientists will not turn to national defense unless they perceive an actual danger to the United States. A danger was perceived in 1939, only two years before a UFO was captured and Pearl Harbor. It is vital that scientists should perceive the danger now, before it is too late. What is at stake is not only the prevention of defeat, but prevention of cosmic war. Nevertheless, convincing the American scientific community that military UFO research is a most difficult undertaking.

DEFENSE AGAINST UFO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

What have Russia, China, Sweden, and Switzerland in common? They all have placed great emphasis on civil defense as a countermeasure to nuclear attack. Anyone who seeks reliable and complete defense against nuclear attack will search in vain, but the two large totalitarian countries and the two small free countries just mentioned have found it worthwhile to take some precautionary measures.

In the United States a counterforce strategy, presently favored by many is supposed to destroy space borne targets, including UFO nuclear weapons before they are launched. Implementation of this strategy would be exceedingly difficult, particularly if our nuclear forces are not numerically superior and inferior to those of, say, extraterrestrial plasma weapons and EMP devices. Furthermore, our weapons would be apt to miss and accidentally hit Russian or Chinese territory because of poor targeting systems. Worst of all, preparation for a counterforce strategy could dangerously resemble the preparation for a first strike by the United States.

The idea is basically sound but fool hardy in its conception, and I believe it should be abandoned. One suggestion has been put forward. It is the "fire on warning." It would be prudent and wise to at least inform Russia and China of our intent, and, by doing so, might even be given support. It is conceivable that the alarm could be false. There might even be situations in which the Russians would simulate an attack to draw our fire. Above all, to fire on warning is apt to destabilize a situation that already possesses much too little stability.

RPVs AND MAN-MADE UFOs

Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) have been mentioned. Radiation with its continuing refinement, promises sophisticated remotely piloted control weapons. If UFOs can use elaborate communications systems information, pictures, accelerations, anything that can be noticed could be transmitted from a space vehicle to the decision making operation. We have attempted this kind of defense weapon in the past with marginal success. If control is to be exercised over short distances, high flying RPVs should be used instead of satellites. For these weapons, speed may not be so important; it might be more essential to equip them with the means of self-defense. Indeed, RPVs could play the role of a small fighter planes or small rockets to defeat an attack on the mother ship.

It is probable that these weapons of the future, designed for information gathering, and more expendable to include fighting or bombing, will be smaller, cheaper, more flexible, and more suited for other missions. It is important to note that such weaponry will not necessarily result in greater damage inflicted upon the enemy, but may instead result in damage inflicted where it counts militarily, but with minimal injury to noncombatants.

The possibility of RPVs exists for Russia as well as for us. But in this special category, there is one reason why we may be able to outdo the Russian effort by a great margin. That reason is that RPVs require electronics, and in this respect our technology is still superior to that of any country. Further emphasis on electronics is therefore recommended.

The use of RPVs was first explored by the U.S. Air Force in the early 1050s. It can also be applied to small naval vehicles and to small but effective tanks.

An ingenious new man-made UFO-type aircraft is now in the experimental stage of development. A delta wing is used in this design, pivoting at its center. The wing is a triangle configuration with vertical takeoff and landing, but at high speed the entire wing unit is pivoted; then what appears as the right wing points forward while the left points backward. Peculiarly enough, this almost asymmetric configuration works. Because the torques cancel at the pivot and effective pivots are easier to design, this compares favorably with present all wing aircraft where the needed pivot is under considerable stress.

This new design (based on wind tunnel models and UFO technical data) has been flown only as a small-scale experimental model and is not yet capable of carrying a man. It could easily be launched as a small RPV that could fly as high as 4.7 times the velocity of sound. This aircraft could also be developed into a full-scale passenger carrier, again demonstrating the close connection between wartime and peacetime technology.

The RPV, using advanced UFO electronics, may represent the right way to re-establish rough equivalence with the kind of technology exhibited in UFOs.

FUTURE WEAPONS

In thinking about future weapons, most people envision a sophistication of existing weapons. This unimaginative view has not been borne out by development during recent decades in which technology has become ever more important in military ????????? is always the practical use of chemical and biological weapons.

UFO TECHNOLOGY AND THE IMBALANCE OF POWER

by

Edward Teller

[illegible] possibilities are surprising. [illegible] scale, when confronted with something greater than [illegible] large the human mind frequently jumps to the conclusion that [illegible] something infinite, some[illegible] limitless. That conclusion [illegible] mistaken. When we are overly impressed by progress in [illegible]

Today all on earth are close neighbors: the First World, which is liberal; the Second World, which is dictatorial; and the Third World, where changes are rapid and often violent. The fate of all hinges on the development and use of UFO technology. If we want to understand and influence the future, we should review and understand humankind's new tools [illegible] of World War II, Niels Bohr, the founder of atomic theory, made a statement I shall never forget: "In the coming [illegible]

Some say the generation just past accomplished more in technology than all generations to come. Comparisons of the past accomplishments with contemporary ones [illegible] than comparisons of contemporary ones are misleading; more important [illegible] quality [illegible] Probably the same will be said of [illegible] quantity [illegible] compare the horse and buggy with a rocket to the moon, quantitative comparisons become arbitrary [illegible] apt to have many secrets of which we are ignorant [illegible] secrecy has to be reevaluated.

Similarly, old and new methods of warfare hardly affected by new technology are neither analogous nor easily comparable. But in all cases we are talking about war and survival. The Napoleonic wars [illegible] affected by new technology. The nineteenth century [illegible] our century's technology [illegible] warfare to full force. In part, this was due to a new style of linking extraterrestrial scientific ideas with terrestrial technology.

The boomerang of secrecy is also at work in our relations with our [illegible] revolution of ideas, ideas totally lacking in empirical knowledge [illegible] the first forty years of this century, a revolution so great that the vast majority of highly educated persons has not yet grasped the new ideas. To most of us the word relativity signifies at best a maze of mathematical formulas [illegible] relativity is not [illegible] atomic theory [illegible] fusion; nor the more specific quantum mechanics, to most people mean nothing. Yet from these three sets of ideas, occurring entirely within one generation, have emerged developments stranger and vastly more important than the once revolutionary idea that our earth is not the whole universe, even its center.

When [illegible]

From the extraterrestrial [illegible] scientific revolution of ideas sprang [illegible] technology [illegible] consequences [illegible] have been [illegible] science and technology [illegible] developing [illegible] applied UFO technology [illegible]

[illegible]

We should strive to eliminate some common misunderstandings [illegible] new events and possibilities are surprising, frightening [illegible]. When confronted with something greater than ever before, the human mind frequently jumps to the conclusion that [illegible] something infinite, something limitless. That conclusion [illegible] mistaken. When we are overly impressed by progress in any given development we lose our sense of proportion: we then enter the realm of what is called the unthinkable.*

SECRECY

It would not be realistic to propose that secrecy should be [illegible]. We can, however, greatly reduce it. Today we

Shortly after the end of World War II Niels Bohr, the founder of atomic theory, made a statement I shall never forget. [illegible] is threefold: In the coming cold war it would be reasonable to expect each side to use the weapons it can handle best. The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy; our [illegible] secrecy. Unfortunately [illegible] habit-forming [illegible]. We can scarcely imagine how we could get along without it. We should remember, however, that secrecy was actually of greater advantage to us when we had secrets to keep. Today, when Russia almost certainly knows all of our secrets, especially technical ones, [illegible] especially since [illegible] which we are ignorant of [illegible] secrecy has to be re-evaluated [illegible] to give an example of what could happen [illegible] If we reveal our greatest secrets, the Russians will not [illegible] Are we not therefore speaking of free energy [illegible] a revolutionary mode of transportation? [illegible] The answer [illegible] secrecy boomerangs — instead of hurting our adversary we hurt ourselves. [illegible] would fully preserve tactical secrecy but exclude strategic [illegible] A small number of documents might need to be [illegible]

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Perhaps the main reason for eliminating secrecy is [illegible] make-believe? It does not work in a free society [illegible]

MILITARY RESEARCH

[illegible] affects our own law-abiding scientists, even deters them from participating in the development of super weapons. But secrecy [illegible] governments determined to learn [illegible] in the way of foreign [illegible] secret known to a million [illegible] particular [illegible] novelty [illegible] comparisons [illegible] secrecy [illegible] openness in [illegible] technology [illegible] mean to actually throw open our laboratories to all foreign observers. The type of secrecy practiced by American private companies does work. But the principles of discoveries should be open. There are no secret formulas, though the alchemists sought them. The one fact the alchemists proved was that science and secrecy are hardly compatible--except, perhaps, under the iron heel of a dictator.) What can be kept secret, at least for some time, is what we call "know-how" [illegible]

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* "[illegible] consisting [illegible] irreconcilable elements [illegible] unslaked [illegible]

leadership seems wise enough to add inducement to [illegible]

[illegible] reason why we should abandon or at least reduce secrecy.

It would not be realistic to propose that secrecy should be abolished forthwith. We can, however, greatly reduce it. Today we are smothered by millions of "classified" documents. A determined move toward openness is firmly recommended. Its purpose is threefold: to stimulate research on military applications of UFO technology within our scientific community; to promote cooperation with our allies in the same field; and to inform the American public through various means the true state [illegible] can be made available to the [illegible] community [illegible] knowledge

research is a most difficult undertaking.

A more detailed proposal is difficult to make, especially since we want it to be realistic and acceptable. Yet such a proposal is made here, both to give an example of what could happen and to begin a concrete discussion on this important issue. We could continue "classification" of UFO documents and therefore secrecy in its present form. But we could impose the condition that all classified UFO documents should be published within two years of issue. That would fully preserve tactical secrecy but exclude strategic and technical secrecy. A small number of documents might need to be kept secret for longer periods, but in those cases a few highly responsible persons would have to certify, year by year, that continued secrecy is required. The rule should be: when in doubt, declassify.

DEFENSE AGAINST UFO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

What have Russia, China, Sweden, and Switzerland in common? All have placed great emphasis on civil defense as a countermeasure to nuclear attack. Anyone who seeks [illegible] complete defense against nuclear attack will search in vain. But the [illegible] countries [illegible] mentioned have found it worthwhile to take some precautionary measures.

In the United States a counterforce strategy, presently favored, is supposed to destroy space borne targets, including nuclear weapons before they are launched. Implementation of this strategy would be extraordinarily difficult, particularly if our forces are not numerically superior [illegible] inferior to those of [illegible]

MILITARY RESEARCH

[illegible] plasma weapons and EMP devices. Furthermore, [illegible] not engaged in an arms race but rather [illegible] perfecting an integrated program of UFO technology. [illegible] emphasizes the quantity of arms [illegible] the latter their quality and [illegible] be difficult even in the absence of secrecy. Since secrecy prevails [illegible] and since it is effective [illegible] virtually impossible.

I believe [illegible]

[illegible]

Actually, more money is necessary but not sufficient. [illegible] rapid budget increase is apt to lead to low efficiency. [illegible] change must be gradual. Second, more money can be spent [illegible] if more scientific talent is available. Military UFO research is unpopular among scientists, partly on account of secrecy. In regimented Russia where scientists are not free to choose their careers, this latter argument is less valid. Actually, the Russian leadership seems wise enough to add inducement to coercion.) This is one reason why we should abandon or at least reduce secrecy.

But our scientists will not turn to national defense unless they perceive an actual danger to the United States. A danger was perceived in 1939, only two years before Pearl Harbor. It is vital that scientists should perceive the danger now, before it is too late. What is at stake is not only the prevention of defeat, but prevention of cosmic [illegible]. Nevertheless, convincing the American scientific community [illegible] the military UFO research is a most difficult undertaking.

outdo the Russian effort by a great margin. That reason is [illegible]

DEFENSE AGAINST UFO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

What have Russia, China, Sweden, and Switzerland in common? They all have placed great emphasis on civil defense as a countermeasure to nuclear attack. Anyone who seeks reliable and complete defense against nuclear attack will search in vain, but the two large totalitarian countries and the two small free countries just mentioned have found it worthwhile to take precautionary measures.

In the United States a counterforce strategy, presently favored by many, is supposed to destroy [illegible] nuclear weapons before they are launched. Implementation of this strategy would be exceedingly difficult, particularly if our forces are not numerically superior [illegible] our nuclear [illegible] extraterrestrial plasma weapons and EMP devices. [illegible] weapons would be [illegible] and accidentally hit Russian or Chinese territory [illegible] poor targeting systems. Worst of all, preparation for a counterforce strategy could dangerously resemble the preparation for a first strike by the United States.

The [illegible] is basically [illegible] believe [illegible] abandoned [illegible] forward [illegible] at [illegible] would be [illegible] might even [illegible] be false. [illegible] is conceivable that [illegible] There might even be situations in which [illegible] would simulate an [illegible] warning [illegible] with marginal success. [illegible] to be exercised over short distances, high-flying [illegible] be used instead of satellites. For these weapons, speed may not be so important; it might be more essential to equip them with the means of self-defense. Indeed, RPVs could play the role of a small fighter planes or small rockets to defeat an attack on the mother ship.

It is probable that these weapons of the future, designed for information gathering, and more expandable to include fighting or bombing, will be smaller, cheaper, more flexible, and more suited for other missions. It is important to note that such weaponry will not necessarily result in greater damage inflicted upon the enemy, but may instead result in damage inflicted where it counts militarily, but with minimal injury to noncombatants.

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING DOCUMENT

The possibility of RPVs exists for Russia as well as for us. But in this special category, there is one reason why we may be able to outdo the Russian effort by a great margin. That reason is that RPVs require electronics, and in this respect our technology is still superior to that of any country. Further emphasis on electronics is therefore recommended.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The use of RPVs was first explored by the U.S. Air Force in the early 1950's. It can also be applied to small naval vehicles and to small but effective [illegible]

UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS

IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

An ingenious new man-made UFO-type aircraft is now in the experimental stage of development. A delta wing is used in this design, pivoting at its center. The wing is a triangle configuration with vertical takeoff and landing, but at high speed the entire wing unit is pivoted; then what appears as the right wing points forward while the left points backward. Peculiarly enough, this almost asymmetric configuration works. Because the torques cancel at the pivot and effective pivots are easier to design, this compares favorably with present swing-wing aircraft where the needed pivots under considerable stress.

[illegible] DOCUMENT AND DOES NOT [illegible] INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OR ITS EMPLOY[illegible] OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT [illegible] CONTENT [illegible]

This new design (based on wind tunnel models and UFO [illegible] data) has been flown only [illegible] scale experimental model [illegible] is not yet capable of carrying [illegible] It could easily be [illegible] as a small RPV that could fly as high as 4.7 times the [illegible] sound. This aircraft could also be developed into a [illegible] passenger carrier, again demonstrating the close connection [illegible] wartime and peaceful technology.

The RPV, using advanced UFO [illegible] may [illegible] way to re-establish rough [illegible] with the [illegible] exhibited in UFOs [illegible]

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REF: REQUEST FOR PHOTO IMAGERY INTERPRETATION YOUR MSG 292030Z OCT 80.
SUBJECT CASE NR: 8017D93-126 HQ CR 44

1. SUBJECT NEGATIVES/FILM WERE ANALYZED BY HQ IVT AND 7602 AINTELG/IT AND THE FOLLOWING RESULTS WERE FOUND:

A. NEGATIVE #1: DEPLICTING C-5A AIRCRAFT ON APPROACH AND STREAKING UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL OBJECT IN LOWER RIGHT PORTION OF FILM. FILM FOUND TO BE UNALTERED. SIZE DIFFERENTIAL WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH SIZE OF AIRCRAFT. CONCLUSION: INCONCLUSIVE

B. NEGATIVE #2; DEPLICTING CYLINDER SHAPED UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL OBJECT IN UPPER LEFT PORTION OF PHOTO. FILM FOUND TO BE UNALTERED. FILM SHOWED OBJECT TO BE CONSISTENT WITH FIELD DEPH AND CONSISTENT WITH RELATIVE SIZE OF FIXED OBJECTS. CONCLUSION: LEGITIMATE NEGATIVE OF UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL OBJECT. ~~BOLTON REINFELD METHOD DID NOT REVEAL VISIBLE MARKINGS [illegible]~~.

C. NEGATIVE #3: DEPLICTING IRREGULAR SHAPED UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL OBJECT IN SEVEN FRAMES OF 8MM FILM. BECAUSE OF THE SIZE AND APPARENT SPEED OF OBJECT NO FURTHER CLASSIFICATION OR CONCLUSION COULD BE DRAWN. FILM SHOWN TO BE UNALTERED.

D. 34 INCHES OF 8MM FILM: DEPLICTING APPARENT COLORED OBJECT MOVING IN FRONT OF STILL CAMERA. FILM FOUND TO BE UNALTERED. SPECTROGRAPHY REVEALED COLORES TO BE BASIC PRISM FEATURES. DEPTH ANALYSIS REVEALED OBJECT TO BE WITHIN 152MM OF CAMERA. OBJECT WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH RELATIVE SIZE OF FIXED OBJECTS OBSERVED FOR SEVERAL SECONDS IN FILM. CONCLUSION: INCONCLUSIVE.

E. ORIGINAL NEGATIVE DEPLICTING UNIDENTIFIED OBJECT. FILM FOUND TO BE UNALTERED. BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FIXED OBJECTS IN THE FILM, NO DEPTH ANALYSIS COULD BE PERFORMED. ~~BOLTON REINFELD METHOD REVEALED OBJECT TO BE SAUCER SHAPED, APPROXIMATE DIAMETER 37 FEET. OBJECT CONTAINED A TRILATERAL INSIGNIA ON THE LOWER PORTION OF OBJECT.~~ CONCLUSION: LEGITIMATE NEGATIVE OF UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL OBJECT.

2. REF YOUR REQUEST FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING HQ CR 44, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED: CAPT GRACE 7602 AINTELG/INS CONTACTED AND RELATED FOLLOWING: (S/WINTEL) USAF NO LONGER PUBLICLY ACTIVE IN UFO RESEARCH, HOWEVER USAF STILL HAS INTEREST IN ALL UFO SIGHTINGS OVER USAF INSTALLATION/TEST RANGES. SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, LEAD BY NASA, ACTIVELY INVESTIGATES LEGITIMATE SIGHTINGS THROUGH COVERT COVER. (S/WINTEL/FSA) ~~ONE SUCH COVER IS UFO REPORTING CENTER, US COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY, ROCKVILLE, MD 20852. NASA FILTERS RESULTS OF SIGHTINGS TO APPROPRIATE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS WITH INTEREST IN THAT PARTICULAR SIGHTING. THE OFFICIAL US GOVERNMENT POLICY AND~~ RESULTS OF PROJECT AQUARIUS IS STILL CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET WITH NO DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE OFFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AND WITH RESTRICTED ACCESS TO "MJ TWELVE". CASE ON BENNEWITZ IS BEING MONITORED BY NASA/INS, WHO REQUEST ALL FUTURE EVIDENCE BE FORWARDED TO THEM THRU AFOSI/IVOE.

4. REF YOUR REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. BECAUSE OF A CHANCE OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, NO KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL WITH SPA WILL BE PROVIDED. CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN YOUR MESSAGE, MILLER/FUGATE. BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF CASE, REQUEST THEY BE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AT REGULAR INTERVALS.

BTS XXXXXXXX
NNNS
DOWNGRADE 17NOV2020

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S E C R E T
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SECRET

THE "LOANED" AIRCRAFT WAS ACQUIRED IN 1945 FROM THE AIR TECHNICAL SERVICES COMMAND (ATSC, NOW AEDC, AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND). THE "S" AIRCRAFT WAS WAS DESIGNED FROM A AERODYNE RECOVERED IN 1941 THAT CRASHED IN SOUTHWESTERN MISSOURI AND ONE CAPTURED IN 1942 IN LOUSIANA. RE-CONSTRUCTION COMMENCED IN 1945 WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF GERMAN SCIENTISTS AT WRIGHT FIELD. PROPULSION PROGRAMS TRIED TO DUPLICATE THE ATOMIC POWER PLANT FOUND ON THE AERODYNE CAPTURED IN LOUSIANA AND INTEGRATED THE MAGNETIC DRIVE SYSTEM DEVELOPED BY TESLA. THE AAF HOPED TO INTRODUCE THIS CRAFT IN WAR, BUT RESOURCES AND MONEY WAS NOT AVAILABLE. FUNDING WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO R&D UNTIL 1946, WHEN LEMAY TOOK OVER THE PROJECT. THE S CRAFT COULD TAKE OFF VERTCALLY AND REACH ALTITUDES AS HIGH AS 90,000 FEET AT SUPERSONIC SPEEDS. THE CONTROLS WERE ELECTRONIC FLY BY WIRE AND THE PILOT LOOKED AT PROJECTION OF SYMBOLS ON A TRANSPARENT SCREEN. THE CRAFT WAS SO COMPLICATED THAT TEST PILOTS HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN HIGH PERFORMANCE AT VERY HIGH ALTITUDES. SEVERAL TEST PILOTS WERE KILLED AS A RESULT OF DECOMPRESSION AND EJECTION CAPSULE OR ESCAPE CYLINDERS WERE NOT DESIGNED FOR HIGH ALTITUDE EJECTIONS. AS A RESULT, ONE "S" CRAFT WAS LOST. THE MATERIALS USED IN THE CONSTRUCTION BY HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY FAILED TO PROTECT THE TEST PILOTS IN MAXIMUM THROTTLE SETTINGS AND EXPOSED THEM TO HIGH DOSE OF RADIATION WHICH RESULTED IN SERIOUS ILLNESS AND DEATH. TEST FLIGHTS CONTINUED OVER THE WSPG IN EARLY 1947 AT KIRTLAND AAF, AND AT ALAMOGORDO AAF TULAROSA RANGE WITH BETTER RESULTS TO FLIGHT PERFORMANCE, BUT EXPOSURE TO THE RADIATION FROM THE ATOMIC ENGINE CONTINUED. IN 1947, THE "S" CRAFT WAS MODIFIED TO CARRY ATOMIC WEAPONS OVER LONG DISTANCES. BUT HIGH ALTITUDE FLIGHT SIMULATIONS AND PILOT SURVIVABILITY WAS STILL A PROBLEM. BELL AIRCRAFT WAS GIVEN THE CONTRACT FOR A ROCKET-POWERED AIRCRAFT TEST BED TO RECORD FLIGHT DATA AT SUPERSONIC SPEEDS AS A PROBLEM SOLVING LABORATORY. DATA COLLECTED FROM X-1 AIRCRAFT WAS UTILIZED FOR DESIGN MODIFICATION OF "S" CRAFT AERODYNAMIC TESTS AT LANGELY. RADIATION PROBLEMS PROMPTED A CHANGE IN THINKING IN THE TEST PILOT PROGRAM PROMPTED A NEW PILOT "MODEL" EXPERIMENT USING ALTERNATE CHOICE OF SUBJECTS WAS APPROVED. THIS R&D PROGRAM WAS KEPT SECRET FROM OTHER COMMANDS AND SERVICES, AND WAS GIVEN SPECIAL STATUS EQUAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB PROGRAM. AT LEAST A DOZEN "S" CRAFT WERE BUILT AND TEST FLOWN. THREE WERE LOST DUE TO MECHANICAL FAILURE AND PILOT ERROR. TWO MORE "S" CRAFT WERE LOST ALONG WITH FIVE FATALITIES, THAT CAUSED THE AAF TO CANCELL THE PROJECT INDEFINITELY. ALL SIMILAR "WING" AIRCRAFT PROJECTED FOR SERVICE IN AAF WERE LIKEWISE CANCELLED IN 1949 AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF GENERAL LEMAY. FUTURE ATOMIC-POWERED AIRCRAFT WERE "PILOTLESS" AND WOULD BE CONTROLLED REMOTELY. THE AF WOULD NOT RESUME TESTING OF "LOANED" AERODYNES UNTIL PILOT SAFETY ISSUES WERE SATISFIED AND A MORE SECURE TEST RANGE COULD BE USED FOR AEROSPACE R&D PROGRAMS. AREA 51 IS BUT ONE SUCH RANGE AMONG THE SECRET TEST SITES NOW IN OPERATION. A SPECIAL RECOVERY AND SECURITY UNIT CALLED S.T.U.D.S., WAS CREATED IN THE LATE 1980's TO FACILITATE THE SERVICING OF NEWER "S" CRAFT FLIGHT TEST OPERATIONS. EFFORTS TO CONCEAL THE TRUE NATURE OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS WERE SUCCESSFULL IN THAT THE AF DEVISED A COVER INTELLIGENCE PROJECT CALLED BLUE BOOK. PROJECT BLUE BOOK, AS A COVER PROJECT, WAS CONTROLLED BY THE CIA TO PROTECT AF TEST FLIGHT OPERATIONS FROM SPECULATION BY THE PUBLIC, AND CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT USAF HAD NO AIRCRAFT CAPABLE OF FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS AND MANEUVERS AS OBSERVED AND REPORTED TO BLUE BOOK AND THE USAF UFO PROGRAM. IN 1958, PROJECT UFO AND MOON DUST WERE ACTIVATED WHEN USA INTERPLANETARY PHENOMENA UNIT OPERATIONS CEASED AND CIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR UFO SECURITY WAS TRANSFERED TO USAFOSI.

RECONSTRUCTED DRAWING OF A UNIDENTIFIED AERODYNE FOUND ON JULY 5 1947, SOUTH OF SOCORRO, NEW MEXICO, BY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT.



APPROXIMATELY 100 FEET IN LENGTH
WIDTH OF CHIME IN AFT PORTION WAS APPROXIMATELY 60 FEET
CHIME RAN THE LENGTH OF AERODYNE
SKIN WAS SMOOTH. NO RIVETS, BOLTS, SEAMS, OR WELDS. LIKE PLASTIC.
NO CANOPY, WINDOWS. NO DOORS, INTAKES, EXHAUST.
MATERIAL WAS NOT INERT.
PROPULSION BELIEVED TO BE ATOMIC.
SILVER-GRAY IN COLOR WITH DARK CHIME SURFACES.
SADDLE SHAPE IN AFT SECTION AND SPEAR SHAPED NOSE.
NO LANDING GEAR WAS OBSERVED. EMBEDDED IN DESERT SAND.NOT DAMAGED..
TRANSPORTED TO ALAMOGORDO ARMY AIR FIELD.

DRAWING APPROVED BY
THOMAS CANTWHEEL
1-30-96

Thomas Cantwheel

RECEIVED
June 6, 1996

June 5, 1996

At my father's request I'm sending this print package. Like my father I served in the Intelligence Community. I'm a retired CIA employee with thirty years in CI under Jim Angleton. There are clues to be found in these documents. I can say no more. Good luck.

Salina

[redacted]

(RY) copy

TOP SECRET [redacted]

CATEGORY = 12

MESSAGE = 12697232

DL #3421 1411123

[redacted]

"WORLD DESK"

YNYN EEI LAN ANL EXC OPC UTY OCS MDI SHP SOL XP A "51"
R 1411123Z NOV 98
FM [redacted]
TO MAJSEC
REM

TOP SECRET MAJESTIC-12/33, CITE 337882. WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIEVED FROM A CONTROLLED CLANDESTINE INTERCEPT AND IS FORWARDED AS AN EVALUATED REPORT NO. 112-98 DATE OF INFORMATION: AS INDICATED RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SCIENTIST IN CHARGE OF PROJECT "KOHTPOA" EQUIVELANT TO SDI WAS ASSASSINATED AFTER UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF PROJECT TO US COUNTERPART
TTCC

1. IN MOSCOW-S4 33 OF NOV 98, CODE NAME 'MAJ' MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY SPOKE WITH US COUNTERPART CODE NAME 'JOSHUA'. 2. 'MAJ': " WE HAVE EXPERIENCED PARETO IN KOHTPOA AND CANNOT GO ANY FURTHER WITH TEST. WHAT ARE YOUR RESULTS? OUR GROUP REQUIRES YOUR DATA FOR COMPARISON. CAN YOU ARRANGE IT? OUR RESULTS WHERE LESS SPECTACULAR WITH VERONEZ SITE AND GENERATED DISCLOSURE TO MOD AND KGB OFFICIALS. WE HAD HOPED FOR POSITIVE CONTACT BUT WAS NOT TO BE. WE COULDN'T KEEP PRESS OUT OF IT. DID YOU EXPERIENCE THE SAME AT DREAMLAND?" 3. 'JOSHUA': "WE MET WITH SIMILAR RESULTS SOMEWHAT ON THE POSITIVE SIDE BUT CONTACT PROVED ELUSIVE AND WE'RE NOT SURE OUR EFFORTS ARE PAYING OFF AS WE HAD HOPED. AS YOU KNOW, AREA 54 AND 17 ARE NOT SEALED OFF FROM PUBLIC SNOOPING AND MEDIA COVERAGE IS GROWING OVER 95 LEAKS BY TELLER. SAGAN TRIED TO SWAY QUALITY CONTROL TO RELOCATE BUT WERE NOT CONVINCED IT WOULD MATTER IN LIGHT OF OUR RECENT DOWN SIZING. I'M SORRY TO HEAR THE BAD NEWS BUT THERE IS LITTLE I CAN DO ON MY END. CONTROL IS ABSOLUTE AND MJ GROUP IS SEEKING NEW FUNDING BEFORE THE CHINA PROBLEM SURFACES. I SUGGEST YOU TRY CONTACTING '33' INVESTORS AS THEY ARE OPEN TO NEW VENTURES OF OUR TYPE. IMF WOULD MAKE THE LOAN IF YELTSIN COOPERATES AND STAYS OUT OF YUGOSLAVIA." CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, CATEGORY E2. IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. #3421

Bowdin took funds

TOP SECRET [redacted]

-2 "Chiny" not to recieve this. ~~Send to~~ FAX Q — 949-631-3561
"Beaver" is in trouble.